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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
SECONDARY STAKEHOLDERS AS AGENTS OF INFLUENCE: THREE ESSAYS 
ON POLITICAL RISK, REPUTATION, AND MULTINATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
by 
David Adam Wernick 
Florida International University, 2011 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Sumit Kundu, Major Professor 
Organizational researchers have recently taken an interest in the ways in which social 
movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other secondary stakeholders 
attempt to influence corporate behavior. Scholars, however, have yet to carefully probe 
the link between secondary stakeholder legal action and target firm stock market 
performance. This is puzzling given the sharp rise in NGO-initiated civil lawsuits against 
corporations in recent years for alleged overseas human rights abuses and environmental 
misconduct. Furthermore, few studies have considered how such lawsuits impact a target 
firm’s intangible assets, namely its image and reputation. Structured in the form of three 
essays, this dissertation examined the antecedents and consequences of secondary 
stakeholder legal activism in both conceptual and empirical settings.  
 Essay One argued that conventional approaches to understanding political risk fail 
to account for the reputational risks to multinational enterprises (MNEs) posed by 
transnational networks of human rights NGOs employing litigation-based strategies. It 
offered a new framework for understanding this emerging challenge to multinational 
corporate activity. Essay Two empirically tested the relationship between the filing of 
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human rights-related civil lawsuits and corporate stock market performance using an 
event study methodology and regression analysis. The statistical analysis performed 
showed that target firms experience a significant decline in share price upon filing and 
that both industry and nature of the lawsuit are significantly and negatively related to 
shareholder wealth. Essay Three drew upon social movement and social identity theories 
to develop and test a set of hypotheses on how secondary stakeholder groups select their 
targets for human rights-related civil lawsuits. The results of a logistic regression model 
offered support for the proposition that MNE targets are chosen based on both interest 
and identity factors. The results of these essays suggest that legal action initiated by 
secondary stakeholder groups is a new and salient threat to multinational business and 
that firms doing business in countries with weak political institutions should factor this 
into corporate planning and take steps to mitigate their exposure to such risks.   
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I. Introduction 
 In his seminal book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970) economist Albert O. 
Hirschman theorized that when confronted with declining performance on the part of an 
entity with which they have a relationship -- whether a business, government, or political 
party – individuals and organizations choose to either withdraw from the relationship 
(i.e., exit), repair it through communication or protest (i.e., voice), or remain quiescent 
(i.e., loyalty). In recent years sociologists and organizational scholars have invoked 
Hirschman’s framework to explain how social movements, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and other activist groups use “voice” to promote institutional 
change (Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005), and influence corporate policies (King & 
Soule, 2007; Rao, 2009).  
 Hirschman’s ideas have had particular resonance with organizational researchers, 
who have sought to marry his framework with stakeholder theory (King & Soule, 2007; 
King, 2008; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Lenox & Eesley, 2009). Stakeholder theory 
(Freeman, 1984) identifies activist groups as secondary stakeholders, which, unlike 
primary stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, customers, employees, suppliers, and 
regulators), have neither a transactional relationship with the firm nor legal authority over 
it (Clarkson, 1995). Moreover, the firm is not dependent on secondary stakeholders for its 
survival (Frooman, 1999). As such, these groups should have limited influence over 
corporate decision-makers, who are typically attuned to the interests and demands of 
more salient stakeholders – those with power, legitimacy, and urgency (Mitchell, Agle, & 
Wood, 1997). And while secondary stakeholders face considerable obstacles in their 
dealings with corporations (Clarkson, 1995), by skillfully leveraging human resources 
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(Yaziji & Doh, 2009), information technology (Hart & Sharma, 2004), and relationships 
with the media, investors, and other stakeholders (Frooman, 1999), they have often been 
able to advance their agendas (Doh & Teegen, 2003; Soule, 2009; Spar & LaMure, 2003; 
Yaziji & Doh, 2009).  
 Meanwhile, since NGOs tend to enjoy high levels of legitimacy (Yaziji, 2004), 
they have increasingly become highly sought after partners by firms seeking to burnish 
their images, enhance their reputations, and protect their brand equity (Dahan, Doh, 
Oetzel, and Yaziji, 2010; Yaziji & Doh, 2009). Given the proliferation of NGOs in recent 
years, the growing scope of their activities, and the increasing complexity of the ties 
between firms and NGOs – both adversarial and cooperative -- a more nuanced 
understanding of secondary stakeholder activism and its relationship to multinational 
financial performance is clearly warranted. This dissertation aims to provide such an 
understanding.  
 Structured in the form of three essays, this dissertation examines the antecedents 
and consequences of secondary stakeholder legal activism in both conceptual and 
empirical settings. Essay One situates the phenomena within the international business 
and strategy literatures on political risk (Kobrin, 1982; Wells, 1998; Oetzel, 2005), and 
the sociology-based literature on social risk (Yaziji, 2005; Yaziji & Doh, 2009). It argues 
that both frameworks offer important insights into secondary stakeholder legal activism, 
but that each ultimately falls short in key areas, thereby necessitating new theorizing. It 
puts forth a new conceptual construct – transnational legal risk – to explain the emerging 
threat to multinational enterprises (MNEs) posed by transnational human rights networks 
and offers implications for theory and practice. 
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 Essay Two empirically tests the relationship between the filing of human-rights 
related lawsuits and MNE stock market performance. Using an event study methodology 
and regression analysis, it shows that target firms experience a significant decline in share 
price upon filing and that both industry and nature of the lawsuit have a significant and 
negative relationship to shareholder wealth. 
 Essay Three explores the issue of why certain firms are targeted for anti-corporate 
campaigns while others escape scrutiny. Drawing upon social movement and social 
identity theories, the study develops and tests a set of hypotheses on how stakeholder 
groups select their targets for human-rights related lawsuits. Support is found for the idea 
that MNE targets are selected based on both interest and identity factors, including social 
performance and financial performance. Conclusions and implications for practice are 
drawn. 
 
Essay 1 – Transnational Legal Activism: A New Form of Political Risk? 
 
 This essay begins by reviewing two recent cases of North American MNEs that 
have been targeted by activist groups over alleged misconduct in developing countries – 
Chevron and Talisman Energy. In both cases the companies were sued in U.S. federal 
courts under a formerly obscure 1789 legal statute known as the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS), which allows foreign individuals to file civil lawsuits against former government 
officials, private individuals, and corporations for serious violations of international law. 
The ATS has been used since the mid-1990s to sue MNEs, with more than 100 cases 
filed, involving over 150 corporate defendants (Drimmer, 2010). High-profile ATS cases 
have involved allegations of MNE support for genocide and ethnic cleansing in Sudan 
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(Kobrin, 2005), repression against non-violent protesters occupying an offshore oil 
platform in Nigeria (Frynas, 2004), aiding and abetting forced labor, torture, rape and 
other crimes against humanity as part of a natural gas pipeline project in Burma (Spar & 
LaMure, 2003), and complicity in extrajudicial killings of trade union leaders at beverage 
bottling plants and coal mines in Colombia (Shamir, 2004). In addition to contesting 
these lawsuits inside the courtroom, both Chevron and Talisman have been targeted by 
activists with boycotts, protests, shareholder resolutions, and other extra-legal tactics. 
These cases are part of a growing trend of transnational legal activism, instigated by U.S. 
and European NGOs to pressure MNEs with operations in the developing world – 
particularly large natural resource firms -- to change their business practices and make 
other concessions (Drimmer, 2010).  
 But from the firm’s perspective, does the prospect of being sued in U.S. courts for 
alleged human rights violations and other misconduct in foreign countries represent a 
type of political risk? An argument could certainly be made that it does based on the 
classical international business (IB) literature on the topic (e.g., Robock, 1971; Kobrin, 
1982; Simon, 1984). Yet the political risk literature focuses on governmental actions 
(e.g., expropriations and discriminatory policies) in the host country as the chief source of 
firm-level risk (de la Torre & Neckar, 1988; Henisz & Zelner, 2003, Wells, 1998), 
whereas the emerging threat of legal activism emanates primarily from non-governmental 
actors in the home country or in multiple countries. In addition, the political risk literature 
tends to focus on the direct operational costs of government interference, whereas the 
new threat of legal activism involves both direct and indirect costs, such as damage to 
corporate images, reputations, and brands (Drimmer & Lamorre, 2011).  
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 The literature on “social risk” (Yazjij, 2005; Yaziji & Doh, 2009) calls attention 
to these indirect costs of activism, as well as the unique pathway in which influence is 
exerted – from secondary stakeholder groups to the firm via the intermediary of “critical 
players” (e.g., public pension funds, customers, the media, regulators, the courts, and the 
general public). Yet the social risk literature, for all its merits, tends to ignore the direct 
costs of activism and focuses primarily on NGO mobilization in the developed world, 
rather than mobilization by transnational networks of activist groups spanning multiple 
nations. 
 In addition to reviewing and synthesizing these literatures on political and social 
risk, this first essay provides an overview of the origins and evolution of corporate ATS 
litigation, along with an analysis of the NGOs that have pioneered its use and the legal 
and extra-legal tactics they routinely employ to gain leverage over their corporate targets. 
A new conceptual construct – transnational legal risk – is offered to explain the emerging 
threat to MNEs posed by these networks. The essay concludes with implications for 
theory and practice. 
 
 
Essay 2: Secondary Stakeholder Legal Action and Stock Market Performance: An Event 
Study of Alien Tort Statue Litigation Filed Against Multinational Enterprises: 1993-2010 
 
 A growing body of empirical research has emerged in recent years that examines 
the relationship between shareholder wealth and stakeholder influence tactics such as 
boycotts (Pruitt & Friedman, 1986; King, 2008), protests (Epstein & Schnietz, 2002; 
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King & Soule, 2007), letter-writing campaigns (Smith & Cooper-Martin, 1997), 
divestitures (Davidson, Worrell, & El-Jelly, 1995), and shareholder (proxy) resolutions 
(Reid & Toffel, 2009; Doh, Howton, Howton, & Siegel, 2010). Yet scholars have 
devoted scarce attention to empirically measuring the stock market’s reaction to 
stakeholder-initiated civil lawsuits. This is surprising since stakeholder groups are 
increasingly employing civil litigation as a central pillar of their anti-corporate campaigns 
(Kurlantzick, 2004). Moreover, one of the few studies to examine corporate response to a 
variety of stakeholder tactics including civil lawsuits found that they were more likely to 
elicit concessions than any other tactic (Eesley & Lenox, 2006).  
 Given that corporate share price is a widely accepted benchmark for assessing 
managerial performance, if the filing of civil lawsuits is associated with a loss of 
shareholder wealth, then managers might have an incentive to engage with stakeholder 
groups and settle these complaints before they result in litigation, or undertake corporate 
citizenship initiatives (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006) that might make the firm less of a 
target in the first place. Conversely, if no relationship exists between the filing of these 
lawsuits and corporate share price, firms might choose to ignore them and let the legal 
process run its course. Either way, the question of whether secondary stakeholder-
initiated litigation is related to corporate share price has great relevance for multinational 
strategy. 
 This essay employed an event study methodology to investigate whether the filing 
of civil lawsuits under the ATS are related to target firm stock price.  Research was 
gathered on all ATS lawsuits filed against MNEs from 1993 to 2010 using Lexis-Nexis 
and Westlaw legal databases of Federal civil lawsuits. Daily stock price data was 
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collected from the CRSP database at the University of Chicago. The study controlled for 
market-wide fluctuations in stock price returns which could occur for reasons unrelated to 
the filing of the lawsuits.  
 Statistical analysis showed that lawsuit filings are significantly and negatively 
related to target firm share prices during certain event windows. In addition, regression 
analysis indicated that cases alleging labor violations are associated with a significant 
loss of shareholder wealth, as are cases involving extractive companies. It was concluded 
that given the current legal environment, firms with existing investments in developing 
countries need to be vigilant about monitoring the activities and practices of their 
overseas subsidiaries and business partners, while firms contemplating major investments 
should think twice, as some potentially profitable opportunities may be so fraught with 
risk that they do not merit the investment.  
Essay 3: Is It Who They Are or What They Do? Understanding the Factors that Predict 
Extractive Firm Vulnerability to Secondary Stakeholder-Initiated Human Rights 
Litigation 
 
 Notwithstanding the recent interest amongst organizational scholars in secondary 
stakeholder activism (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Gardberg & Newburry, 2010; King & 
Soule, 2007), the question of why particular firms become targets of activist pressure 
while others fly below the radar has only received limited attention in the management 
literature (Whetten, Rands, & Godfrey, 2002).  
 Rowley and Moldoveneau (2003) have proposed that anti-corporate activists are 
driven by two distinct sets of factors: interest-based motivations and identity-based 
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motivations. The former pertain to issues these groups hold to be important, including 
conservation, social justice, and non-discrimination in the workplace. Identity-based 
factors, by contrast, relate to the organizational imperative to foster solidarity and 
collective identity. If stakeholder groups are driven primarily by interest-based 
motivations, they might be expected to target companies in industries that generate 
negative externalities such as air and water pollution, as well as specific firms perceived 
to be negligent on social, environmental, and workplace issues. If driven primarily by 
identity-based motivations, they might be expected to target companies for reasons 
unrelated to their industry or social performance (Rowley & Moldoveneau, 2003). A 
recent review of the empirical literature suggests that “both repeated wrong-doers and 
larger and more visible firms are at a greater risk of stakeholder scrutiny,” thus lending 
support for both interest-based and identity-based explanations (de Bakker & den Hond, 
2008). Whether this holds true for stakeholder-initiated civil lawsuits, however, remains 
an unanswered question.  
 We studied this question by examining lawsuits filed by NGOs against natural 
resources firms under the ATS. We chose this industry because of its size and importance 
to the global economy – in 2006, the world’s 39 largest publicly listed oil companies 
generated nearly $2.8 trillion in revenue (Rangan & Barton, 2010) -- and because roughly 
one-quarter of all the ATS lawsuits filed against MNEs have targeted firms engaged in 
natural resource extraction or production (Drimmer & Lamorre, 2011).  
 Our results suggest that activist groups sometimes choose their corporate targets 
with the aim of changing the practices of social performance laggards (i.e., based on what 
they do). But they also indicate that some ATS lawsuits are targeted at highly profitable 
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firms, irrespective of their social performance (i.e., based on who they are). It is possible 
to infer from these results that stakeholder groups are motivated by both interest and 
identity-based rationales in choosing corporate targets for ATS lawsuits – a finding that is 
broadly consistent with past empirical research on stakeholder activism (den Hond & de 
Bakker, 2007; Rehbein, Waddock & Graves, 2004). 
 
Conceptual Model for the Three Essays 
 Figure 1 provides a conceptual diagram that links the three essays that comprise 
this dissertation. The diagram, viewed from left to right, depicts the pathways of 
influence and the hypothesized relationships between actors and variables. As can be 
seen, Essay 3 postulates that secondary stakeholder groups, when considering the 
universe of potential corporate targets for litigation-based adversarial campaigns, base 
their decisions, at least in part, on four factors (H1 – H4). Essay 2 considers 
consequences for firms of being targeted by ATS litigation and other stakeholder actions. 
It predicts that the filing of ATS litigation will trigger a negative short-term stock market 
reaction (H1), as investors adjust their portfolios in response to the news of the litigation. 
The magnitude of the stock market’s reaction, it is further hypothesized, will be affected 
by a series of firm and stakeholder factors (H2 – H6). Finally, Essay 1 provides an 
integrative theoretical and conceptual framework for the three essays. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model for the Three Essays 
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Contribution 
 This dissertation has relevance for theory, practice, and public policy. By 
examining how an increasingly influential group of secondary stakeholders – human 
rights activists – are using civil litigation and extra-legal tactics to press for concessions 
from MNEs, we offer new insights into a phenomenon that has great salience for IB and 
management scholars. Given the dearth of scholarly analysis on this topic in the core 
management literature in comparison to other anti-corporate tactics such boycotts, 
protests, and proxy resolutions, this work fills an important void.  
 In a broader sense, this research contributes to the scholarly effort to understand 
how a range of relatively resource-poor, powerless, and marginalized groups (Gardberg 
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& Newburry, 2010) are using “voice” (Hirschman, 1970) to challenge corporate policies 
and practices, promote institutional change, and press for new and binding global norms 
governing the conduct of international business. These groups include NGOs (Doh & 
Teegen, 2003; Yaziji & Doh, 2009), social movements (King & Soule, 2007; King, 2008; 
Soule, 2009), and transnational advocacy networks (Riesse et al., 1999). Meanwhile, by 
identifying the factors that underlie the targeting decisions of NGOs initiating ATS legal 
challenges against MNEs and empirically testing their impact on stock market 
performance, this research addresses the gap in our knowledge of the motives and tactical 
choices stakeholders make and their firm-level consequences (de Bakker & den Hond, 
2008), thereby advancing stakeholder theory.  
 This research also has relevance for practice. Given the sharp rise in human-rights 
related lawsuits against MNEs in recent years, managers need to have a better 
understanding of the likelihood and costs (both direct and indirect) of litigation prior 
entering new markets. Our principal findings that the filing of ATS lawsuits has a 
significant and negative relationship to shareholder wealth and that stakeholder groups 
select their targets for ATS litigation based in part on their social performance would 
seem to provide a strong justification for multinational managers to seek ways to improve 
their overseas business practices and stakeholder relations. Possible avenues for action 
include pursuing dialogue with activists (Hart & Sharma, 2004), adopting voluntary 
codes of conduct (Drimmer & Lamorree, 2011), joining private certification schemes 
(Conroy, 2007; Vogel, 2008), embracing cross-sectoral partnerships with NGOs (Dahan 
et al., 2010), and undertaking other corporate citizenship initiatives (Gardberg & 
Fombrun, 2006). 
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 From a policy standpoint, the sharp rise in foreign direct investment to emerging 
markets in recent years has been heralded as a promising development in global 
economic affairs (Khanna & Palepu, 2010). But if MNEs perceive the legal risks in these 
markets to be too great, they may scale back their investments or withdraw entirely, with 
grave consequences for local development. Moreover, the exit of Western MNEs from 
countries with weak governing institutions could diminish Western strategic influence in 
countries regarded as important partners in the struggle against international terrorism 
(Shamir, 2004), and open the door to state-owned firms from emerging nations that are 
less beholden to pressures from civil society and less committed to social responsibility 
(Schrage, 2003).  
 This research suggests that the concerns of business and political leaders are 
legitimate. But so too are the concerns of activist groups that have called attention to the 
growing disparity in economic power between MNEs and their developing country hosts, 
and the historic ability of these firms to influence (and sometimes subvert) local laws and 
regulations while evading responsibility for grievous crimes committed on their behalf or 
in their interests by sovereign governments. In the absence of a new and binding global 
framework that spells out the specific social responsibilities and moral obligations of 
MNEs operating in developing countries, private efforts by transnational activist 
networks to hold them accountable for overseas rights abuses are bound to continue, with 
major ramifications for firms that do international business, and the governments and 
citizens of the nations where they do it. 
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Essay I – Transnational Legal Activism: A New Form of Political Risk? 
 
II. Abstract and Introduction 
Business scholars have recently taken an interest in the ways in which social movements, 
non-governmental organizations, and other secondary stakeholder groups attempt to 
influence corporate policies and practices through confrontational tactics such as boycotts 
and protests. Yet few efforts have been made to conceptualize the relationship between 
social activists and the firms they seek to influence, and the mechanisms by which these 
groups exert their influence remain poorly understood. This essay seeks to fill this gap by 
examining how transnational networks of human rights activists have used extraterritorial 
civil litigation and extra-legal activism to push for concessions from multinational 
enterprises. Building upon stakeholder theory, international business theories of political 
risk, and neo-institutional theories of social risk, we offer a new conceptualization. 
Implications for theory and practice are discussed. 
 In his seminal book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970), Albert O. Hirschman 
theorized that when confronted with declining performance on the part of an entity with 
which they have a relationship -- whether a business, government, or political party – 
individuals and organizations chose to either withdraw from the relationship (i.e., exit), 
attempt to repair it through communication or protest (i.e., voice), or remain quiescent 
(i.e., loyalty). In recent years sociologists and organization scholars have invoked 
Hirschman’s exit, voice, loyalty framework to explain how social movements, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and other relatively powerless groups use “voice” 
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to influence corporate policies (King & Soule, 2007; King, 2008) and promote 
institutional change (Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005; Rao, 2009).  
 Hirschman’s ideas have influenced the work of Baron (2001, 2003), who has 
coined the term “private politics” to refer to social activism aimed directly at corporations 
rather than channeled via the intermediary of the state (i.e., public politics). Examples of 
private political activity include boycotts, protests, civil lawsuits, and shareholder (proxy) 
resolutions,1 whereas lobbying legislators and regulators and seeking favorable judicial 
interpretations represent public political activities (Baron, 2001, 2003; Reid & Toffel, 
2009).2 While private political activity in the U.S. has a long history that dates back at 
least to the Boston Tea Party,3 it has become increasingly common in recent years, 
spurred by the growing economic power of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and the 
                                                            
1 Pioneered by religious organizations, proxy resolutions are often initiated by activist groups who 
buy enough shares of a company’s stock (the equivalent of $2,000) to initiate a vote on their 
resolutions at annual shareholder meetings. An example is People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals (PETA), which has reportedly purchased shares in at least 80 companies in recent years, 
including McDonald’s and Kraft Foods, in order to file proxy resolutions (Crumb, 2010). 
 
2 Activist groups often pursue private and public political strategies simultaneously. A prime 
example is the student-based Free Burma Coalition, which, during its heyday in the late 1990s, 
combined anti-corporate activism, including protests, boycotts, and shareholder resolutions, with 
appeals to local, state and federal governments for sanctions and selective purchasing laws (Spar 
& LaMure, 2003). 
 
3 As King (2009) observes, the Boston Tea Party was both a protest against Britain’s rule over its 
North American colonies and a tactic designed to generate outrage about the East India Tea 
Company, which was using its market power to drive smaller American rivals out of business. 
The current era of private political activity directed against MNEs began with the boycott of 
Nestle in the late 1970s over its sale of infant formula in developing countries (Davis, Morrill, 
Rao, & Soule, 2008).  
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diminished ability of states to rein them in through regulation (King & Pearce, 2010), and 
the proliferation of NGOs (Doh & Teegen, 2003; Yaziji & Doh, 2009).4  
 NGOs have been defined as private, not-for-profit organizations that aim to serve 
particular societal interests by focusing on advocacy and/or operational efforts on social, 
political and economic goals, including equity, education, health, environmental 
protection and human rights (Teegen et al., 2004). These groups pressure corporations to 
meet their demands through “insider” and “outsider” strategies (Peterson, 1992). The 
former involve efforts to influence decision makers directly, typically through moral 
suasion; the latter, indirectly, by mobilizing public opinion (Peterson, 1992). Outsider 
strategies often involve adversarial “market campaigns” that threaten (and deliver) harm 
to corporate reputations and brands (Klein, 2000; Baron and Diermeier, 2007; O’Rourke, 
2005). These market campaigns have grown in scope and sophistication in recent years 
(Manheim, 2001; Drimmer, 2010), and now frequently transcend national borders, 
creating new risks for MNEs (Spar & LaMure, 2003; Kobrin, 2005).  
 A case in point is the campaign waged against Chevron for alleged environmental 
damage caused by Texaco (acquired by Chevron in 2001) during the nearly three decades 
it operated a petroleum concession in Ecuador’s Oriente region.5 Spearheaded by the 
Amazon Defense Fund (ADF), an Ecuadorian NGO that describes itself as “part of a 
                                                            
4 As Yaziji and Doh (2009) observe, the number of NGOs around the world has grown by 400 
percent over the last decade, while mentions of NGOs in the Financial Times and the Wall Street 
Journal have risen twenty-fold over this period.  
 
5 Texaco subsidiary TexPet acquired the right to explore and drill for oil in Ecuador in 1964. It 
operated as part of various consortia with private and state partners until 1992, when it sold its 
assets to PetroEcuador, the state-owned oil company (Drimmer, 2010). 
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regional, national, and global struggle for environmental and collective rights in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon,” the campaign began in the early 1990s with a lawsuit filed in a 
U.S. district court claiming violations of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) (Aguinda v. 
Texaco, Inc.), a law that permits non-U.S. citizens to sue corporations in U.S. federal 
courts for overseas human rights violations (Davis, 2008).6 The lawsuit was filed on 
behalf of 30,000 indigenous people from Ecuador by U.S. and foreign NGOs, public 
interest attorneys, a Philadelphia-based class action law firm, and several Boston-based 
law professors (Shamir, 2004). The plaintiffs claimed that Texaco improperly disposed of 
toxic oil by-products, contaminating rivers and streams,  and causing widespread illness.7 
 While the ATS lawsuit was dismissed by a U.S. court in 1996 under forum non 
conveniens, a legal doctrine that requires a court to dismiss a case if a more appropriate 
alternative forum exists, related charges were brought in Ecuador under local law. Years 
of costly litigation ensued. Meanwhile, activists launched a multi-pronged grassroots 
effort in the U.S. aimed at damaging the firm’s image with customers and investors. The 
campaign, which continues to this day, has included a sophisticated media and public 
relations effort built around a web-based portal (chevrontoxico.com) containing news 
items, fact sheets, press kits, court documents, and multimedia clips, and an investor 
outreach effort that has involved filing shareholder resolutions critical of the company’s 
                                                            
6 The ATS, part of the U.S. Judiciary Act of 1789, states that “The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the 
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 
 
7 The Plaintiffs charged Texaco with dumping 18.5 billion gallons of “formation water” – leftover 
water from the oil extraction process  – into open pits that fed into waterways. The result was 
massive ecological damage, elevated rates of cancer for local residents, and other health issues 
(Kolker, 2006). 
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environmental practices and direct appeals to large public pension funds urging them to 
liquidate their Chevron stock.8 The activists achieved a stunning victory in 2011 when an 
Ecuadorian court found the firm liable for $17 billion in damages – the largest-ever 
award of its kind -- and ordered the MNE to pay an additional 10 percent of the value of 
the compensatory damages (roughly $860 million) to the ADF.9 
 Another prominent case of private politics involves Canadian oil and gas producer 
Talisman Energy, which was targeted by activists in the late 1990s after acquiring a 
smaller Canadian firm with investments in Sudan (Manhas, 2007). Like the campaign 
against Chevron, the centerpiece of Talisman campaign was a lawsuit: a $1 billion class 
action lawsuit filed in a U.S. federal court charging the firm with complicity in genocide 
and war crimes perpetrated by the Sudanese government against Christians and other 
non-Muslim minorities (Kobrin, 2004). In addition to aiding the repressive regime in 
Khartoum with royalties from an oil pipeline it helped operate, Talisman was accused of 
providing fuel, vehicles, aircraft, and runways for the Sudanese military, which used 
them to carry out bombing raids on civilians (Shamir, 2004). Other elements of the 
divestment campaign, led by the American Anti-Slavery Group, a Boston-based NGO, 
included boycotts, protests, and proxy resolutions. The campaign generated a barrage of 
negative press and prompted large investment funds including TIAA-CREF, CALPERS, 
                                                            
8 A novel element of the anti-Chevron campaign is the feature-length documentary “Crude,” 
produced by an independent filmmaker at the suggestion of one of the plaintiffs’ attorneys, which 
features interviews with villagers supposedly harmed by the firm’s environmental malpractice 
and cameo appearances by celebrities such as musician Sting and his wife Trudi Styler (Drimmer, 
2010). 
 
9 Chevron has appealed the judgment, claiming that the ruling was the “product of fraud and 
contrary to the legitimate scientific evidence” and filed a counter-lawsuit in the U.S. against the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO) (Barrett, 2011). 
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and the New York City Pension Fund to sell their Talisman shares. The U.S. Congress 
also considered legislation that might have resulted in Talisman’s shares being delisted 
from the New York Stock Exchange (Kobrin, 2004). Talisman ultimately succumbed to 
pressure and sold off its Sudanese assets in late 2002, citing “shareholder fatigue” 
(Manhas, 2007). 
 The campaigns against Chevron and Talisman, and others like them, suggest a 
new dynamic in business-society relations, wherein activist groups are leveraging 
resources and networks across countries and using both legal and extra-legal tactics to 
pressure firms to divest from otherwise profitable ventures, alter their business practices, 
and improve their social and environmental performance. In addition, some activist 
groups appear bent on instigating sweeping institutional changes to entire industries 
(Reid & Toffel, 2009) and establishing binding new global norms governing MNE 
conduct in developing countries (Shamir, 2004). Tarrow (2005) refers to this as “the new 
transnational activism,” which he sees as being driven by “rooted cosmopolitans” -- 
individuals with local and international networks and resources that they use to advance 
claims on behalf of external actors. In a similar vein, other scholars herald the emergence 
of “transnational advocacy networks” (Risse et al., 1999), “transnational social 
movements” (Smith et al., 1997), and “activism beyond borders” (Keck and Sikkink, 
1998). 
 But to what extent is the emerging threat to international business (IB) posed by 
these activist networks new and different from past threats that MNEs have confronted? 
How should IB and Strategy scholars conceptualize this threat? And what are the risk 
management implications? For Jones (2010), transnational legal activism of the kind 
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practiced against Chevron and Talisman represents a “new form of political risk.” It is 
“new” in the sense that it stems from changes in international legal norms that have made 
MNEs potentially liable in the home country for the misconduct of foreign governments, 
security forces, and even paramilitary organizations if it can be proven that the firm’s 
managers knew about this misconduct or somehow benefitted from it (Davis, 2008). Yet 
in other respects, this threat is not all that different from the types of challenges MNEs 
operating in developing countries have faced for years. Indeed, Simon (1984), who put 
forth an influential conceptual model of political risk, included unfavorable legal rulings 
in the MNE’s home country within his model, categorizing these as “direct external 
risks” to operations and profitability.10  
 Yet the political risk literature, by and large, focuses on governmental action (or 
inaction) in the host country as the source of firm-level risk (Wells, 1998), whereas the 
emerging threat of transnational legal activism emanates from NGOs typically domiciled 
in the home country or in multiple countries. Indeed, as Kobrin (2005: 204-205) writes, 
what drove Talisman from Sudan, “was not in-country risk: they managed a difficult 
situation well… Rather, Talisman sold its Sudanese operations because of ‘political risks’ 
arising in North America from activists’ successful efforts to associate it with complicity 
in human rights violations in Sudan.” 
 Yaziji (2005) offers a different label for this emerging threat: “social risk,” which 
he defines as “exposure to possible loss or constraints on strategic choice resulting from 
                                                            
10 By contrast, unfavorable legal rulings in the host country, along with expropriations, 
restrictions on remittances, wage and price controls, and other discriminatory actions represented 
“direct-internal risks,” which emanate from the host government (Simon, 1984). 
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normative delegitimation challenges by external organizations.” Drawing upon neo-
institutional theory (Scott, 2001; Suchman, 1995), he calls attention to the indirect costs 
to firms of stakeholder activism, which may include the loss of brand value, employee 
morale, and legitimacy with key stakeholders. It is these costs, he argues, that ultimately 
drive the managers of targeted firms to respond to the demands of activist groups, which 
otherwise wouldn’t receive much attention. 
 But does either of these frameworks adequately explain the nature of the threat to 
MNEs posed by transnational legal activism and the mechanisms by which such 
influence is exerted? This essay argues that both frameworks offer important insights into 
this emerging threat but that each ultimately falls short in key areas, thereby necessitating 
new theorizing.  
 This paper proceeds as follows: First we review the literature on secondary 
stakeholder activism. Next, we examine existing theories of political and social risk. We 
then provide a brief overview of the ATS, followed by an analysis of the NGOs that have 
pioneered its use and the legal and extra-legal tactics they routinely employ to gain 
leverage over their corporate targets. We then put forth a new conceptual construct – 
transnational legal risk – to explain the emerging threat to MNEs posed by these 
networks and conclude with implications for theory and practice. 
III. Literature Review 
 Numerous observers have noted that the once adversarial relationship between 
NGOs and corporations appears to have evolved into a new and more complex 
relationship that often involves elements of collaboration, dialogue, and partnership 
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(Doh, Newburry, & Teegen, 2003; Rondinelli & London, 2003; Yaziji & Doh, 2009). 
One indicator of the new spirit of cooperation is the proliferation of cross-sectoral 
partnerships like those forged between McDonald’s and the Environmental Defense Fund 
to eliminate polystyrene packaging and reduce solid waste (Davis et al., 2008), and 
Unilever and Oxfam International to reduce poverty and promote economic development 
in Indonesia (Yaziji & Doh, 2009). Research suggests that corporations and stakeholder 
groups can both derive significant benefit from these partnerships. NGOs may obtain 
financial and technical resources that enable them to better serve their members and 
maximize their social impact, while firms may gain enhanced social legitimacy 
(LaFrance & Lehaman, 2005), technical and legal expertise (Yaziji, 2004), and access to 
new information about consumer trends that leads to innovative new products, services, 
and business models (Dahan et al., 2010; Hart & Sharma, 2004; Yaziji, 2004). 
 And while cooperation between NGOs and corporations is on the rise, 
confrontation remains a key leitmotif of the relationship – particularly when the NGO 
possesses a radical, anti-corporate ideology (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007). Management 
and organization researchers seeking to understand the interplay between activist groups 
and corporations have recently employed stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) as a 
theoretical lens (Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008). A stakeholder is “any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s 
objectives (Freeman, 1984: 46).” In contrast to the shareholder perspective, which views 
profit maximization as the sole objective of the corporation (Friedman, 1962), 
stakeholder theory views the economic goals of the corporation to be less important than 
organizational survival, which can be enhanced by cultivating strong relationships with a 
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wide array of groups with a stake in the corporation, including employees, customers, 
suppliers, creditors, and communities, as well as shareholders (Soule, 2009). 
 Stakeholder theory accords NGOs and social movements the status of secondary 
stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995). Unlike the primary stakeholders of the company (e.g., 
shareholders, workers, suppliers, and creditors), secondary stakeholders have no 
contractual bond to the firms they seek to influence, little resource leverage, and are less 
vital to organizational survival (Clarkson, 1995; Eesley & Lenox, 2006). In conceptual 
terms, they are part of an outer ring of stakeholder “spokes” that encircle a “hub,” which 
represents the firm. See Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Stakeholder Conceptual Diagram 
 
 
 Given their peripheral status in relation to the firm and its primary stakeholders, 
theory suggests that secondary stakeholders should attract little managerial attention and 
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have limited sway over corporate policy (de Bakker & den Hond, 2008). Indeed, Mitchell 
and colleagues (1997: 875) liken these groups to “mosquitoes buzzing in the ears of 
managers: irksome but not dangerous, bothersome, but not warranting more than passing 
management attention.”   
 Yet we know that mangers not only pay attention to these secondary stakeholders, 
they often meet their demands – sometimes incurring significant costs in the process. For 
instance, PepsiCo, Disney, Levi Strauss, and Apple Computer, among others, bowed to 
pressure from the student-based Free Burma Coalition in the 1990s and divested from 
Burma (Myanmar) (Spar & LaMure, 2003); Nike capitulated to the United Students 
Against Sweatshops and affiliated pressure groups and demanded that foreign suppliers 
improve working conditions within their factories (Soule, 2009); Starkist conceded to the 
Earth Island Institute’s (EEI) demands that it implement dolphin-safe fishing practices 
throughout its foreign supply chain (Frooman, 1999); Trader Joe’s agreed under pressure 
from Greenpeace to remove genetically modified products from its shelves (Frooman & 
Murrell, 2005); Shell gave in to the demands of Greenpeace that it scuttle plans to 
dispose of the Brent Spar oil platform at sea and spent $70 million to haul the rig to shore 
for disassembly (Yaziji, 2004); and Aventis capitulated to Friends of the Earth and other 
environmental NGOs, spending more than $500 million to buy back genetically modified 
StarLink corn from growers (Yaziji & Doh, 2009). Meanwhile, in 2001, Novartis 
undertook a series of far-reaching social initiatives, including providing an anti-malaria 
drug at cost to patients in the developing world before being targeted by NGOs – a move 
that Spar and LaMure (2003) describe as “preemptive capitulation.” 
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 The success of secondary stakeholders in influencing corporate behavior has 
stimulated a growing body of theoretical and empirical literature. One stream of research 
focuses on stakeholder mobilization, and considers which groups are most likely to 
engage in confrontational tactics such as boycotts (Gardberg & Newburry, 2010) and 
shareholder resolutions (Profit & Spicer, 2006). Another stream focuses on firm response 
to activism, examining the success of activists in winning concessions from target firms, 
including the disclosure of information on greenhouse gas emissions (Reid & Toffel, 
2009), improvements in social performance (David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2007), 
enhancements to environmental practices (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Lenox & Eesley, 
2009), and the addition of healthy items to restaurant menus (Julian, Ofori-Dankwa, & 
Justice, 2008).  
 Yet another research stream examines the stock market’s reaction to different 
stakeholder tactics including boycotts (Pruitt & Friedman, 1986; Koku et al., 1997), 
protests (Epstein & Schnietz, 2002; King & Soule, 2007), divestiture campaigns 
(Davidson, Worrell, & El-Jelly, 1995; Meznar, Nigh, & Kwok, 1994), proxy resolutions 
(Reid & Toffel, 2009; Doh et al., 2010), and a variety of tactics including civil lawsuits 
(Eesley & Lenox, 2005). The evidence, by and large, suggests that these tactics typically 
have only a modest impact on shareholder wealth (Spar & LaMure, 2003; Vogel, 2005). 
 A related body of work examines the mechanics by which secondary stakeholder 
groups exert influence over corporate targets. An important contribution to this literature 
is Frooman’s (1999) model of stakeholder influence. Drawing upon resource dependence 
theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), he argues that stakeholder groups seeking to affect 
firm behavior typically adopt one of four strategies: Withholding, usage, direct, and 
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indirect. Withholding strategies involve restricting the supply of a critical resource to the 
firm as a means of exerting leverage. Usage strategies involve attaching conditions (i.e., 
“strings”) to the continued supply of a critical resource. Direct influence strategies entail 
directly manipulating the flow of critical resources. And indirect strategies involve using 
third parties to influence resource flows to the firm. The choice of a strategy is largely 
determined by the level of resource dependence (independence) that exists between the 
stakeholder and the firm (Frooman, 1999). 
 Frooman and Murrell (2005) offer a modification of this typology. It involves two 
types of “manipulation strategies” (coercion and compromise), and two types of 
pathways (direct and indirect). In this model “withholding” represents a coercive 
manipulation strategy, whereas “usage” a compromise manipulation strategy. Since 
secondary stakeholder groups usually have few critical resources they can withhold (or 
threaten to withhold) from the target firm, they typically opt for an indirect influence 
strategy (Frooman, 1999), which involves appealing to an ally such as consumers or 
shareholders, who in turn use their leverage with managers to press for change. The EII, 
as Frooman explains, adopted an indirect strategy in its efforts to convince Starkist to 
change its tuna procurement policies – it appealed to consumers through a savvy and 
sophisticated media campaign that included grisly imagery of dolphins being trapped and 
killed in the netting of fishing trawlers. The ensuing controversy pressured the firm to 
demand changes in the highly efficient yet inhumane technique its foreign suppliers used 
to catch tuna.  
 The models of stakeholder influence articulated by Frooman (1999) and Frooman 
and Murrell (2005), are broadly consistent with that put forth by Yaziji (2005), who sees 
26 
 
secondary stakeholders as exerting influence via “critical players” (i.e., primary 
stakeholders), who in turn use their leverage with firm managers to push for change. We 
next examine Yaziji’s model of social risk, compare it with political risk, and then 
explore the conceptual fit between these frameworks and the emerging threat of 
transnational legal activism. 
IV. Theory Development  
Social Risk 
 As previously mentioned, Yaziji (2005) characterizes social risk as threats to firm 
performance stemming from attacks on the firm’s image and reputation by activist 
groups.  At the core of Yaziji’s model is the concept of “normative delegitimation.” 
Rooted in the writings of Suchman (1995), Scott (2001), and other neo-institutional 
theorists, normative delegitimation is the process by which an organization’s normative 
legitimacy is diminished through challenges by outside organizations. These challenges 
may take the form of boycotts, “brand bashing,” shareholder resolutions, and civil 
lawsuits (Yaziji, 2005).  
 While some of these actions may impose direct financial costs on the firm, these 
costs, Yaziji argues, are far less significant than the indirect costs, which may include the 
loss of trust, confidence, and legitimacy with the critical players. It is concern about 
damage to these “intangible assets” (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Fombrun, 1996) and 
relationships which prompts the firm’s managers to respond to the activists. Their 
response may involve initiating delegitimization efforts of their own against the activist 
groups, issuing threats, extending invitations to negotiate, or adopting policy changes in 
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line with the activists’ demands. The choice of response is mediated by the activists’ 
success in aligning (or failing to align) with the critical players’ interests and institutional 
norms, the beneficence of the social and economic conditions, and the degree of success 
of past challenges. Figure 3 provides a conceptual model of social risk based on Yaziji 
(2005). 
Figure 3: A Conceptual Model of Social Risk 
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Political Risk 
 Social risk shares an affinity with political risk in that both streams of research 
center on firm interactions with non-market players who can affect firm behavior and 
performance (Yaziji, 2005). Yet social risk is a relatively new concept, whereas political 
risk is well established in the IB and Strategy literatures (e.g., de la Torre & Neckar, 
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1988; Kobrin, 1982; Simon, 1984; Oetzel, 2005; Wells, 1998). Although many different 
definitions of political risk have been offered over the years, there is general agreement 
that it arises from discontinuities in the firm’s political environment that are difficult to 
anticipate and threaten its profitability, performance, operations, and/or strategy (Robock, 
1971).  
 These discontinuities typically stem from the actions of host governments (Wells, 
1998), although they can also emerge from actions taken by non-governmental actors in 
the home, host, or international society (de la Torre & Neckar, 1988). Examples include 
protests and strikes initiated by student groups and labor unions, attacks on company 
property by guerrilla organizations and terrorist groups, and threats against corporate 
personnel by criminal syndicates (Markwick, 1998). These discontinuities may also 
emanate from government actions in the home country, such as when the executive or 
legislative branches impose trade sanctions on “rogue nations,” or technology transfer 
restrictions on particular industries (Simon, 1984). Figure 4 provides a conceptual model 
of political risk based on Simon (1984). 
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Figure 4: A Conceptual Model of the Political Risk 
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 Although political risk can have positive as well as negative consequences for 
firms – an example of a positive consequence being a sudden change in government that 
brings a business-friendly regime to power -- the literature focuses on the negative 
consequences and the managerial strategies that can be adopted to anticipate and mitigate 
these consequences (Kobrin, 1982). Following Robock (1971), some scholars distinguish 
between micro (or sub-sovereign) and macro (or sovereign) political risks (Alon, 
Gurumoorthy, Mitchell, & Steen, 2006; Alon & Herbert, 2009; Oetzel, 2005). The former 
involve threats to select projects and firms, whereas the latter involve threats to many or 
all projects, firms, and industries in a country. 
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Social vs. Political Risk: Toward a Synthesis 
 As Yaziji (2005) observes, social risk is a close “phenomenal cousin” to political 
risk. Yet important differences exist. Whereas social risk calls attention to the indirect 
costs of activist pressures aimed at firms, political risk focuses on the direct costs of such 
activity, which include the loss of ownership rights (e.g., through expropriation), or, more 
commonly, operational losses stemming from government interference or discrimination 
(Kobrin, 1982; Henisz & Zelner, 2004). Social and political risk also differ over what 
they identify as the chief source of risk. In the case of political risk, it is typically (though 
not always) the foreign host government, through its moves to seize assets, impose 
currency controls, and change laws and regulations in ways that penalize MNEs (Wells, 
1998). Social risk, by contrast, is exerted by non-governmental actors through 
delegitimation campaigns directed at shareholders and public pension funds, customers, 
the media, regulators, the courts, and the general public (Yaziji & Doh, 2009). Finally, 
firms manage these two types of risks in markedly different ways. Political risk is usually 
managed during the pre-investment phase (Oetzel, 2005) through strategies such as 
postponement, avoidance, joint ventures, hedging, and insurance (Rivoli & Salorio, 1996; 
Wells, 1998), whereas social risk is managed both before and after investments are made, 
through dialogue, partnerships, philanthropy, and other forms of stakeholder engagement 
(Yaziji & Doh, 2009; Oetzel, Getz, & Ladek, 2007). Whether the emerging threat of 
transnational legal activism represents a type of political or social risk is the question to 
which we now turn our attention, following a brief survey of the NGOs that have 
pioneered this new form of contestation and their legal tool of choice – the ATS. 
31 
 
 
The ‘Human Rights Revolution,’ NGOs, and the Alien Tort Statute  
  Legal scholar Jeffrey Davis (2008) has referred to the recent efforts to hold 
MNEs accountable in U.S. federal courts for alleged complicity in human rights abuses in 
developing countries as a “human rights revolution.” This revolution is being driven by a 
relatively small cadre of U.S.-based NGOs, based in New York and Washington, D.C., 
using the 200 year-old ATS as their primary legal vehicle.11 
 Originally drafted with an eye toward protecting diplomats and deterring piracy 
on the high seas, the ATS lay dormant for nearly 200 years until invoked in the late 1970s 
by a New York-based NGO serving as legal counsel for the family of a Paraguayan 
citizen who was kidnapped, tortured, and killed by a Paraguayan police inspector in 
Paraguay who later immigrated to the U.S. While the case was initially dismissed by a 
U.S. district court on jurisdictional grounds, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit reversed the decision, ruling that torture and extra-judicial killing constitute 
violations of the “law of nations” and are thus actionable under ATS. The judge awarded 
the plaintiffs $10 million in punitive damages, stimulating new interest in the law as a 
vehicle for prosecuting crimes against humanity committed on foreign soil (Davis, 2008; 
Gallagher, 2010). 
 Subsequent ATS lawsuits targeted prominent political figures including Ferdinand 
Marcos of the Philippines, and in the mid-1990s, a U.S. federal court ruled that non-state 
                                                            
11 The list of NGOs includes the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), Earth Rights 
International (ERI), International Rights Advocates (IRA), and the International Labor Rights 
Fund (ILRF). These groups typically draw on the support of public interest attorneys and 
sometimes work in tandem with private law firms (Drimmer, 2010). 
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actors, such as Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, could be prosecuted for war 
crimes and other rights abuses.12 Shortly thereafter, two NGOs -- the Center for 
Constitutional Rights (CCR) and Earth Rights International (ERI) -- filed a landmark case 
on behalf of villagers in Myanmar (Burma) against the U.S. oil and gas company Unocal 
and its senior executives (Doe v. Unocal). The claims included complicity in forced 
labor, torture, rape, extra-judicial killings, and other crimes committed by the Burmese 
military against civilians as part of a $1.2 billion natural gas pipeline project in which the 
company had a minority stake (Holzmeyer, 2009; Schoen, Falchek, & Hogan, 2005). 
Unlike previous ATS cases involving corporate defendants, this one survived motions to 
dismiss, suggesting that U.S. courts viewed the American legal system as the appropriate 
forum for claims involving serious rights abuses committed by foreign governments and 
militaries, and the theories of “vicarious corporate liability” upon which these claims 
rested (Davis, 2008; Shamir, 2004).13 
 Since Doe v. Unocal, plaintiffs have filed dozens of ATS cases against U.S. and 
foreign-headquartered MNEs over alleged misconduct in some 60 different countries 
(Drimmer, 2010).14 High-profile ATS cases have involved allegations of facilitating 
                                                            
12 The case against Bosnian Serb General Radovan Karadzic (i.e., Kadic v Karadzic) for crimes 
against humanity was particularly important since Karadzic, who headed an illegitimate 
government not recognized by the international community, was a private individual rather than a 
state actor. As Goldhaber (2010) observes, “creative plaintiffs soon concluded that alien tort also 
applies to non-state actors like corporations that violated the law of nations.” 
 
13 Unocal later won summary judgment in 2000 based on the court’s finding that it had neither 
participated in nor influenced the Burmese military’s conduct, however, that ruling was 
overturned on appeal in 2002, setting the stage for a jury trial. The case was settled prior to trial 
in 2004 for a reported $30 million (Davis, 2008). 
 
14 Under U.S. law, litigation can only proceed against a corporate defendant where it maintains 
certain “minimum contacts with the forum.” However, U.S. courts have tended to interpret this 
principle broadly, conferring jurisdiction in cases where the foreign company had no substantial 
33 
 
genocide in Sudan, aiding and abetting atrocities committed by the Apartheid government 
in South Africa, manufacturing the chemical herbicides used by the U.S. military in the 
Vietnam War, and conducting non-consensual medical trials on children in Nigeria 
(Shamir, 2004). Among the MNEs that have been sued under ATS in recent years are 
Chevron Corp., Royal Dutch/Shell, ExxonMobil, Occidental Petroleum, Talisman 
Energy, Rio Tinto PLC, Chiquita, Bridgestone, Nestle, Coca-Cola, IBM, Pfizer, Yahoo, 
and Wal-Mart (Gallagher, 2010). 
 Although no MNE has yet been found liable in an ATS case that has gone to trial, 
a number of cases have survived dismissal motions and entered the discovery phase, 
requiring firms to devote significant resources to legal defense (Kropf, 2010). Some of 
these cases have lingered in the court system for over a decade, generating negative 
publicity and tarnishing the reputations of the corporate defendants and their chief 
officers (Dunst, 2010). Numerous corporate ATS cases have also been settled out of court 
for large sums,15 and two cases involving MNEs have made it to trial.16 Some legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
U.S. presence, but was listed on a major U.S. stock exchange or maintained a U.S. investor 
relations office (Drimmer, 2010).  
 
15 At least 17 ATS cases involving corporations have been settled over the past 15 years. The list 
includes the so-called “Nazi gold” lawsuits of the late 1990s, which secured $1.25 billion in 
compensation from Swiss banks for victims of the Holocaust and the case against Unocal in 
Burma (reportedly between $30 and $60 million). Other major settlements include those 
involving U.S. apparel and retail companies for allegations related to sweatshop labor in Saipan 
($20 million), Royal Dutch Shell for alleged human rights violations in the Niger Delta ($15.5 
million), and Yahoo! Inc. for divulging private information on political dissidents to the Chinese 
government (undisclosed amount) (Goldhaber, 2010). 
 
16 One of these cases (Bowoto v. Chevron) alleged that Chevron was complicit in the Nigerian 
military’s violent crackdown against unarmed protesters at one of the company’s offshore oil 
platforms. The other case (Romero v. Drummond Co.) was based on accusations that the 
Drummond Company conspired with Colombian paramilitary organizations to murder union 
leaders at one of its coal mines (Kropf, 2010). 
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analysts believe it is just a matter of time before a defendant is found liable, which would 
presumably incentivize new cases (Drimmer, 2010). 
 
NGOs as Transnational Advocacy Networks 
 While the human rights NGOs that have initiated much of the recent ATS 
litigation against MNEs typically have small staffs and modest budgets, they extend their 
reach and maximize their impact by operating as “transnational advocacy networks” 
(Risse et al., 1999), drawing upon the support of individuals and organizations 
throughout the world. Such networks are characterized by “shared values and by dense 
exchanges of information and services” (Sikkink, 1993). Key constituents of 
transnational human rights networks include NGOs and labor unions at home and abroad, 
grassroots community activists, academics, individual public interest attorneys, and even 
attorneys with large corporate law firms that offer pro-bono services (Davis, 2008).  
 ERI is a good example of an organization that functions as a transnational 
advocacy network. One of the two NGOs that served as legal counsel to the plaintiffs in 
the Doe v. Unocal case, ERI maintains a permanent staff of fewer than two dozen 
attorneys and administrators in Washington, D.C., with an annual budget of less than $2 
million. Yet its global network of alliances and partnerships is extensive. The network 
includes an overseas branch in Chaing Mai, Thailand, which oversees the organization’s 
activities in Burma and Southeast Asia, partnerships with leading U.S. and European 
human rights NGOs, including Human Rights Watch, Human Rights First, Global 
Witness, and Amnesty International through the International Corporate Accountability 
Roundtable (ICAR), and relationships with an array of NGOs and grassroots groups 
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throughout the developing world. Meanwhile, ERI maintains tight links with foreign 
attorneys through initiatives like the Mekong Legal Advocacy Institute, a forum for 
lawyers in South East Asia to network and “develop new legal and advocacy strategies, 
and take effective coordinated actions to protect the environment and human rights” 
(earthrights.org). 
 The importance of this extended network to ERI’s success was recently 
underscored by the organization’s executive director: “Making sure that local NGOs are 
involved is of the utmost importance, because lawyers in D.C. aren’t going to know how 
to go into the pipeline region of Burma and gather evidence that the government doesn’t 
want gathered and not put themselves and others in danger. In many of these (ATS) 
cases, just for pure logistics, you have to have local people who know what a human 
rights abuse is and know how to document it in a way that’s reliable” (Davis, 2008: 83). 
 ERI also participates in organizations such as Publish What You Pay, a global 
civil society coalition that claims to help citizens of developing countries hold their 
governments accountable for the management of revenues derived from natural resource 
projects, Save the Mekong, ESCR-Net, Network for Human Rights Documentation – 
Burma, and The True Cost of Chevron, an initiative comprising some 40 NGOs from 20 
countries or U.S. states, including Amazon Watch, Global Exchange, Greenpeace, the 
Rainforest Action Network, and Public Citizen. The initiative describes itself as “a 
unique collaboration of indigenous, native, and First Nation communities and their allies 
resisting the destructive human rights and environmental policies of Chevron and the 
entire oil industry” (earthrights.org).  
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Extra-Legal Activism 
 In addition to their legal advocacy efforts, human rights NGOs often engage in 
extra-legal activism, purportedly to pressure firms to settle these lawsuits on terms 
favorable to the plaintiffs and gain leverage in the legal proceedings. As Drimmer (2010) 
observes, these out-of-court tactics cluster into four categories: media-related activities, 
community organizing activities, investment-related activities, and political advocacy 
activities.  
 Media-related activities include creating websites to showcase news about the 
case and mobilize support and donations, authoring opinion-editorials in newspapers, 
granting media interviews, staging press conferences to coincide with key events such as 
the filing of new litigation, and filming mini-documentaries (and sometimes full-length 
films) about the cases; community organizing activities involve organizing protests and 
boycotts of the goods and services of target firms; investment-related activities include 
introducing proxy resolutions at shareholder meetings, pressuring institutional investors 
to divest from the target company, and contacting the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to initiate investigations; and political advocacy activities include testifying 
at Congressional hearings (Drimmer, 2010). 
 ERI, which has filed ATS cases against Unocal, Occidental Petroleum, Chiquita, 
Chevron, Union Carbide, and Shell in recent years, engages in a wide variety of extra-
legal tactics. In the context of its campaign against Unocal for its investment in Burma, 
ERI has published reports critical of the company’s activities, written letters to Chevron 
senior executives accusing the company of supporting repression, and published anti-
Chevron opinion-editorials in international newspapers. It also has organized events to 
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promote “Total Denial,” a documentary by an independent filmmaker about the Unocal 
case. The anti-Chevron campaign continues to this day, notwithstanding the fact that the 
legal case was settled in 2004 (earthrights.org). 
 International Rights Advocates (IRA) is another U.S.-based human rights NGO 
that engages in extensive extra-legal tactics in support of its ATS litigation. In concert 
with an ATS lawsuit it filed against Coca-Cola for alleged complicity in repression 
against union leaders at a Colombian bottling facility (Sinaltrainal v. The Coca-Cola 
Company), IRA launched the “Killer Coke” campaign, a multi-pronged grassroots effort 
designed to “hold The Coca-Cola Company, its bottlers and subsidiaries accountable and 
to end the gruesome cycle of violence and collaboration with paramilitary thugs, 
particularly in Colombia” (killercoke.org). The site contains visceral imagery including 
mock Coca-Cola ads with captions such as “Murder: It’s the Real Thing,” and exhorts 
activists to demonstrate, leaflet, and write letters to the offices of Coke’s Board of 
Directors (killercoke.org). While the legal effort against Coca-Cola has yet to bear fruit, 
the activist campaign has produced results: In 2006 TIAA-CREF sold 1.2 million shares 
of Coca-Cola stock, worth over $50 million, from its Social Choice Fund. The move 
followed the decision of KLD Analytics to remove the firm from its Broad Market Social 
Index (BMSI) list of socially responsible firms, in part because of allegations of human 
rights violations in Colombia (Mankowski, 2006).  
 
V. Discussion 
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Transnational Legal Risk: A New and Unique Threat to MNEs? 
 The foregoing analysis suggests that human rights NGOs are operating on two 
tracks simultaneously – the legal track, in which they seek to obtain favorable 
dispensations in the courtroom or lucrative financial settlements, and the activist track, in 
which they seek to harm the target firm’s image and reputation as a means of gaining 
leverage over the firm and winning concessions. From the perspective of the target firm, 
the first of these tracks resembles political risk in the sense that it exposes the firm to 
direct financial costs in the form of legal fees, court costs, and public relations 
expenditures, while diverting managerial time and attention away from running the 
organization. Such maneuvers also expose the firm to the possibility of substantial out-of-
court settlements and billion-dollar judgments.  
 The second track, however, resembles social risk in the sense that it raises the 
prospect of indirect financial harm to the firm through damage to its image, reputation, 
and ultimately the loss of legitimacy. The potential costs of such reputational damage 
include the loss of customers, clients, employees, investors, and suppliers, as firms 
distance themselves from the target and withhold critical resources. An additional cost to 
the firm is the heightened possibility of regulatory action. Given that neither the social or 
political risk frameworks adequately capture the essence of this new and increasingly 
salient threat to MNE operations, we believe it merits a new label: “transnational legal 
risk.” We define this as the risk to a firm’s performance and reputation caused by 
transnational networks of human rights activists employing legal and/or extra-legal 
tactics in the home country to win concessions. Table 1 compares key aspects of 
transnational risk with political and social risk. 
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Table 1: Political, Social and Transnational Legal Risk – Key Aspects 
 Political risk 
 
Social risk Transnational legal risk 
Focus government interference 
– primarily in the host 
country 
 
NGO and social 
movement activism – 
primarily in the home 
country 
 
NGO and social movement 
activism – in both the host 
and home countries 
Tactics -expropriation  
-f/x controls 
-taxation 
-restrictions on profit 
remittances 
-local content 
requirements 
-export performance 
requirements 
-shareholder resolutions 
-boycotts 
-protests 
-letter-writing campaigns 
-civil litigation 
 
-civil litigation 
(extraterritorial) 
-shareholder resolutions 
-boycotts 
-protests 
-letter-writing campaigns 
 
Costs direct  indirect (damage to 
image, reputation, and 
legitimacy) 
 
direct (legal, pr expenses) 
and indirect (damage to 
image, reputation, 
legitimacy) 
 
Nature of 
influence 
direct (govt to MNE) indirect (NGO to MNE 
via “critical players”) 
direct and indirect 
Risk management -avoidance 
-postponement 
-joint ventures 
-lobbying 
-insurance 
-hedging 
-diversification 
-avoidance 
-cross-sectoral 
partnerships  
-CSR initiatives 
-community relations 
 
 
-avoidance 
-cross-sectoral partnerships  
-CSR initiatives 
-community relations 
 
Theme building barriers around 
the firm (insulation) 
breaking down barriers 
(engagement) 
breaking down barriers 
(engagement) 
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VI. Conclusion 
 As de Bakker & den Hond (2008) recently observed, despite more than 25 years 
of research on stakeholder theory since Freeman’s seminal (1984) contribution, scholars 
know relatively little about the mechanisms by which external agents influence 
organizational behavior. This research helps fill this gap by examining how an 
increasingly influential group of secondary stakeholders – human rights activists – are 
using civil litigation and extra-legal tactics to press for concessions from MNEs. Given 
the growing importance of civil litigation to the efforts of NGOs and the relative dearth 
of scholarly analysis on this topic in the management literature in comparison to other 
anti-corporate tactics such as boycotts, protests, and proxy resolutions, this research fills 
an important void.  
 In a broader sense, this research contributes to the scholarly effort to understand 
how a range of relatively resource-poor and powerless groups including NGOs (Doh & 
Teegen, 2003; Yaziji & Doh, 2009), social movements (King & Soule, 2007; King, 2008; 
Soule, 2009), and transnational advocacy networks (Riesse et al., 1999) are seeking to 
change corporate policies and practices, promote institutional change, and press for new 
and binding global norms governing the conduct of international business. Moreover, by 
offering insights into the ways in which MNEs conceptualize and manage threats to their 
tangible and intangible assets, this research contributes to the literatures on political and 
social risk and the non-market strategies of firms (Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Bonardi, 
Hillman, & Keim, 2005). This research also draws attention to the social and moral 
ramifications of MNE behavior in the developing world – an issue that has been 
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identified as one of high importance for IB researchers (Ricart, Enright, and Ghemawat, 
2004). 
 Beyond its theoretical contributions, this research has relevance for practice. As 
Frooman (1999) observes, knowing how stakeholders may try to influence a firm is 
critical knowledge for any manager since strategic planning and action presupposes some 
understanding of how organizations in their environment will act and react. By offering 
insights into the different tactics that activist stakeholder groups employ -- both inside 
and outside of the courtroom -- this research contributes to that endeavor.  
 An important conclusion of this research is that firms targeted with human rights-
related litigation need to take into account both the direct and the indirect costs of these 
lawsuits – the latter of which include image damage, loss of brand equity, and diminished 
social legitimacy. Moreover, they need to realize that such challenges are more than a 
legal fight – they are a battle for the hearts and minds of stakeholders (Garcia & Ewing, 
2008). Or, stated differently, they are “public relations and political wars” with the 
courtroom battle being just one theater in a wider war (Garcia & Ewing, 2008). As such, 
MNEs should approach these challenges in a very different way than they would other 
types of litigation. Elements of an effective counter-strategy, as Garcia and Ewing (2008) 
observe, include acting quickly to disclose all relevant information about the allegations 
“before the media frenzy begins,” crafting a simple message that can be understood by a 
variety of audiences (e.g., legal, public, and policy), communicating it forcefully, and 
mobilizing allies and using them to “tell the story” – in a word, many of the same extra-
legal techniques that the claimants have used so effectively against corporations. 
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 It has been suggested that firms facing class-action lawsuits brought by private 
(non-corporate) plaintiffs ought to litigate these cases, while settling those brought by 
other firms, since the latter have a higher probability of success and are viewed by the 
markets as more threatening (Koku, 2006). And while it is true that no private plaintiff 
has yet prevailed in a corporate ATS case that has gone to trial (Drimmer, 2010), such 
advice ignores the exceptionally high reputational risks associated with ATS claims, 
which, after all, involve allegations of complicity in genocide, murder, torture, rape, and 
other heinous acts. Moreover, the tendency for these cases to linger in the court system 
for years, owing to lengthy motion practice, discovery, appeals, and frequent reversals of 
lower court rulings by appellate courts, only magnifies the potential impact. The case 
against Royal Dutch Shell for its alleged complicity in the 1995 execution of Ogoni 
human rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa by the Nigerian military is a case in point. That 
litigation, which attracted an international outcry and became a cause célèbre amongst 
activists, dragged on for 13 years, blighting the company’s otherwise positive reputation 
on social issues.17 The parties ultimately agreed to a $15.5 million settlement on the eve 
of the trial in 2009, although in many respects the damage had already been done (Dunst, 
2009). In this case, and many others, the defendant clearly would have been better off 
opting for mediation or a settlement earlier in the game. 
                                                            
17 In 2009 activists groups, including PLATFORM, Oil Change International, and Friends of the 
Earth launched the “Shell Guilty” campaign, which included the release of reports critical of the 
firm’s activities in the Niger Delta, protests, and international press conferences. These and other 
groups also initiated a media campaign, “Remember Ken Saro-Wiwa? Shell Would Rather You 
Didn’t,” that included the placement of full page anti-Shell advertisements in major UK 
newspapers (anitaroddick.com, 2010). 
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 While this research does not directly address the question of what strategies 
MNEs can take to reduce their vulnerability to ATS litigation, some implications can be 
drawn. First, companies can enhance their due diligence, by adopting codes of conduct, 
carefully screening potential business partners, and hiring third parties to monitor the 
compliance of these partners with company codes (Drimmer & Millerwise Dyck, 2009). 
Beyond these steps, MNEs can adopt one of three strategies, which we label avoidance, 
resistance, and engagement. 
 Avoidance involves steering clear of countries with repressive governments, weak 
institutions, and chronic human and labor rights violations. And indeed, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that some companies – particularly small and medium-size firms -- are 
thinking twice about investing in certain high risk countries due to concerns about legal 
liability.18 But given the importance of emerging markets to the business strategies of 
MNEs (Khanna & Palepu, 2010), and the fact that ATS cases have been brought against 
firms operating in over 60 countries including some of the world’s largest and fastest-
growing markets (e.g., China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa), avoidance would seem 
to be a questionable strategy. 
 Resistance involves undertaking efforts to oppose the application of ATS to 
corporations, while attempting to delegitimize or co-opt the groups behind these lawsuits 
(Shamir, 2004). To this end, MNEs have conducted a vigorous lobbying effort in 
Washington aimed at convincing policymakers to repeal or amend the statute. The 
campaign has been spearheaded by business groups such as USA*Engage, the National 
                                                            
18 Davis (2008: 238) quotes an interview with a senior U.S. State Department lawyer who 
remarked: “ In a certain number of instances small and medium size businesses their risk advisors 
are telling them not to go in conflictive situations simply because…. of the legal fees of 
defending (against ATS lawsuits).” 
44 
 
Foreign Trade Council, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the U.S. Council for 
International Business, and the Organization for International Investment (Davis, 2008). 
These groups have also filed friend of the court (amicus) briefs with district courts urging 
them to drop these cases and petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to settle the matter of 
“corporate liability” once and for all. Their efforts appeared to bear fruit in 2004 when 
the high court took up an ATS-related case (Sosa v. Alvarez Machain), but the court’s 
ruling that the door should remain open to corporate ATS lawsuits “subject to vigilant 
door-keeping” was hardly the result the business community had sought (Shamir, 2004). 
Meanwhile, a July 2011 ruling by a federal appeals court overturning a lower court’s 
decision in favor of Exxon Mobil in a 2001 ATS case brought by Indonesian plaintiffs 
over claims of murder, torture, and other atrocities has raised speculation that the 
Supreme Court will again address this matter, yet how the justices will rule is anyone’s 
guess (Stempel, 2011b). 
 Engagement, in our view, is the most promising strategic approach to ATS 
vulnerability. It involves pursuing dialogue with activists (Hart & Sharma, 2004; Yaziji, 
2004), seeking mediation (Rees, 2010), and embracing corporate citizenship initiatives 
(Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006), including voluntary codes of conduct, private certification 
schemes, and philanthropic support for community education, health, and environmental 
projects. While there are obvious financial costs to an engagement strategy and no 
evidence that such a strategy reduces the risk of being targeted by activists, there are huge 
potential benefits. These include enhanced trust, confidence, and goodwill from local 
communities, greater legitimacy, and a more robust “social license” to operate 
(Gunningham, Kagan, & Thornton, 2004). Firms adopting an engagement strategy in 
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developing countries may realize other benefits too, including better employee 
recruitment and retention, increased sales, reduced insurance risk premiums, and 
improved relations with host governments and other stakeholders, thereby leading to a 
sustainable, long-term competitive advantage (Oetzel et al., 2007). 
 An example of a firm that has adopted an engagement strategy is France’s La 
Farge Group, the world’s second-largest cement-maker. Among the many different 
countries in which Lafarge operates is Indonesia, where it has a plant in the city of Banda 
Aceh, located in the restive northern province of Aceh, Sumatra. Aware of the “liability 
of foreigness” associated with being a Western company in the world’s largest Muslim 
nation, Lafarge has actively looked for ways to enhance its social legitimacy. It perceived 
an opportunity following the December 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami, which devastated 
the area, killing nearly one-third of its local workers and contractors (Lafarge, 2005). In 
much the same way that Wal-Mart responded to Hurricane Katrina, Lafarge quickly 
mobilized workers and resources to assist local community groups with relief and 
reconstruction. In the months that followed the disaster it built over 300 houses, set up 
clinics, restaurants, and schools, purchased school supplies, and even renovated mosques 
(Lafarge, 2005). The result, as Kapstein (2006) observes, is that “Lafarge is widely 
appreciated in Banda Aceh, and harming its plant or people in any way would not make 
good political sense for those who wish to make a statement.” Similarly, we might 
presume that the idea of filing an ATS lawsuit against the company would gain little 
traction within the local community – notwithstanding the fact that ATS lawsuits have 
been filed against other Western MNEs operating in Indonesia, including Exxon Mobil 
and Freeport McMoran. 
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 Finally, this research has relevance for public policy. The sharp rise in ATS 
lawsuits against MNEs in recent years and the size of the damages sought has raised 
concerns amongst policymakers that foreign direct investment -- an important engine of 
global economic growth -- could be curtailed (Fergenson & Merrigan, 2007). Indeed, 
Hufbauer (2009) warns that the growing tide of ATS litigation could “chill investment in 
non-OECD countries,” slowing economic growth and increasing human suffering in 
countries that account for over 5 billion people and half the world economy. Moreover, 
Hufbauer and Mitrokostas (2004) estimate that $55 billion in U.S. foreign direct 
investment (FDI) could be deterred by ATS lawsuits, jeopardizing some $10 billion in 
U.S. exports and 80,000 manufacturing jobs. Concerns over ATS liability could also 
discourage foreign-based MNEs from investing in the U.S., costing thousands of 
additional American jobs (Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, 2004).  
 Business and political leaders also warn that the exit of Western MNEs from 
emerging nations in Africa and Southeast Asia owing to legal concerns could diminish 
Western strategic influence in countries seen as important partners in the struggle against 
international terrorism, while opening the door to investment by state-owned firms from 
emerging nations that are less beholden to pressures from civil society and less 
committed to social responsibility (Schrage, 2003). Indeed, when Talisman Energy 
divested from an oil pipeline project in the Sudan in 2003 amidst intense stakeholder 
pressure, India’s state-owned oil company ONGC Videsh Limited purchased its assets. 
The project continues to this day, but without the community development projects and 
transparency initiatives that Talisman claims it had implemented (Manhas, 2007). 
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 This research suggests that the concerns of business and political leaders are 
legitimate. But so too are the concerns of activist groups that have called attention to the 
growing disparity in economic power between MNEs and their developing country hosts, 
and the historic ability of these firms to influence (and sometimes subvert) local laws and 
regulations while evading responsibility for grievous crimes committed on their behalf or 
in their interests by sovereign governments and their security forces. In the absence of a 
new and binding global framework that spells out the specific social responsibilities and 
moral obligations of MNEs operating in developing countries, private efforts by 
transnational activist networks to hold them accountable for overseas rights abuses are 
bound to continue, with major ramifications for firms that do international business, and 
the governments and citizens of the nations where they do it. 
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Essay II: Secondary Stakeholder Legal Action and Stock Market Performance: An Event 
Study of Alien Tort Statue Litigation Filed Against Multinational Enterprises: 1993-2010 
 
VII. Abstract and Introduction 
Secondary stakeholder groups have filed dozens of civil lawsuits in U.S. federal courts 
against multinational enterprises in recent years over alleged human rights abuses, labor 
violations, and environmental crimes in developing countries. Multinational business 
leaders complain that these lawsuits add to their cost of doing business and hamper their 
global competiveness. Anecdotal evidence suggests that their concerns may be justified. 
But does the empirical evidence bear this out? To answer this question we conducted an 
event study of lawsuits filed against multinational enterprises between 1993 and 2010 
under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute, a law that gives U.S. federal courts extraterritorial 
jurisdiction for cases involving allegations of serious offenses committed against foreign 
citizens. Our analysis shows that target firms experienced a significant decline in share 
price upon filing and that both industry and nature of the lawsuit had a significant and 
negative relationship to shareholder wealth. We offer conclusions and implications for 
practice. 
 The rise of anti-corporate activism represents a challenge to international 
management theory and practice. Although a rich stream of international business (IB) 
and management literature exists on non-market threats to the multinational firm 
(Chambers, Wernick, Zdanowicz, & Von Glinow, 2010; Grosse, 2005; Henisz, 
Mansfield, & Von Glinow, 2010), this literature tends to focus on political risks to 
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investors emanating from the acts of host governments (Kobrin, 1979; de la Torre & 
Neckar, 1988), and the opportunistic policy decisions these sovereign entities often take 
(Henisz & Zelner, 2010). For many multinational firms today, however, the biggest non-
market threat they face comes not from governments abroad, but from individuals and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) domiciled in the home country, or from 
networks of activists spanning multiple countries (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Tarrow, 2005; 
Doh & Teegen, 2003).  
 By launching boycotts and protests and filing shareholder resolutions and civil 
lawsuits, these activist groups damage corporate reputations, tarnish brands, and 
undermine the firm’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public (Soule, 2009; Spar & La Mure, 
2003; Yazjij, 2005). Companies stigmatized as poor corporate citizens may also 
experience difficulty recruiting and retaining employees, customers, and suppliers, and 
raising investment capital (David et al., 2007; Turban & Greening, 1997). Given the 
stakes, it is no surprise that multinational enterprises (MNEs) have responded to the 
threat of being “named and shamed” by devoting increasing attention and resources to 
social risk identification (Yaziji & Doh, 2009), stakeholder management (Hillman & 
Keim, 2001), and corporate citizenship initiatives (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006).19  
 Management and organization researchers seeking to understand the interplay 
between activist groups and corporations have recently employed stakeholder theory 
(Freeman, 1984) as a theoretical lens (Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008). Stakeholder 
                                                            
19 Corporate citizenship refers to the range of socioeconomic activities that companies undertake 
to fulfill perceived duties as members of society. Examples include charitable giving, pro bono 
activities, volunteerism, and support for community educational, health, and environmental 
programs (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006). 
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theory accords social activists the status of “secondary stakeholders,” which, unlike 
primary stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, employees, suppliers, and creditors), are not 
vital to organizational survival (Clarkson, 1995). As such, these groups should attract 
little managerial attention (Mitchell et al., 1997). Yet the empirical literature suggests that 
managers often do pay careful attention to the demands of these secondary stakeholders 
and sometimes make significant concessions (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; King, 2008). This 
reality has stimulated new research that examines when and why these groups mobilize 
(Rowley & Moldoveneau, 2003; den Hond & de Bakker, 2007), how they select their 
targets (Rehbein et al., 2004; Hendry, 2006; Lenox & Eesley, 2009), the different 
influence strategies they employ (Frooman, 1999; Frooman & Murrell, 2005), and the 
factors that influence firm response (Spar & LaMure, 2002; Reid & Toffel, 2009). 
Researchers have also analyzed the shareholder wealth implications of common 
stakeholder tactics such as boycotts (Pruitt & Friedman, 1986; King, 2008), protests 
(Epstein & Schnietz, 2002; King & Soule, 2007), letter-writing campaigns (Smith & 
Cooper-Martin, 1997), divestitures (Davidson, Worrell, & El-Jelly, 1995), and proxy 
resolutions (Reid & Toffel, 2009; Doh et al., 2010).  
 What is surprising, however, is that scholars have devoted scarce attention to 
empirically measuring the stock market’s reaction to the filing of civil lawsuits by 
stakeholder groups. This is surprising because stakeholder groups are increasingly 
employing civil litigation as a central pillar of their anti-corporate campaigns 
(Kurlantzick, 2004). Moreover, one of the few studies to examine corporate response to a 
variety of stakeholder tactics including protests and boycotts found that civil suits were 
more likely to elicit concessions than any other tactic (Eesley & Lenox, 2006).  
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 Given that corporate share price is a widely accepted benchmark for assessing 
managerial performance (Lambert & Larker, 1987), if the filing of civil lawsuits is 
associated with a loss of shareholder wealth, then managers might have an incentive to 
engage with stakeholder groups and settle these complaints before they result in litigation 
(e.g. through mediation), or undertake measures that would make their firms and senior 
executives less of a target in the first place. Such measures might include adopting 
voluntary codes of conduct, participating in private certification programs (Vogel, 2008), 
or engaging in multi-sectoral partnerships (Dahan et al., 2010). Many MNEs have 
established such alliances in recent years and claim to be benefiting from them (Kourala 
& Laasonen, 2010). Conversely, if there is no relationship between the filing of these 
lawsuits and corporate share price, firms might choose to ignore them and let the legal 
process run its course – in much the same way that managers of boycotted firms have 
often paid them little attention.20 Either way, the question of whether and how secondary 
stakeholder-initiated litigation affects corporate share price has great relevance for 
multinational strategy. 
The U.S. Legal Environment and Transnational Tort Litigation 
 The U.S. has been dubbed the “litigious society” (Baye, Kovenock, & de Vries, 
2005). Indeed, trial attorneys in America generate almost $50 billion per year in revenue 
through tort litigation — more than the annual revenues of Microsoft and Intel, and 
double the global sales of Coca-Cola (Center for Legal Policy, 2010). In recent years the 
                                                            
20 Procter & Gamble’s chairman, for example, refused to acquiesce to boycotters’ demands in the 
early 1990s that his company cease from purchasing coffee beans from El Salvador -- the 
revenues from which were claimed to be financing right-wing death squads -- because he knew 
the action would have little or no financial impact (Koku, Akhigbe, & Springer, 1997). 
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proliferation of class-action lawsuits, which permit one or more parties to sue (or be 
sued) on behalf of all those who are similarly situated, has further increased the legal 
burden companies face, with multi-billion dollar settlements occurring in cases involving 
tobacco, silicone breast implants, the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, and the diet 
supplement Fen-Phen, while others related to fast food, lead paint, firearms, Chinese dry 
wall, and asbestos may be on the horizon.  
 Although many different types of civil litigation are on the rise, the growth of 
transnational tort litigation has been particularly noteworthy (Drimmer, 2010). These 
cases involve allegations of personal or environmental harms stemming from corporate 
misconduct overseas. While some transnational tort cases deal with fairly mundane issues 
such as personal injury claims and allegations of negligent business practices, a growing 
number involve allegations of complicity in serious overseas human and labor rights 
abuses and environmental crimes. The primary vehicle for these lawsuits in the U.S. is 
the ATS, a controversial law that allows foreign citizens to sue government officials, 
private individuals, and corporations in U.S. federal courts for particular violations of 
international law or a treaty of the U.S. (Davis, 2008). 
 Originally drafted with an eye toward protecting diplomats and deterring piracy 
on the high seas, the ATS lay dormant for nearly 200 years until invoked in the late 1970s 
by a New York-based non-governmental organization (NGO) serving as legal counsel for 
the family of a Paraguayan citizen who was kidnapped, tortured, and killed by a 
Paraguayan police inspector in Paraguay who later immigrated to the U.S. (Kobrin, 
2005). While the case was initially dismissed by a U.S. district court on jurisdictional 
grounds, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the decision, ruling 
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that torture and extra-judicial killing constitute violations of the “law of nations” and are 
thus actionable under ATS. The judge awarded the plaintiffs $10 million in punitive 
damages, stimulating new interest in the law as a vehicle for prosecuting crimes against 
humanity committed on foreign soil (Davis, 2008; Gallagher, 2010).  
 Subsequent ATS lawsuits targeted prominent political figures including former 
Philippines dictator Ferdinand Marcos, and in the mid-1990s, a U.S. federal court ruled 
that non-state actors, such as Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, could be prosecuted 
for war crimes and other rights abuses.21 Shortly thereafter, two NGOs -- the Center for 
Constitutional Rights and Earth Rights International -- filed a landmark case on behalf of 
villagers in Myanmar (Burma) against the U.S. oil and gas company Unocal and its 
senior executives (Doe v. Unocal). The claims included complicity in forced labor, 
torture, rape, extra-judicial killings, and other crimes committed by the Burmese military 
against civilians as part of a $1.2 billion natural gas pipeline project in which the 
company had a minority stake (Holzmeyer, 2009; Schoen, Falchek, & Hogan, 2005). 
Unlike previous ATS cases involving corporate defendants, this one survived motions to 
dismiss, suggesting that U.S. courts viewed the American legal system as the appropriate 
forum for adjudicating claims of serious rights abuses committed by foreign governments 
and militaries, and the theories of “vicarious corporate liability” upon which these claims 
rested (Davis, 2008; Shamir, 2004).22 
                                                            
21 The case against Bosnian Serb General Radovan Karadzic (i.e., Kadic v Karadzic) for crimes 
against humanity was particularly important since Karadzic, who headed an illegitimate 
government not recognized by the international community, was a private individual rather than a 
state actor. As Goldhaber (2010) observes, “creative plaintiffs soon concluded that alien tort also 
applies to non-state actors like corporations that violated the law of nations.” 
 
22 Unocal later won summary judgment in 2000 based on the court’s finding that it had neither 
participated in nor influenced the Burmese military’s conduct, however, that ruling was 
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 Since Doe v. Unocal, plaintiffs have filed dozens of ATS cases against U.S. and 
foreign-headquartered MNEs over alleged misconduct in some 60 different countries 
(Drimmer, 2010).23 High-profile ATS cases have involved allegations of facilitating 
genocide in Sudan, aiding and abetting atrocities committed by the Apartheid government 
in South Africa, manufacturing the chemical herbicides used by the U.S. military in the 
Vietnam War, and conducting non-consensual medical trials on children in Nigeria 
(Shamir, 2010). Among the MNEs that have been sued under ATS in recent years are 
Chevron Corp., Royal Dutch/Shell, ExxonMobil, Occidental Petroleum, Talisman 
Energy, Rio Tinto PLC, Chiquita, Bridgestone, Nestle, Coca-Cola, IBM, Pfizer, Yahoo, 
and Wal-Mart (Gallagher, 2010). 
 Although no multinational corporate defendant has yet been found liable in an 
ATS case that has gone to trial, a number of cases have survived dismissal motions and 
entered the discovery phase, requiring firms to devote significant resources to legal 
defense (Williams & Conley, 2007; Kropf, 2010). Some of these cases have lingered in 
the court system for over a decade, generating negative publicity and tarnishing the 
reputations of the corporate defendants and their chief officers (Dunst, 2010). Numerous 
corporate ATS cases have also been settled out of court for large sums,24 and two cases 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
overturned on appeal in 2002, setting the stage for a jury trial. The case was settled prior to trial 
in 2004 for a reported $30 million (Davis, 2008). 
 
23 Under U.S. law, litigation can only proceed against a corporate defendant where it maintains 
certain “minimum contacts with the forum.” However, U.S. courts have tended to interpret this 
principle broadly, conferring jurisdiction in cases where the foreign company had no substantial 
U.S. presence, but was listed on a major U.S. stock exchange or maintained a U.S. investor 
relations office (Drimmer, 2010).  
 
24 At least 17 ATS cases involving corporations have been settled over the past 15 years. The list 
includes the so-called “Nazi gold” lawsuits of the late 1990s, which secured $1.25 billion in 
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involving MNEs have made it to trial.25 Some legal analysts believe it is just a matter of 
time before a defendant is found liable, which would presumably incentivize new cases 
(Drimmer, 2010). 
 The U.S. business community has been an outspoken critic of ATS and has 
mobilized to defeat it through lobbying and legal action (Shamir, 2004). Business 
organizations such as the National Foreign Trade Council and USA*Engage contend that 
the rising tide of ATS litigation represents a “unique but significant risk” to companies 
with a substantial U.S. presence, saddling them with heavy legal fees and putting them at 
a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign competitors in the international marketplace 
(Williams & Conley, 2007). Business advocates and analysts warn that American MNEs 
might respond to the rising tide of transnational tort litigation by retrenching from 
developing countries, with grave consequences for the U.S. economy,26 and the 
economies of host countries.  
 U.S. government officials, meanwhile, warn that the exit of Western MNEs from 
fragile democracies in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East owing to escalating legal risk 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
compensation from Swiss banks for victims of the Holocaust and the case against Unocal in 
Burma (reportedly between $30 and $60 million). Other major settlements include those 
involving U.S. apparel and retail companies for allegations related to sweatshop labor in Saipan 
($20 million), Royal Dutch Shell for alleged human rights violations in the Niger Delta ($15.5 
million), and Yahoo! Inc. for divulging private information on political dissidents to the Chinese 
government (undisclosed amount) (Goldhaber, 2010). 
 
25 One of these cases (Bowoto v. Chevron) alleged that Chevron was complicit in the Nigerian 
military’s violent crackdown against unarmed protesters at one of the company’s offshore oil 
platforms. The other case (Romero v. Drummond Co.) was based on accusations that the 
Drummond Company conspired with Colombian paramilitary organizations to murder union 
leaders at one of its coal mines (Kropf, 2010). 
 
26 Hufbauer and Mitrokostas (2004) estimate that $55 billion in U.S. foreign direct investment 
(FDI) could be deterred by ATS lawsuits, jeopardizing some $10 billion in U.S. exports and 
80,000 manufacturing jobs. Additionally, concerns over ATS liability could discourage foreign-
based MNEs from investing in the U.S., costing thousands of additional American jobs. 
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could have major U.S. foreign policy implications (Shamir, 2004). It could diminish 
Western strategic influence in countries regarded as important partners in the struggle 
against international terrorism, while opening the door to investment by state-owned 
firms from emerging nations that are less beholden to pressures from civil society groups 
(Schrage, 2003).27 
 But are the concerns of U.S. business and government leaders justified? Are the 
costs to corporations associated with defending themselves against transnational tort 
litigation indeed substantial? If so, according to the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 
1970), we might expect the market to discount a firm’s stock price at the initiation of 
such litigation, in the absence of contemporaneous market-moving events, since the 
hypothesis holds that current prices of assets in the market reflect all available 
information about that asset. To date, no study has examined this question, although it 
has important implications for corporate strategy and public policy. 
 The objective of this study is to determine whether a relationship exists between 
the filing of ATS lawsuits and corporate share price. Given the proliferation of ATS 
lawsuits against corporations in recent years and the expectations that they will continue 
in the future,28 it is important to know whether the filing of new lawsuits is negatively 
                                                            
27 Indeed, when Talisman Energy divested from an oil pipeline project in the Sudan in 2003 
amidst intense stakeholder pressure, India’s state-owned oil company ONGC Videsh Limited 
purchased its assets. The project continues to this day, but without the community development 
projects and transparency initiatives that Talisman claims it had implemented (Manhas, 2007). 
28Numerous observers have predicted that ATS will become the next “litigation bonanza” for trial 
attorneys (Drimmer, 2010). And while an October 2010 ruling by the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals that exempts corporations from liability for human rights abuses under ATS caused some 
to speculate about the imminent demise of this type of legal challenge (Goldhaber, 2010), 
subsequent decisions in other federal districts have affirmed the principle of corporate liability. 
Meanwhile, new ATS cases continue to be filed on a regular basis. In May 2001, for instance, an 
ATS case against Cisco Systems was filed in a California Federal District Court by an NGO on 
behalf of members of Falun Gong, claiming that Cisco helped design a firewall used by the 
Chinese government to censor the Internet and track political dissidents (Markoff, 2011). That 
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associated with shareholder wealth and the magnitude of this relationship, if any. 
Empirical data of this sort may prove valuable to corporate decision makers 
contemplating overseas investments -- particularly in countries run by military 
governments, beset by war or ethnic conflict, or where violations of internationally 
recognized human and labor rights are commonplace.  
 If the majority of ATS suits are baseless, as suggested by corporate executives in 
interviews, congressional testimony, and court briefs (e.g., Drimmer, 2010; Fergenson & 
Merrigan, 2007), then the market’s reaction to them should be insignificant. Thus, claims 
that such lawsuits impose excessive costs, risks, and burdens on business could be treated 
with a high dose of skepticism. If it can be demonstrated, however, that the 
announcement of these lawsuits does trigger an immediate and significant decline in 
shareholder wealth, then MNE managers would have an incentive to undertake measures 
that could preempt such lawsuits, such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs 
and initiatives.29 After all, research has shown that firms adopting CSR initiatives prior to 
tactical attacks by activist groups can buffer themselves from potential criticism (Baron 
2001; Baron & Diermeier, 2007). 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
literature on corporate lawsuits and financial markets. Section 3 puts forth hypotheses 
informed by this literature. Section 4 discusses our data and methodology. Section 5 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
same month a California Federal Appeals Court revived a previously dismissed ATS lawsuit 
against DaimlerChrysler claiming the company was liable for abetting human rights abuses 
committed by Argentina’s military dictatorship during the “Dirty War” of the 1970s (Stempel, 
2011a). 
 
29 On the other hand, evidence of a litigation-share price link could encourage MNEs to redouble 
lobbying efforts to oppose such challenges and discredit the groups behind them (Shamir, 2004), 
make symbolic changes to policy while maintaining “business as usual” (David et al., 2007), or to 
divest from politically unstable countries (Hufbauer, 2009). 
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examines our results. And Section 6 offers discussion, conclusions, and directions for 
future research.  
 
VIII. Literature Review   
 Business researchers have long been interested in the question of whether and 
how legal disputes involving corporations affect company performance and shareholder 
wealth. An early study by Banks & Kinney (1982) examined the market’s reaction to 
footnote disclosures of pending lawsuits. They found that there was indeed a negative 
reaction to such disclosures. Frost (1991) corroborated these findings in a study using a 
larger sample size over a different time period. Bhagat, Brickley, & Coles (1994) 
examined the market’s reaction to lawsuits between corporations filed between 1981 and 
1983. They found that defendant firms lost about one percent of their equity upon filing. 
Karpoff and Lott (1993) found that corporate defendants accused of fraud and anti-trust 
violations suffer significant wealth losses when the accusations were announced. The 
authors also found that criminal restitution, civil penalty, and court costs accounted for 
less than 10 percent of the shareholder wealth loss, and that the vast majority was due to 
reputational damage. 
 While analyses of the market’s reaction to litigation between companies abound, 
research on the impact of civil lawsuits brought by private citizens against corporations is 
limited. Unlike inter-firm lawsuits, which primarily involve patent infringements and 
contract disputes, most lawsuits between individuals and corporations involve allegations 
of personal harms resulting from corporate negligence or misconduct (i.e., tort cases).  
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 In one of the few studies to consider these issues, Bhagat, Bizjak, & Coles (1998) 
examined how lawsuits filed by governments, firms, and private citizens variously affect 
corporate share price. They observed that defendant firms experienced an average wealth 
loss upon filing of about 1% of market value of equity, or roughly $16 million. Wealth 
destruction was largest for lawsuits filed by governments (-1.73%), and smallest for those 
filed by other firms (-0.75%); suits brought by private parties resulted in a loss of equity 
of -0.81%. In explaining their results, the authors hypothesized that governments have 
more leverage and resources at their disposal than other parties, and thus are seen by 
investors as more likely to prevail in a court battle. They also speculated that lawsuits 
filed by government agencies (e.g., environmental suits) may have more serious financial 
consequences for firms than other types of litigation (e.g., breach of contract). By 
contrast, Koku, Qureshi, & Akhigbe (2001) found that lawsuits brought by individuals 
against corporate defendants had no significant wealth effect, although those against 
other firms did. This finding led the authors to conclude that firms should settle inter-firm 
lawsuits while litigating non-interfirm suits. 
 Koku (2006) found a difference in the way that the market responds to class-
action and non-class action lawsuits. While investors tend to react negatively to the 
stocks of defendants in both cases, the reaction to class-action suits tends to be of a 
greater magnitude and occurs over a larger event window. Gande and Lewis (2009) too 
found significantly negative stock price reactions to shareholder-initiated class-action 
lawsuits.  
 Although the empirical evidence is far from conclusive, it does suggest that 
corporations typically experience a loss of shareholder value upon the filing of lawsuits 
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against them, regardless of whether the plaintiff is a government, a corporation, or a 
private individual. Whether the filing of ATS lawsuits against MNEs by private plaintiffs 
results in the loss of shareholder wealth, however, remains an unanswered question. It is 
to this question that we now turn our attention. 
 
IX. Hypotheses 
 In the next section we develop a series of hypotheses on how the filing of ATS 
lawsuits may be related to firm stock market performance. These hypotheses consider 
characteristics of the firms targeted by litigation, the stakeholder groups that initiate 
them, and the nature of the lawsuits themselves. 
 
1. Negative Market Reaction - Since most of the corporate ATS cases filed to date have 
been dismissed by federal courts on jurisdictional grounds, and the few that have made it 
to trial have resulted in verdicts for the defense, it is possible that the financial markets 
discount these lawsuits as insignificant events initiated by fringe activist groups and 
“global ambulance chasers” (Goldhaber, 2008). On the other hand, it is possible that 
market players do view the filing of ATS lawsuits as important occurrences that cloud a 
firm’s financial prospects. After all, these cases typically involve allegations of 
complicity in grave human rights abuses and may generate serious reputational harms for 
defendant firms – especially since these legal cases are increasingly accompanied by 
sophisticated media campaigns designed to vilify the company (Manheim, 2001; 
Drimmer, 2010). Companies facing ATS litigation may need to take steps to publicize 
their side of the story and defend their reputations, including mobilizing public relations 
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and crisis management teams and launching media campaigns -- all of which may come 
at a significant cost to the firm. 
 In addition to the possible image costs of ATS litigation for defendant firms, there 
are financial costs associated with either settling the cases or contesting them in court. 
Since ATS cases involve complex legal theories and arcane constitutional questions, they 
are typically expensive to litigate, requiring extensive preparation by in-house counsel or 
private attorneys. In the event that cases survive pretrial motions for dismissal or 
summary judgment and move into the discovery phase, legal costs escalate dramatically, 
as discovery may require extensive overseas travel and investigation, the deposing of 
foreign witnesses, the procurement of documents from foreign governments and 
militaries and their translation into English, and the hiring of expert witnesses in foreign 
and international law (Kropf, 2010). Defendants may also be compelled by the courts to 
provide public access to internal documents, emails, and other materials as part of the 
discovery process that are time-consuming to collect and may prove embarrassing to 
corporate officers (Baue, 2007).30 While defendants may prevail in lower courts, these 
rulings are subject to appeals and reversals, raising the prospect of protracted legal battles 
and escalating court costs.  
 The case of Talisman Energy in Sudan illustrates the arduous and costly path that 
ATS litigation can take. The firm, a large, Canadian independent oil and gas producer, 
was targeted in November 2001 with a $1 billion class action lawsuit for alleged 
complicity in genocide and war crimes perpetrated by the Sudanese government against 
                                                            
30 Davis (2008: 291) recounts an interview he conducted with ERI litigator Richard Herz who 
explained how a damning piece of evidence against Unocal was uncovered during the course of 
discovery: “We got an email where the Unocal guy says to the Total guy, ‘we have no 
responsibility to control what the military does. We have our responsibility and they have theirs – 
let’s just admit there’s a grey area.’” 
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Christians and non-Muslim minorities (Kobrin, 2004). In addition to aiding the repressive 
regime in Khartoum via royalties from an oil pipeline it helped operate as a minority 
partner in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNOPC), Talisman was 
accused of providing fuel, vehicles, aircraft, and runways for the Sudanese military, 
which used them to carry out bombing raids on civilians (Shamir, 2004). The legal case 
against Talisman was but one facet of a larger divestment campaign that included 
boycotts, protests, and shareholder resolutions. Spearheaded by the American Anti-
Slavery Group, a Boston-based NGO, the campaign generated a barrage of negative press 
and prompted large investment funds including TIAA-CREF, CALPERS, and the New 
York City Pension Fund to sell their Talisman shares. The U.S. Congress also considered 
legislation that might have resulted in Talisman’s shares being delisted from the New 
York Stock Exchange (Kobrin, 2004).  
 Talisman ultimately sold off its Sudanese assets in late 2002, citing “shareholder 
fatigue,” but this did not end its legal ordeal. In March 2003 a federal district judge 
denied Talisman’s request for dismissal, ruling that the case could proceed. Several more 
years of litigation ensued. In 2006, a district court granted summary judgment for 
Talisman, seemingly vindicating the company. But plaintiffs promptly appealed the 
ruling, initiating a new round of litigation. The appeals court upheld the dismissal in 
2009, but the plaintiffs have since filed a petition with the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
may yet take up the case. The case against Royal Dutch/Shell for its alleged complicity in 
the execution of Ogoni human rights activist and Nobel Peace Prize nominee Ken Saro-
Wiwa by Nigeria’s military followed a similar trajectory, marked by dismissals and 
63 
 
reversals, and ultimately culminating in a $15.5 million settlement on the eve of the trial 
some 13 years after the initial lawsuit was filed.31 
 Beyond the reputational damage and legal costs, defendants in ATS cases face the 
possibility of sizable compensatory and punitive damages in the event that a jury finds it 
liable. This is not an idle threat given the sympathy American juries have shown toward 
individual plaintiffs in non-ATS tort cases (Koku et al., 2001) and ATS cases involving 
private individuals and government defendants. Indeed, in 1995 a U.S. jury awarded 
Filipino citizens nearly $2 billion in damages in an ATS case against the estate of former 
dictator Ferdinand Marcos (Latham & Watkins, 2010). Plaintiffs may also attempt to 
recover attorneys’ fees and seek the disgorgement of profits, further adding to the 
potential legal liability that defendant firms face (Fergenson & Merrigan, 2007).  
 Even if these efforts fail, MNEs facing litigation may experience higher insurance 
premiums and higher costs of capital (Frynas, 2004), and in some cases, the loss of 
customers, as illustrated by a Danish energy firm’s recent announcement that it was 
halting coal purchases from Drummond Co. pending the resolution of a case involving 
alleged complicity in the murder by right-wing paramilitaries of labor activists at one of 
its mines in Colombia (Cooper, 2006). Finally, allegations of grave and systematic abuses 
may invite unwanted attention from policymakers and result in regulatory sanctions that 
negatively impact future cash flows (Eesley & Lenox, 2006). 
 Thus, it is possible that market players will view the filing of an ATS lawsuit 
against a corporation as bad news that will diminish firm value by diverting resources 
                                                            
31 As Goldhaber (2009) observes, it is quite likely that Royal Dutch Shell spent significantly more 
in fees to its legal counsel than it did on the settlement, and that it would have spent more again 
on the trial and subsequent appeals. 
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from productive activities to litigation and public relations, driving up operating costs, 
and chasing away customers and investors. Financial markets might also surmise that the 
reputational damage associated with these suits could adversely affect the firm’s ability to 
raise money on capital markets and attract and retain top managerial talent, triggering a 
decline in future earnings expectations.  
 
H1 – News of the initial filing of an ATS lawsuit against a firm will result in a negative 
stock market reaction. 
 
2. Industry: It has been shown that investors react to sudden and unexpected market 
events by penalizing firms in industries associated with these events. For instance, in the 
aftermath of the anti-globalization protests that derailed the 1999 WTO global trade 
negotiations, investors sold shares in firms in industries considered to be 
“environmentally damaging” (i.e., mining, steel, chemical, pulp and paper, and energy) 
and “labor abusing” (i.e., toys, apparel, and footwear) (Epstein & Schnietz, 2002). 
Investor reaction appears to have been motivated by concerns that the success of these 
protests might trigger a wave of anti-business regulation or consumer boycotts against 
firms in these industries. A similar logic could apply to the filing of ATS lawsuits; 
investors might presume that firms in industries targeted most often by this type of 
litigation could be harmed in the future by stricter regulation or a consumer backlash.  
 Although firms from a wide variety of industries, including chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, financial services, telecommunications, agriculture, and food and 
beverages, have been sued under ATS in recent years, those involved in petroleum and 
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gas exploration and mining (i.e., extractive companies) and heavy construction have been 
the most frequent targets (Kropf, 2010). This may be because extractive companies and 
the firms that help build the infrastructure for their projects typically have limited choices 
about where they can invest -- they must go where the natural resources are. Since these 
resources are often buried beneath the soil in developing countries run by authoritarian 
regimes or torn by strife and internal conflict, MNEs involved in the extraction and 
production of natural resources may be particularly vulnerable to ATS litigation (Kaeb, 
2008).  
 Furthermore, since MNEs seeking to exploit mineral resources in foreign 
countries must often partner with state-owned enterprises as a condition of entry and hire 
government security forces to police these projects, and these security forces typically 
have little human rights training, extractive MNEs may be disproportionately exposed to 
ATS litigation (Drimmer, 2010). Finally, since extractive firms and their construction 
industry affiliates are typically held in low regard by the public, and seen in some 
quarters as exploitative and corrupt, investors might determine that these firms would be 
unsympathetic defendants in the event that a case goes to a jury trial (Kropf, 2010), 
leading them to anticipate declines in future cash flows, thereby adversely affecting 
corporate share price. 
 
H2 – Lawsuits against extractive companies will have a larger negative impact than 
those against non-extractive firms. 
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3. Reputation for Social Responsibility – There is a large and growing management 
literature that examines the link between a firm’s commitment to social responsibility, 
broadly understood as discretionary activities designed to improve social conditions 
(Mackey, Mackey, & Barney, 2007), and its financial performance (Godfrey, Merrill, & 
Hansen, 2009). A primary aim of this literature is to determine whether firms regarded as 
socially responsible, based on evaluations of third-party entities,32 are more profitable 
than their less socially- and environmentally-minded peers. Although debates rage over 
the methodologies and measures used in these studies, the consensus is that “virtuous” 
firms do tend to perform better over time than their non virtuous counterparts (Doh et al., 
2010; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003), and may also 
generate enhanced support from consumers, employees, and investors (Waddock & 
Graves, 1997), thereby laying the foundation for sustained competitive advantage (Hill & 
Keim, 2001). 
 While the idea that a reputation for social responsibility can serve as a source of 
economic value has gained currency, few researchers have examined the social 
responsibility-financial performance link in the face of organizational uncertainty and 
crisis. Does having a reputation for social responsibility preserve shareholder wealth in 
the event of a negative reputation event, such as a legal challenge by secondary 
stakeholder groups? It is possible that it does. After all, past empirical research has shown 
that a reputation for social responsibility can buffer a firm from external financial and 
                                                            
32 A variety of third-party entities publish CSR and corporate citizenship rankings. The list 
includes journals (e.g., Fortune and Business Ethics magazines), mutual funds, private 
companies, and non-profit organizations. The two most widely used social indices are the Domini 
social index, created by KLD Research & Analytics, Inc., and the Calvert social index, created by 
Calvert Investments (Doh et al., 2010). 
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political turbulence. Jones, Jones & Little (2000) found that firms with a high score on 
Fortune’s Most Admired Companies survey experienced smaller declines in shareholder 
value during the stock market crash of 1989 than did those without, while Schnietz & 
Epstein (2005) reported that firms with a reputation for social responsibility experienced 
proportionately smaller losses in shareholder value in the aftermath of the failed 1999 
WTO talks.  
 These and other studies examining the risk management ramifications of social 
responsibility initiatives (e.g., Love & Kraatz, 2009; Doh et al., 2010) suggest that a 
reputation for social responsibility may serve as a source of “moral capital” (Godfrey, 
2005) or “reservoir of goodwill” (Jones et al., 2000) in times of crisis, providing 
“insurance-like protections” (Godfrey et al., 2009), and cushioning the firm from 
potentially negative outcomes. A reputation for social responsibility may also facilitate a 
firm’s return to normalcy after a negative event, thereby serving as a source of 
organizational resilience (Beer, 2009; Sheffi, 2005). As such, we expect that investors 
will perceive the securities of MNEs with reputations for social responsibility to be less 
risky than those of firms without such reputations, and that these virtuous firms in turn 
will experience a smaller adverse market reaction upon the filing of ATS lawsuits. We 
thus propose: 
 
H3 – Firms with reputations for social responsibility will experience a smaller negative 
stock market reaction upon the filing of an ATS lawsuit than firms without such 
reputations. 
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4. Identity of Plaintiff’s Legal Representation – Theory suggests that managerial attention 
to stakeholder demands is conditioned by the group’s salience, as defined by its power, 
legitimacy, and the urgency of its demands (Mitchell et al., 1997). It is logical that 
investors would be swayed by these attributes as well in assessing the potential threat a 
lawsuit poses to future earnings. While NGOs and other secondary stakeholder groups 
have little or no resource leverage over focal firms and hence little power (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Frooman, 1999), they often have high legitimacy in the eyes of the public 
(Yaziji, 2004; Yaziji & Doh, 2009). Legitimacy has been defined as social acceptance 
resulting from adherence to social norms and expectations (Deephouse & Carter, 2005), 
and it is reasonable to presume that lawsuits filed by groups with high levels of 
legitimacy would carry more weight with investors than those filed exclusively by groups 
with low legitimacy, such as trial attorneys, who are renowned for being unscrupulous 
and opportunistic.33 After all, litigation initiated by high legitimacy groups are likely to 
be seen as more credible by the primary stakeholders of the firm (e.g., customers, 
employees, suppliers) as well as by the media and government regulators, which may 
increase the economic and reputational risks associated with these lawsuits.  
 NGOs have other assets that may give them an advantage over private firms in 
civil litigation, including dense networks of relationships with individuals and advocacy 
groups both domestically and abroad (Rowley & Berman, 2000; Doh, Newburry, & 
                                                            
33 In practice, NGOs and private law firms often work together on ATS cases, along with public 
interest lawyers. For example, the ATS case against Texaco (Aguinda v. Texaco) was filed on 
behalf of members of three indigenous tribes from Ecaudor by an Ecuadorean attorney based in 
the U.S., and American class action law firm, a group of Boston-based law professors, and U.S. 
and foreign NGOs, including the Massachusetts Environmental Law Society, Earth Justice 
International, and Amazon Watch (Shamir, 2004). 
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Teegen, 2003).  These networks may facilitate the gathering of evidence required to 
prosecute a successful court case (Davis, 2008). NGOs may also have dedicated legal 
staffs with extensive knowledge of human rights law and experience litigating ATS cases 
as well as connections to other NGOs will similar resources and capabilities, and these 
resources may facilitate the development of successful legal cases (Davis, 2008). 
Moreover, since NGOs tend to draw people who are morally engaged and committed to 
the principles their organizations stand for (della Porta & Mario, 1999), NGOs may be 
more willing than private firms to pursue cases that take years to develop and are unlikely 
to result in favorable verdicts or lucrative settlements. Finally, since NGOs typically have 
limited resources, they tend to be highly selective about the legal cases they take on, and 
this selectivity may result in more successful litigation (Davis, 2008). 
 
H4 – ATS lawsuits filed with NGO support will have a larger the negative stock market 
reaction than those filed exclusively by private law firms. 
 
5. Nature of Claims – In addition to paying attention to the identity of the stakeholder 
group mounting the anti-corporate challenge and the legitimacy they possess, theory 
suggests that managers consider the nature of the claims being brought against the target 
firm, with those related to issues affecting primary stakeholders having greater urgency 
than those involving issues of concern to more distant stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997; 
Clarkson, 1995; Hillman & Keim, 2001). Given that workers are a stakeholder group 
critical to organizational survival and financial performance, one might presume that 
investors, like managers, would view lawsuits alleging overseas labor violations as a 
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particularly serious economic threat. In fact, it is possible that investors would view 
labor-related lawsuits as an even greater threat than lawsuits alleging more serious human 
rights crimes, including kidnapping, torture, and murder, perpetrated against non-
workers. After all, a broad public consensus  appears to have developed in the U.S. in the 
wake of the NGO-led anti-sweatshop campaigns of the 1990s, that companies have a 
moral responsibility for the treatment of workers in foreign factories, even when these 
workers are employed by subcontractor firms (Soule, 2009; Spar & LaMure, 2003). No 
such consensus appears to yet exist over corporate obligations with respect to the 
environment and the treatment of more distant stakeholders (e.g., protestors). It is also 
possible that investors view labor-oriented lawsuits as a prelude to other anti-corporate 
activities that may negatively affect firm financial performance such as protests, boycotts, 
and strikes (King & Soule, 2007). Based on this, we propose the following: 
 
H5 – ATS lawsuits premised on labor violations will generate a larger negative stock 
market reaction than those premised on non-labor issues. 
 
6. Number of Defendants – Theory suggests that certain stakeholder actions are more 
threatening to firms than others because they signal to investors that the public no longer 
trusts the company (King & Soule, 2007). Such a lack of trust, or loss of legitimacy, may 
undermine the company in its dealings with consumers, employees, suppliers, and 
investors, thereby causing market players to anticipate a future loss in cash flow 
(Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Fombrun, 1996). One possible indicator of threat with 
respect to civil litigation is the number of corporate defendants named in the lawsuit. 
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Although many ATS lawsuits name a single corporate defendant, others target two or 
more firms, and a few -- including those related to Apartheid-era crimes in South Africa -
- involve more than two dozen firms and damage claims in the billions of dollars 
(Fergenson & Merrigan, 2007). And while the resources that can be marshaled by 
multiple corporate defendants are likely greater than those available to a single corporate 
defendant, giving these defendants an edge in a protracted legal dispute, most ATS cases 
to date have been either dismissed or settled prior to a trial, thereby negating some of 
these resource-based advantages. In short term, it is likely that the extensive negative 
media attention these multi-defendant lawsuits tend to generate, and the possibility of a 
costly settlement, will harm investor sentiment toward target companies and depress their 
share price. We therefore propose: 
 
H6 – ATS lawsuits involving multiple corporate defendants will generate a larger 
negative stock market reaction to each defendant than those involving a single corporate 
defendant. 
 
X. Methodology 
  
Data Collection Technique 
 The sample for this study is drawn from a variety of data sources. Information on 
all ATS lawsuits involving MNEs between 1993 and 2010 was gathered using the 
LexisNexis and Westlaw legal databases. We selected 1993 as the start date for our study 
since a landmark ATS lawsuit was filed that year by Ecuadorian plaintiffs with the 
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assistance of NGOs against Texaco for alleged human rights violations and 
environmental crimes committed during its nearly three decades of operations in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon (Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.).34  
 Our legal research was supplemented by searching business news abstracts in 
Bloomberg Law, Lexis-Nexis, and ProQuest for articles about the filing of civil lawsuits 
against corporations published in the major international business press (e.g., The Wall 
Street Journal, The New York Times, and The Financial Times) and wire services (e.g., 
Bloomberg, Dow Jones, Reuters, and the Associated Press). Keywords searches were 
conducted using terms such as “alien tort,” “civil litigation,” “lawsuit,” “human rights,” 
and individual company names, obtaining information on ATS lawsuits involving 141 
multinational corporate defendants. Thus, our initial sample consisted of 141 events. This 
was reduced to 102 events after eliminating privately held corporations, companies not 
listed on a major U.S. stock exchange, and firms with gaps in their market data. 
Following the methodology used in past event studies (e.g., Godfrey et al., 2009; 
Schnietz & Epstein, 2005), we also screened for possible confounding events such as 
announcements of earnings, new products, and mergers and acquisitions occurring 3 
weeks before the time news of the lawsuit became public, eliminating 6 additional cases.  
 Our final sample consists of 92 cases involving 67 MNEs. See Appendix A for a 
list of the cases, defendants, and filing dates. Our sample includes firms cited as 
defendants in large class-action lawsuits involving dozens of multinational companies 
such as the South African Apartheid litigation (Khulamani v. Barclay’s National Bank 
                                                            
34 While the Aguinda ATS case was dismissed by a U.S. court in 1993, related charges were 
brought in Ecuador under Ecuadoran law, and in 2011 an Ecuadorian court found Chevron 
(which acquired Texaco in 2001) liable for $17 billion in damages (Carroll & Gullo, 2011). 
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Ltd.), as well as cases involving a single corporate defendant (e.g., Pfizer v. Adbullahi). 
Our sample also includes several companies that had more than one ATS lawsuit filed 
against them during the time series (e.g., The Coca-Cola Company, Dow Chemical, 
Chiquita, and Occidental Petroleum). The size of the firms in our sample ranges from a 
market cap of $126 million (Cutter & Buck) to $396 billion (Exxon Mobil). The average 
market cap is $60.19 billion. Tables 2 and 3 provide descriptive statistics and correlations 
for all independent variables. 
 
TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
MCap 61 126.08 396160.00 60194.1428 76543.20802
Valid N (listwise) 61     
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TABLE 3: Correlation Matrix 
 
Correlation Matrix 
  26 Day CAR 
with company 
vector  Size Extractive CSR NGO Labor Mulltidefs
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.071 -.151 .099 -.151 -.192 -.098
Sig. (2-tailed)  .503 .151 .348 .152 .067 .354
26 Day CAR 
with company 
vector  
N 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.071 1 .285** .130 -.120 -.445** -.103
Sig. (2-tailed) .503  .006 .217 .255 .000 .330
Size 
N 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.151 .285** 1 -.267* -.144 -.272** -.261*
Sig. (2-tailed) .151 .006  .010 .170 .009 .012
Extractive 
N 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Pearson 
Correlation 
.099 .130 -.267* 1 -.164 .054 .080
Sig. (2-tailed) .348 .217 .010  .119 .608 .449
CSR 
N 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.151 -.120 -.144 -.164 1 .257* .235*NGO 
Sig. (2-tailed) .152 .255 .170 .119  .013 .024
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N 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.192 -.445** -.272** .054 .257* 1 .224*
Sig. (2-tailed) .067 .000 .009 .608 .013  .032
Labor 
N 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.098 -.103 -.261* .080 .235* .224* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .354 .330 .012 .449 .024 .032  
Mulltidefs 
N 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
  Although all of the cases in our data set involve allegations of grave 
human rights abuses or environmental misconduct, most of the cases cluster around one 
of the following issues: 1) violations of international labor standards, including forced 
labor, child labor, human trafficking, sweatshop labor, and systematic employment 
discrimination; 2) environmental crimes, including pollution of groundwater and the 
disruption of ecosystems; 3) harms committed by state security forces, including murder, 
torture, rape, genocide, kidnapping, and unlawful detention; 4) harms committed by 
paramilitary groups including intimidation, torture, and murder; and 5) support for the 
Apartheid regime in South Africa. Figure 5 shows the distribution of cases in our data set 
according to issue. 35 
                                                            
35  It should be noted that many lawsuits do not fit neatly into only one of our categories. An ATS 
lawsuit filed in 2000 against British mining firm Rio Tinto for its activities on Bougainville 
Island in Papua New Guinea is a case in point. The suit claims that the company requested and 
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Figure 5: ATS Lawsuits by Issue 
 
 
 To account for the potential confounding of non-independence of measurement, a 
company vector was generated, as suggested by Kerlinger and Pedhazur (1973), McNeil, 
Newman, and Kelley (1996). This variable will allow one to determine the effect of the 
independent variable of interest (lawsuit) that is independent of company differences due 
to multiple lawsuits filed against individual companies. We did not include legal appeals 
as events in our data set, as our focus is the market’s reaction to the onset of new 
litigation.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
obtained government support to suppress a local uprising against environmental damage caused 
by the firm’s copper mining operations, as well as its racially discriminatory hiring practices 
(Kaeb, 2008), and as such, this case is included in three of our categories: “Security forces,” 
“Environment,” and “Labor practices.”  
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 While concern could be expressed about what may at first appear to be the small 
sample size, it is notable that our total sample size is larger than those used by previous 
studies of similar issues. For example, in their study of the relationship between boycotts 
and boycott threats and target firm share price, Koku et al., (1997) used a sample size of 
54. Event studies of boycotts by Pruitt and Friedman (1986) and Pruitt, Wei, and White 
(1988), meanwhile, examined 21 and 16 events, respectively.  
 
Statistical Analysis 
 We test our hypotheses using an event study methodology and ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression (Fraas & Newman, 2003; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  Event 
studies use the past performance of a firm’s stock to calculate the extent to which its 
performance on and around an event deviates from expected performance, and then test 
whether this deviation is statistically significant (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
Developed by finance and accounting scholars (Brown & Warner, 1985), the event-study 
methodology is based on the efficient market hypothesis, which posits that markets are 
efficient in reflecting new information and therefore a firm’s stock price will quickly 
adjust to the new information, reflecting all available information about the firm’s current 
and future profit potential (Muth, 1961; Fama 1970). If any new information resulting 
from the unexpected event is believed to affect a firm’s current or future earnings, the 
security price changes as soon as the market learns of the event. Thus, stock prices are 
viewed as reliable indicators of a firm’s value (Agrawal & Kamakura, 1995).  
 In addition to the assumption of efficient markets, the event-study methodology 
assumes that the events under study are unanticipated, and that no confounding events 
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occur during the event window that could affect share price (McWilliams & Siegel, 
1997). While the event-study methodology has its detractors, even critics such as 
Schleifer (2000) acknowledge that the basic assumptions underpinning the methodology 
are valid, that when executed properly it produces robust results, and that these studies 
have significantly enhanced our understanding of stock market reaction to external 
events.  
 In recent years management and IB researchers have used event studies to 
examine the the stock market’s reaction to a variety of unanticipated events -- from 
product recall announcements (Davidson & Worrell, 1992) and plant closings (Clinebell 
& Clinebell, 1994) to congressional votes on international trade-related legislation (Oxley 
& Schnietz, 2001). Event studies involve four basic steps: 1) Defining the event and 
announcement period; 2) Measuring the stock’s return during the announcement period; 
3) Estimating the expected return of the stock during the announcement period in the 
absence of the announcement (i.e., normal returns); and 4) Computing the abnormal 
return and testing its statistical significance (Bhagat & Romano, 2007). Most event 
studies follow up this initial analysis by performing regression analysis to determine 
whether certain variables of interest are related to the change in stock price (Godfrey et 
al., 2009).  
 There are several different models used to derive normal returns, but the market 
model is the one most commonly used in management research (MacKinlay, 1997). This 
model is based on the argument that the expected return on an asset in the market is 
linearly related to the contemporaneous return on the market portfolio, such that: 
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Rit = αi + βiRmkt + eit  (equation 1) 
 
 In this equation, Rit captures the expected return for the ith firm’s share price on 
that day controlling for market-based fluctuations. Rmkt is the return for the overall 
market portfolio at time t, as defined by the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) equally-weighted stock market index; αi and βi are firm specific and time-
independent parameters; eit is the error term for stock i at time t. Following King & Soule 
(2007) and Zajac & Westphal (2004), we regress stock market returns for the firms in our 
sample against returns on a broad market portfolio for a period beginning 239 trading 
days before the event and ending 21 days before the event. We then use the parameters 
from equation 1 to forecast expected returns for a period of 20 days prior to the event (t-
20) to 5 days after the event (t+5).36 We include 5 days following the announcement to 
ensure that any change in stock price is not temporary or the result of supply and demand 
adjustments following the announcement (Doh et al., 2010). We then calculate abnormal 
returns ARit, by subtracting the actual returns, obtained from CRSP, from the forecasted 
returns, as shown in equation 2. 
 
ARit = Rit – (αi + βiRmkt)  (equation 2) 
 
                                                            
36 It is important that there is no overlap between the estimation period and the event window so 
as to prevent the “normal” returns (i.e., those that could have been expected had the event not 
taken place) from being influenced by the event itself and thereby distorting the abnormal return 
(MacKinlay, 1997). Our estimation period does not overlap with the event or the 
preannouncement period, as it ends 21 trading days before the event, and a day before the 
beginning of the preannouncement period. 
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 In the above equation, ARit  is the abnormal return t of security i, Rit and Rmkt 
are the returns on t of security i and the market portfolio, respectively. The parameters αi 
and βi are estimated by an OLS regression. Each firm’s abnormal returns are then 
standardized and cumulated over the event interval to derive the cumulative abnormal 
return (CARi), providing a measure of how much the market value of a firm changed as a 
result of the event. Cumulative abnormal returns of all firms in the sample are then 
summed, and the sum is divided by the number of firms to derive the mean CAR, which 
is then standardized and tested for significance (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
 Most event studies begin calculating the event window prior to the day of the 
event because of the tendency for investors to receive news about the impending event 
from private, non-news sources and social networks and act upon this news (Schleifer, 
2000; Zajac & Westphal, 2004). This is particularly germane in the case of lawsuits since 
plaintiffs often use the media as a vehicle to communicate with potential parties and leak 
information to influence public opinion and gain leverage in legal proceedings (Koku, 
2006). As such, we calculate CAR based on a 26-day window, which is consistent with 
other research examining the shareholder wealth implications of stakeholder actions 
including boycotts (Pruitt & Friedman, 1986; Koku, Akhigbe, & Springer, 1997) and 
protests (Epstein & Schnietz, 2002; King & Soule, 2007). However, to enhance the 
probability that our findings were not merely a function of the length of the event 
window, we calculated CAR for three additional windows: 21 days (day -15 to +5), 11 
days (-5, +5), and two days (day -1 to 0). The smaller windows provide a more 
conservative test (King & Soule, 2007), but may not capture the full market reaction to 
the lawsuit announcement. Because we were interested in only investors’ initial reactions 
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to the filing, we used a short window (+5 days) following the announcement to minimize 
the possibility that confounding events, including the company’s actions in response to 
the lawsuit, were captured in our event window (King & Soule, 2007). 
 
Dependent Variable 
 Our dependent variable in this study is mean CAR, which is a standard measure 
of abnormal stock price return in event studies (Brown & Warner, 1985; Zajac & 
Westphal, 2004). CAR represents the idiosyncratic change in shareholder value, as 
represented by stock price, surrounding the announcement of the lawsuit. Stated 
differently, CAR is the sum of the daily differences between the firm’s actual and 
expected return. If the market believes the lawsuit undermines the firm’s future financial 
prospects, then CAR should be negative and significant; if investors determine that the 
legal action poses no real financial threat to the firm, CAR should not be significantly 
different from zero. 
 We derived CAR by gathering daily market returns from CRSP through the 
Eventus software program available through the Wharton Research Data Service. 
Following standard event study methodology, we selected the date of the first public 
announcement of the litigation in the major business press as the event date (Day t=0). In 
many cases, the first news item appeared on the day of the filing. In others it appeared on 
the next trading day, or several days later. But in some cases information about an 
impending lawsuit was published prior to the actual filing. In these cases, the date of the 
pre-filing news item was used as the event date. 
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Independent Variables 
 In addition to assessing the effect of ATS lawsuit announcements on target firm 
stock price to test hypothesis 1, we examine whether certain characteristics of the 
defendant, the plaintiff, and the legal case itself moderate the market’s reaction to these 
lawsuits, to test hypotheses 2-6. We thus performed a regression with a set of predictor 
variables, using the 26-day CAR as the dependent variable. 
 According to hypothesis 2, firms involved in mineral extraction and production 
should experience larger negative returns upon announcement of an ATS lawsuit than 
firms in other sectors because of the close ties these corporations often have to 
authoritarian governments and militaries, their generally poor public image, and the 
possibility that litigation may force these firms to settle or curtail otherwise profitable 
activities. To assess this hypothesis, we create a dichotomous industry variable based on 
whether the firm’s primary business activities involve mineral extraction or production 
(via the provision of construction services) using the two-digit standard industrial 
classification (SIC). The SIC classificatory scheme is commonly used in the management 
and strategy literatures (Russo & Fouts, 1997; Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002; Epstein & 
Schnietz, 2005). Firms involved in extraction or construction are coded with a 1, and 
include those in the metal mining (10), coal mining (12), oil and gas extraction (13), non-
metallic minerals, except fuels (14), general building contractors (15), heavy 
construction, except building (16), and special trade contractors (17) categories; firms not 
involved in these activities are coded with a 0. 
 To test hypothesis 3, which predicts that firms with a reputation for social 
responsibility will experience smaller negative returns upon the announcement of ATS 
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lawsuits than firms without such reputations, we include a dichotomous variable based on 
whether the firm was listed on the Calvert Social Index (CSI) in the year prior to that in 
which the lawsuit was filed (CSI-listed firms are coded 1; non-listed firms 0). The CSI is 
one of the most widely recognized indices of socially and environmentally responsible 
corporations. Its membership includes companies that meet rigorous standards for 
sustainable and socially responsible practices and are selected from the universe of 
approximately the 1,000 largest U.S. companies, based on total market capitalization, 
included in the Dow Jones Total Market Index. The Index is reconstituted once a year. As 
of May 2011, 666 firms comprised the index. While not a reputation rating per se, the 
CSI provides inputs for stakeholder groups in their formulation of a firm’s reputation for 
social responsibility, and thus represent a good proxy for reputation – and one that has 
been used by other management researchers (e.g., Doh et al., 2010).   
 To test hypothesis 4, that lawsuits filed by NGO plaintiffs or with NGO 
representation will trigger a larger negative stock price reaction in target firms than those 
filed by private law firms, we include a dichotomous variable based on whether the 
plaintiff’s legal counsel includes an NGO. Those cases involving NGO participation are 
coded 1; those filed by private firms without any NGO involvement are coded 0. 
 To test hypothesis 5, that lawsuits involving allegations of labor violations will 
result in a larger negative stock market reaction than those involving other issues, we 
include a dichotomous variable based on whether the principal legal claim centers on 
violations of internationally recognized labor standards, such as the use of forced labor, 
child labor, and anti-union activities. Cases involving labor claims are coded 1; all others 
are coded 0. 
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 To test hypothesis 6, that lawsuits involving multiple corporate defendants will 
result in a larger negative stock market reaction than those involving a single corporate 
defendant, we include a dichotomous variable based on the number of defendant firms 
named in the litigation. Those cases involving a single corporate defendant are coded 0; 
those with multiple corporate defendants are coded 1. 
 
Control Variables 
 Because large firms differ from small and medium-sized firms in fundamental 
ways, including visibility (Rindova et al., 2006), access to resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978), political influence (Hillman & Hitt, 1999), and exposure to risk (Godfrey, 2005), 
firm size is often used as a control variable in empirical studies in the strategy and IB 
literatures (e.g., Hillman & Keim, 2001; Rehbein, 2004; Strike et al., 2006). Following 
this literature, we control for firm size using the firm’s market capitalization (market 
cap), which is a measurement of business value based on share price and number of 
shares outstanding. A firm’s market cap represents the market's view of its stock value 
and is a determining factor in stock valuation. Since market cap can vary significantly 
from year to year, we generated a dichotomous variable based on whether the firm’s 
average market cap was greater or less than $10 billion over a 5-year period beginning in 
May 2006, and ending in May 2011. Firms with an average market cap of less than $10 
billion are coded 0; those with an average market cap exceeding $10 billion are coded 1. 
The final regression model is as follows: 
 
ARit = α0 + β1 SZ + β2 EXT + β3 CSR + β4 NGO + β5 LAB + β6 ND +e 
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 Where ARit  is the abnormal return for firm i over the 26-day event window (-20, 
+5), SZ is the control variable for the size of the defendant firm, as measured by its 
market capitalization, EXT is the dummy for whether the target company is in the 
extractive industry, CSR is the dummy for whether the target company has a reputation 
for social responsibility, NGO is the dummy variable for whether the plaintiff in the 
lawsuit is represented by an NGO, LAB is the dummy variable for whether the lawsuit 
involves allegations of international labor violations, and ND is the dummy variable for 
whether the lawsuit names more than one corporate defendant.  
 
XI. Results  
 To test hypothesis 1, that the announcement of ATS lawsuits lead to a negative 
stock market reaction, we assessed the statistical significance of the CAR for four event 
windows: 2-days (-1, 0), 11-days (-5, +5), 21-days (-15, +5), and 26-days (-20, +5). Table 
4 shows the test statistics for CAR for these windows, using the Market Model, Equally 
Weighted Index.37 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
37 Since our sample includes many large-cap firms, we also ran our analysis using a Value-
Weighted Index (Market Model). These results were not substantially different, although the 
CAR in the 11-day window was no longer significant, and the size of the negative CAR in the 21 
and 26 day windows was smaller (-1.13%) and (-0.52%), respectively. 
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TABLE 4: Test Statistics for Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Event 
Window 
Days N Mean 
CAR 
CAAR Patell Z p-value 
26-day (-20, +5) 92 -4.76% -4.88% -4.669 <.0001** 
21-day (-15, +5) 92 -4.39% -4.50% -4.792 <.0001** 
11-day (-5, +5) 92 -1.52% -1.59% -2.344 <.001** 
2-day (-1, 0) 92 -0.61% -0.35% -1.203 <.1144 
 
 
 Columns 1 and 2 show the different event windows and the specific days before 
and after the event included in these windows, respectively. The third column shows the 
number of cases. Column four provides the mean CAR, which is expressed as a 
percentage and represents the average cumulative percentage change in a stock price 
below that which was expected. Column 5 shows the cumulative average abnormal return 
(CAAR), which is an alternative way of signifying the average change and can be 
interpreted as the cumulative percentage change in the daily means of the firms’ 
abnormal returns (King & Soule, 2007). Column 6 contains Patell’s Z, a standard 
measure of statistical significance in event studies, and column 7 shows the p-value. 
 Our results show that in the 2-day window, the stock market’s reaction is 
negative, as expected, but not significant. The mean CAR is -0.61%, with a Patell’s Z 
value of -1.203. These results are consistent with those reported by Koku (2006), who 
examined class-action lawsuits filed by private parties against corporations and did not 
find a significant market reaction on the announcement date, and Koku et al. (2001), who 
analyzed lawsuits filed against corporate defendants by individuals and failed to find 
significance during a 2-day window surrounding the announcement.  
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 Koku (2006) did, however, report significance when using a wider event window, 
as do we. Consistent with our expectations, the mean CAR is negative in all three of our 
longer windows and statistically significant. Stock prices of targeted firms declined on 
average by 4.76% during the 26-day window (-20, +5), representing a loss in shareholder 
wealth of roughly $2.86 billion for the average firm in our sample. Likewise, the share 
price of targeted firms declined on average by 4.39% during the 21-day window (-15, 
+5), and by 1.52% during the 11-day window (-5, +5), representing losses in shareholder 
wealth of roughly $2.6 billion and $912 million, respectively, for the average firm in our 
sample.  
 To appreciate the magnitude of this effect, it is instructive to compare our results 
to those found by researchers analyzing other stakeholder actions. For instance, in their 
study of the relationship of protests to stock price returns, King and Soule (2007) found 
that targeted firms suffered a -1.03% return during the 26-day window. This suggests that 
the market views civil litigation in general, and ATS lawsuits in particular, as a much 
more serious economic threat to firms than protests – a fact that may help explain why 
firms targeted by lawsuits are more likely to offer concessions than those targeted with 
other stakeholder tactics (e.g., Eesley & Lenox, 2006).  
Regression Analysis of CAR 
 To determine whether a relationship exists between our independent variables and 
abnormal returns and the magnitude of any such relationship, we performed an OLS 
regression using the 26-day CAR as our dependent variable, following the method used 
by King and Soule (2007). Regression results are shown in Table 5. 
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TABLE 5: Regression Coefficients 
 
Regression Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -4.027 1.874  -2.149 .0341 
Size -1.559 2.320 -.071 -.672 .503
(Constant) 3.098 3.168  .978 .331
Size -3.763 2.625 -.171 -1.434 .155
*Extractive -4.450 2.646 -.195 -1.682 .096**
*NGO -2.167 2.534 -.094 -.855 .395
*CSR 2.013 2.945 .076 .684 .496
*Labor -6.257 2.657 -.281 -2.355 .021**
2 
*Mulltidefs -1.854 2.314 -.087 -.801 .425
a. Dependent Variable: 26 Day CAR with company vector  
b. * = sign in predicted direction 
c. ** = statistically significant at p<.05 based upon the appropriate directional test of significance 
 
  
 As we can see, the coefficient for “Labor” is negative and significant (p<.05), 
suggesting that ATS lawsuits involving allegations of labor rights abuses are viewed by 
investors as particularly serious threats to the corporate defendant’s economic prospects. 
This finding is consistent with past empirical research showing that protests targeting 
labor issues generated lower than expected stock price returns than those targeting other 
issues (King & Soule, 2007). The coefficient for “Extractive” is also negative and 
significant (p<.05), suggesting that investors also view ATS litigation involving large 
mining and construction firms as a considerable economic threat. This finding is 
consistent with past research showing that firms in industries with reputations for 
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environmentally-damaging operations, including mining, energy, and chemicals, 
experienced proportionately greater market declines in the aftermath of the 1999 WTO 
protests in Seattle than firms with reputations for responsible environmental practices 
(Epstein & Schnietz, 2002). None of the other predictor variables are significant, 
although all of the signs are in the expected direction. 
 
XII. Discussion  
 Our findings suggest that the announcement of civil lawsuits against MNEs for 
alleged complicity in human rights abuses and other misconduct overseas has a 
substantial negative relationship to the target firm’s share price. Moreover, we find cases 
alleging violations of internationally recognized labor standards are associated with a 
significant loss of shareholder wealth, as are cases targeting extractive companies. These 
findings have important implications for multinational firms with existing operations in 
developing countries, as well as those considering such investments. For firms with 
existing investments, it suggests that they can no longer turn a blind eye to serious human 
rights abuses committed by government security forces, paramilitary groups, or private 
security forces, since they may be held liable for abetting these abuses in a U.S. federal 
court and have to pay a steep financial price.  
 But it is not only the conduct of foreign governments and security forces that need 
to be more closely monitored; MNEs increasingly must answer for the activities of joint 
venture and consortium partners as well as other businesses in their supply chains and 
certify that the final products sold under their brand names were produced in a humane 
and ethical way. This is a considerable challenge given the growing complexity of supply 
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chains in many industries, which may include overseas suppliers, agents, contractors, and 
other third parties. As Dovey (2009) observes, a key question for corporate managers is 
to determine how far down the supply chain their responsibility goes, and then take steps 
to enhance due diligence. In some cases this may involve terminating relationships with 
contractors, as Levi Strauss did in Saipan after discovering that the contractor imposed 
forced labor on some of its Chinese workers and failed to honor minimum wage 
legislation (Schoen et al., 2005). In others it may involve coming up with creative 
solutions to preserve valuable sourcing relationships, as Levi’s did in Bangladesh after it 
found out that its local contractor employed workers under the age of 14 in its factories, 
in violation of company guidelines, but permissible under local law. In this case the 
company chose to pay the workers while they attended school and then give them full-
time jobs upon turning 14 (Schoen et al., 2005). 
 Similarly, our research suggests that the “enclave model” of political risk 
management (Kapstein, 2006) favored over the years by extractive companies and other 
firms doing business in conflict zones may no longer be viable. After all, this model, 
which is premised on minimizing contact with local communities and other stakeholder 
groups through heavy investments in perimeter security and close operational 
relationships with local militaries, may invite unwanted attention from activist and anti-
government groups. These groups may specifically target the MNE to make a political 
statement or provoke it into a disproportionate response, which can then serve as the 
basis for a lawsuit.  
 A much better approach, in many cases, may be the “engagement model” 
(Kapstein, 2006), which involves looking for ways to embed the firm within the host 
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society, typically by forging close relationships with community groups and investing in 
schools, clinics, roads, water wells, and other infrastructure. Such an approach may 
enhance the firm’s legitimacy and help it maintain its “social license” to operate 
(Gunningham, Kagan, & Thornton, 2004). Firms adopting an engagement strategy – 
especially in the context of violent conflict -- may also gain a sustainable, long term-term 
competitive advantage (Oetzel, Getz, & Ladek, 2007). As former Talisman Energy CEO 
Jim Buckee recently remarked: “If you are seen as a welcome presence on the ground, 
then you are in a much better position than if you are hated” (Campbell, 2011). 
 Our research also suggests that firms with existing operations in high-risk 
developing countries ought to look for ways to reduce their vulnerability to ATS lawsuits. 
Possibilities run the gamut from adopting human rights policies, voluntary codes of 
conduct, joining multilateral stakeholder engagement initiatives such as the UN Global 
Compact (Janney, Dess, & Forlani, 2009), and entering into multi-stakeholder 
partnerships with NGOs, academics, and other civil society groups (Dahan et al., 2010). 
A particularly innovative partnership initiative was launched in 2007 following an ATS 
lawsuit against Yahoo! Inc. for providing private user information to the Chinese 
government, which then used it to arrest a political dissident. Formed by technology 
industry leaders including Yahoo!, Google, and Microsoft, and NGOs, academics, and 
investors, the Global Network Initiative provides guidance to firms on how to protect 
freedom of expression and the right to privacy in the face of demands from authoritarian 
governments (Dovey, 2009).  
 Other noteworthy multi-stakeholder partnership programs include the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative, which brings together governments, firms, NGOs, and 
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other stakeholder groups to address the issue of transparency in company payments to 
foreign governments for natural resource projects, and the Voluntary Principles on 
Human Rights and Security, a set of principles developed by extractive firms, 
governments, and NGOs to provide guidance on how to balance the need for the security 
and safety of employees and contractors with human rights obligations (Dovey, 2009). As 
management research on multi-stakeholder partnerships suggests, participation in these 
alliances can help enhance firm legitimacy and reduce risks while serving as a source of 
creativity and innovation that lead to new business opportunities (Hart & Sharma, 2004; 
Yaziji, 2004).  
 For firms that are contemplating major investments in developing countries, 
particularly those with weak institutions, social and ethnic cleavages, or a history of 
human rights abuses, our research suggests that they should think twice. Some potentially 
profitable opportunities may be so fraught with social, legal, and reputational risk that 
they do not merit the investment. If a decision is made to proceed, firms should begin by 
conducting detailed risk assessments that go beyond the conventional analyses of 
political threats, including the possibility of nationalization by host governments or of 
kidnapping, extortion, and intimidation of personnel by criminal elements. They must 
also examine the potential social and environmental impact their operations may have on 
a broader range of stakeholders, the potential grievances these projects might engender, 
and the possibility that these grievance might resonate with activists and investors both 
domestically and abroad. As Drimmer (2010) observes, in conducting these risk 
assessments, investors should seek input for a wide variety of parties, including 
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community leaders, government officials, and NGOs, and then craft a compliance 
program that addresses these concerns. 
 Knowing that their firms’ share prices are vulnerable to ATS lawsuits and the 
cloud of impropriety that accompany them, managers have an incentive to try to resolve 
these disputes proactively, before they result in litigation. Thus, from a corporate strategy 
standpoint, it would seem to make sense for firms facing the prospect of ATS litigation to 
reach out and initiate a dialogue with external stakeholder groups that could result in an 
out-of-court resolution. Such advice runs counter to that offered by Koku et al. (2001), 
who argued that firms should litigate lawsuits brought by individuals (including ATS 
cases, presumably), while settling those brought by other corporations, owing to the 
greater likelihood of losing in court to another corporation. While we acknowledge that 
defendant firms are likely to prevail in ATS cases that make it to trial (based on the small 
number of cases that have made it that far in the legal process), the victory might be a 
Pyrrhic one, given the hefty legal costs and damaging media attention that accompany 
such lawsuits. To this list of negative consequences we can now add the likelihood of a 
substantial loss of shareholder wealth in the days leading up to, and following, the filing 
of the lawsuit.   
 The idea that firms should settle such cases regardless of their merit raises the 
issue of moral hazard. If NGOs and other stakeholder groups conclude that they can 
easily win large settlements from corporations by initiating legal action, firms may 
quickly become inundated with a wave of new cases. However, this possibility is 
tempered by the reality that NGOs typically have limited resources and that mounting an 
ATS case is a costly endeavor that requires significant time and legal expertise. 
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Moreover, recent court decisions have raised the bar in terms of what type of evidence is 
required from plaintiffs before a case is allowed to proceed beyond the pleading stage 
(Dunst, 2009). Thus, we do not foresee an exponential rise in ATS litigation in the 
coming years – although a steady increase is possible. 
 
Limitations 
 This research enhances our understanding of the relationship between anti-
corporate civil litigation and target firm stock price reaction, thereby filling a gap in the 
empirical literature on stakeholder challenges to multinational firms. However, our study 
has several limitations. First, the constraints of our data and time period limit the scope of 
validity beyond the specific circumstance that is the subject of our analysis. Moreover, 
the construct validity of some of our measures could be questioned. For instance, while 
we believe that inclusion in the Calvert Social Index is a reasonable proxy for 
“Reputation for CSR,” firms interact with society in a variety of different and complex 
ways, and it is possible that particular companies included in the list are viewed 
unfavorably by certain stakeholder groups, while other firms generally viewed as 
exemplary corporate citizens were omitted. 
 
Future Research  
 Future scholars should analyze the extent to which the declines in shareholder 
wealth experienced by firms targeted by ATS lawsuits is a temporary phenomena, or 
more long lasting in nature, and whether subsequent lawsuits against a company have a 
similar effect on shareholder wealth. Research by Koku et al. (2001) suggests that firms 
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that are subject to repeated lawsuits may become “judgment proof,” in the sense that 
investors do not react in the same way to the announcement of new litigation as they did 
in the past, having already factored the probability of future lawsuits into the current 
share price. 
 The filing of the initial lawsuit is by no means the only significant event in the 
litigation life cycle. The market might view subsequent events including judgments on 
motions to dismiss, the filing of appeals, reversals by higher courts of lower court 
decisions, settlements, trials, and verdicts as equally or more significant. Thus, discerning 
whether there is a systematic pattern in the market reaction to news of such events is 
another important task for future research. Additionally, scholars should examine whether 
and how human-rights related litigation filed in U.S. state courts under statutes such as 
the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Practices Act (RICO), as well as in foreign courts, is related to shareholder wealth, given 
the trend of plaintiffs filing transnational tort cases similar in substance to ATS cases 
outside the federal court system.38   
 Finally, future researchers might also examine the extent to which a corporation’s 
stock price is related to the amount of media attention the lawsuit garners, the jurisdiction 
in which it is filed, and whether the lawsuit is part of a larger stakeholder campaign 
involving boycotts, protests, or shareholder resolutions. These questions provide a rich 
                                                            
38 Examples of human rights-related cases filed in state rather than federal courts include those 
brought by banana workers on plantations in Nicaragua and elsewhere against Dole Foods, Dow 
Chemical, Shell Oil, and Occidental Petroleum for exposure to the pesticide DBCP. Occidental 
Petroleum has also been sued in a California state court by Peruvian plaintiffs for allegedly 
contaminating land and rivers in the Amazon region (Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum). An 
example of a human rights case filed in a foreign court is the one against Trafigura, a 
multinational oil-trading company, for allegedly dumping toxic oil off the coast of the Ivory 
Coast (Drimmer, 2010). 
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research agenda for future scholarly inquiry into the relationship between stakeholder-
initiated civil litigation and corporate financial performance. 
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Essay III: Is It Who They Are or What They Do? Understanding the Factors that Predict 
Extractive Firm Vulnerability to Secondary Stakeholder-Initiated Human Rights 
Litigation 
 
  
XIII. Abstract and Introduction 
Organizational researchers have recently examined the efforts of activist groups to 
influence corporate policies and practices through coercive tactics. Yet the issue of why 
certain firms are targeted for anti-corporate campaigns while others escape scrutiny has 
not yet been fully explored. Drawing upon social movement and social identity theories, 
we developed and tested a set of hypotheses on how stakeholder groups select their 
targets for human rights-related civil lawsuits under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute, a law 
that gives U.S. federal courts extraterritorial jurisdiction for cases involving allegations of 
serious offenses committed against foreign citizens. We found support for the idea that 
multinational targets are selected based on both interest and identity factors. Conclusions 
and implications for practice are drawn. 
 
 Organizational researchers have recently taken an interest in the phenomena of 
private politics (Baron, 2003), whereby activist groups seek to change corporate practices 
by directly targeting firms with coercive tactics, rather than exerting influence indirectly 
via appeals to the government (King & Soule, 2007; Reid & Toffel, 2009).39 While anti-
corporate activism has a long history in the United States, dating back at least to the 
Boston Tea Party (King, 2009), it appears to have taken on new vigor in recent decades, 
                                                            
39 Appeals to the government typically include lobbying legislators and regulators and seeking 
judicial interpretations that institutionalize new and more favorable norms (Reid & Toffel, 2009).  
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spurred by the growth of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Yaziji & Doh, 2009; 
Doh & Teegen, 2003). Defined as social, cultural, legal, and environmental advocacy 
and/or operational groups that have goals that are primarily non-commercial (Kourula & 
Laasonen, 2009), NGOs have established themselves as important agents of political and 
social change, championing issues ranging from animal welfare to climate change (Lyon, 
2010). NGOs have raised awareness of ethical issues in global supply chains, 
spearheaded monitoring efforts of overseas factories, and promoted private certification 
schemes that encourage firms to adopt sustainable business practices (Conroy, 2007; 
O’Rourke, 2005). With more than 30,000 NGOs operating internationally, one-tenth of 
these drawing membership from three or more countries (Vogel, 2008), NGOs have 
considerable global reach. NGOs have grown in stature and influence in recent years and 
are now seen by some as having supplanted the role of host governments in the historic 
business-government bargaining relationship (Yaziji & Doh, 2009).  
 Related to the growth of NGOs has been the spread of social movements, which 
have been defined as “collectivities acting with some degree of organization and 
continuity outside of institutional channels for the purpose of seeking or resisting change 
in some extant system of authority (Soule, 2009).” Together, NGOs and social 
movements, which often share similar characteristics and overlapping membership 
(Davis & Zald, 2005), have helped to fill a “governance gap” caused by the decline in 
power of national governments and organized labor, coupled with the growing clout of 
“footloose” multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Soule, 2009; King & Pearce, 2010).  
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 Using a variety of coercive tactics, from boycotts to shareholder (proxy) 
resolutions,40 NGOs and social movements pressure companies to meet their demands. 
Some of these tactics, such as civil lawsuits, impose a direct financial obligation on the 
target firm in the form of legal and public relations expenses (Lenox & Eesley, 2009). 
Others, like boycotts and protests, may affect consumption patterns and corporate share 
price – particularly if they generate extensive media coverage (King & Soule, 2007; 
King, 2008; Martin & Kracher, 2008). All may inflict serious reputational harm, making 
it more difficult for the firm to attract and retain employees, suppliers, and investors, 
while diverting managerial attention away from more pressing strategic and operational 
concerns (Vogel, 2005; Yaziji & Doh, 2009).41 
 Management and organization researchers seeking to understand the interplay 
between activist groups and corporations have recently employed stakeholder theory 
(Freeman, 1984) as a theoretical lens (Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008). Stakeholder 
theory accords NGOs and social movements the status of “secondary stakeholders,” 
which, unlike primary stakeholders (e.g., shareholders, employees, suppliers, and 
creditors), are not vital to organizational survival (Clarkson, 1995). As such, these groups 
should attract little managerial attention (Mitchell et al., 1997).  
 Yet we know that mangers not only pay attention to these secondary stakeholders, 
they sometimes meet their demands. For instance, PepsiCo, Disney, Levi Strauss, and 
Apple Computer, among others, bowed to pressure from the student-based Free Burma 
                                                            
40 Proxy resolutions are often initiated by activists who specifically buy enough shares to initiate a 
vote on these resolutions at annual shareholder meetings (Soule, 2009). 
  
41 In addition to using coercive tactics to inflict harm upon firms, NGOs and social movements 
seek to create new markets for sustainable products and services, including “sweat-free” garments 
and fair trade coffee (O’Rourke, 2005).  
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Coalition in the 1990s and divested from Burma (Myanmar) (Spar & LaMure, 2003); 
Nike capitulated to the United Students Against Sweatshops and affiliated pressure 
groups and demanded that foreign suppliers improve working conditions within their 
factories (Soule, 2009); Starkist conceded to the Earth Island Institute’s (EII) demands 
that it implement dolphin-safe fishing practices throughout its foreign supply chain 
(Frooman, 1999); and grocery chain Trader Joe’s agreed under pressure from Greenpeace 
to remove genetically modified products from its shelves (Frooman & Murrell, 2005). 
Meanwhile, in the early 1990s, a coalition of environmental groups that included 
Greenpeace and the Rainforest Action Network succeeded in getting the forest products 
industry to establish the Forest Stewardship Council, a private regulatory body that put 
forth stringent industry-wide deforestation standards (Bartley, 2007). 
 While there is growing recognition amongst organization researchers that 
secondary stakeholder groups can and do exert meaningful influence vis-à-vis firms and 
markets (de Bakker & den Hond, 2008; King & Pearce, 2010), the question of why 
particular firms become targets of activist pressure while others fly below the radar has 
only received limited attention in the management literature (Whetten, Rands, & 
Godfrey, 2002).  
 Rowley and Moldoveneau (2003) propose that anti-corporate activist groups are 
driven by two distinct sets of factors: interest-based motivations and identity-based 
motivations. The former pertain to issues these groups hold to be important, including 
conservation, social justice, and non-discrimination in the workplace. Identity-based 
factors, by contrast, relate to the organizational imperative to foster solidarity and 
collective identity. If stakeholder groups are driven primarily by interest-based 
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motivations, they might be expected to target companies in industries that generate 
negative externalities such as air and water pollution, as well as specific firms perceived 
to be particularly negligent on social, environmental, and workplace issues. Conversely, 
if driven primarily by identity-based motivations, these groups might be expected to 
target companies for reasons unrelated to their industry or social performance. Indeed, 
such groups might choose to target highly visible and socially progressive firms to 
generate publicity and mobilize support from members and donors (Rowley & 
Moldoveneau, 2003).  
 A recent review of the empirical literature suggests that “both repeated wrong-
doers and larger and more visible firms are at a greater risk of stakeholder scrutiny,” thus 
lending support for both interest-based and identity-based explanations (de Bakker & den 
Hond, 2008). Whether this holds true for stakeholder-initiated civil lawsuits, however, 
remains an unanswered question. Legal challenges differ from other stakeholder tactics in 
important ways. They are typically more expensive to mount than proxy resolutions, 
boycotts, or protests, more difficult to organize and execute, and require specialized legal 
knowledge that few NGOs possess (Holzmeyer, 2009).  Moreover, litigation-based 
campaigns require broader and denser support networks than do other types of 
stakeholder campaigns, particularly those involving allegations of overseas crimes, since 
attorneys must often rely on intermediaries to gain access to local communities to gather 
evidence (Davis, 2008; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). Finally, since successful legal 
campaigns require significant resource commitments over extended periods of time, 
plaintiffs hoping to prevail must consider the resources their prospective target might be 
able to marshal to defeat the challenge – a strategic calculation that stakeholder groups 
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employing alternative tactics like boycotts or protests may not need to make (Holzmeyer, 
2009). 
 Thus, from the standpoint of the NGOs considering potential corporate targets for 
their legal campaigns, do interest or identity factors take precedence? Or, stated 
differently, are targeting decisions based on who they are or what they do? We study this 
question by examining lawsuits filed by NGOs in recent years against natural resources 
firms under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a controversial 1789 law that allows foreign 
citizens to sue private individuals and corporations in U.S. federal courts for specific 
international human rights violations.42 Since a landmark 1996 case against Unocal for 
alleged complicity in human rights violations committed by the Burmese military in 
furtherance of a $1.2 billion natural gas pipeline project,43 the ATS has been used to sue 
some of the world’s largest MNEs, including Citigroup, Dow Chemical, General Motors, 
Exxon Mobil, Chiquita, Bridgestone, Coca-Cola, IBM, and Wal-Mart (Gallagher, 2010). 
These charges range from aiding repressive governments in their efforts to crack down on 
political dissidents (Yahoo, Cisco Systems) to conducting non-consensual clinical trials 
on children (Pfizer) (Drimmer, 2010). 
 Although firms from a wide variety of industries, including chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, financial services, and agriculture, and food and beverages, have been 
                                                            
42 The ATS, which is part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, allows individual plaintiffs to sue for 
violations of the “law of nations.” While legal scholars dispute which specific crimes constitute 
violations of this law, there is general agreement that the list includes extrajudicial killing, rape, 
genocide, slavery, and torture (Drimmer, 2010). 
 
43 The Unocal case was filed in 1996 by NGOs Earth Rights International and the Center for 
Constitutional Rights on behalf of Burmese villagers who claim they were beaten, raped, tortured, 
and conscripted into labor by the Burmese military as part of the Yadana natural gas pipeline 
project jointly owned by Unocal, Total of France, and the Burmese government (Davis, 2008).  
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sued under ATS, those involved in natural resource extraction have been the most 
frequent targets (Drimmer, 2010). This may be because extractive firms typically have 
limited choices about where they can invest -- they must go where the resources are. 
Since these resources are often buried beneath the soil in countries run by authoritarian 
regimes or torn by internal conflict, MNEs involved in natural resource extraction may be 
particularly vulnerable to claims of complicity in human rights abuses (Kaeb, 2008).  
 But even amongst extractive firms, not all players appear equally exposed to ATS 
litigation. Of the U.S.’s three largest privately-owned oil and gas companies 
(supermajors), two – Exxon Mobil and Chevron – have been targeted with ATS lawsuits, 
and both have been sued multiple times. Yet the other supermajor, ConocoPhillips, which 
also operates in countries prone to instability and violence, has escaped ATS litigation. 
What explains this anomaly? Likewise, what explains the fact that Occidental Petroleum, 
a company with assets of $52 billion, has been sued four times under ATS, while 
Marathon Oil, a company of equivalent size (in assets) and with operations in some of the 
same countries has been given a pass? 
 Given that legal analysts expect a steady drumbeat of ATS cases against MNEs 
and their senior executives for years to come (Drimmer, 2010),  it is important for 
managers to understand the factors that may make their firms vulnerable to this type of 
activist pressure. Such knowledge may allow them to craft effective risk mitigation 
strategies that safeguard corporate reputations and preserve shareholder wealth. 
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XIV. Theory and Literature Review 
 In recent years a growing, multidisciplinary body of scholarly research has 
emerged that examines the ways in which activist groups interact with firms and markets 
(Kourula & Laasonen, 2009; Doh & Teegen, 2003; Rao, 2009). Much of this literature 
uses stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) as a conceptual lens. A stakeholder is “any 
group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s 
objectives (Freeman, 1984: 46).” In contrast to the shareholder perspective, which views 
profit maximization as the sole objective of the corporation (Friedman, 1962), 
stakeholder theory views the economic goals of the corporation to be less important than 
organizational survival, which can be enhanced by cultivating strong relationships with a 
wide array of groups with a stake in the corporation, including employees, customers, 
suppliers, creditors, and communities, as well as shareholders (Soule, 2009). 
 Stakeholder theory accords NGOs and social movements the status of secondary 
stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995). Unlike the primary stakeholders of the company (e.g., 
shareholders, workers, suppliers, and creditors), secondary stakeholders have no 
contractual bond to the firms they seek to influence, little resource leverage, and are not 
necessary for survival (Clarkson, 1995; Eesley & Lenox, 2006). As such, theory suggests 
they should attract little attention from managers and have limited sway over corporate 
policy (de Bakker & den Hond, 2008). Mitchell and colleagues (1997) claim that 
managers are most likely to pay attention to the demands of those stakeholders with 
power, legitimacy, and urgency.44 Empirical research supports the notion that managers 
                                                            
44 According to Mitchell and colleagues (1997), a stakeholder has power to the extent that it “has 
or can gain access to coercive, utilitarian, or normative means to impose its will in the 
relationship.” Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
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tend to resist influence efforts by secondary stakeholders, while being more receptive to 
overtures from primary stakeholders (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; David et al., 
2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006). 
 But, as previously mentioned, it is clear that secondary stakeholder groups do 
sometimes influence corporate policies and practices – in ways both subtle and profound. 
How, then, do secondary stakeholder groups select the corporate targets they wish to 
influence? As de Bakker and den Hond (2008) observe, few management researchers 
have analyzed this question. Nor have social movement scholars, who have traditionally 
focused their attention on influence efforts aimed at states, given this question due 
attention (Soule, 2009). As Bartley and Child (2007) point out, the constitution of 
corporate targets for social movement pressure is a topic “ripe for sociological analysis.” 
 Perhaps the most compelling explanation of stakeholder mobilization and 
targeting has been put forth by Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003). Building upon social 
movement and social identity theories (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999; Fireman & Gamson, 
1979), the authors argue that both interests and identities influence activist groups in their 
decisions to take action against firms. The case for interest-based motivations is anchored 
in rational choice theory (Olson, 1965). It suggests that activist groups act to advance or 
protect their particular interests – especially when they perceive these interests to be 
under threat (Savage, Nix, Whitehead, & Blair, 1991). Thus, an environmental NGO 
(ENGO) might be expected to target a firm that is a notorious polluter, whereas a labor 
rights advocacy NGO might confront a firm renowned for using sweatshop labor.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
beliefs, and definitions.” And urgency “exists only when two conditions are met: 1) when a 
relationship or claim is of a time-sensitive nature and 2) when that relationship or claim is 
important or critical to the stakeholder.” 
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 Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) accept this logic, but contend that stakeholder 
groups also take actions to strengthen their internal solidarity and collective identity, 
irrespective of whether these actions advance their organization’s strategic goals. Thus, a 
stakeholder group might undertake an action with little realistic chance of success (e.g., a 
boycott) against a firm that is widely admired (e.g., Starbucks), simply because the action 
affirms the group’s social identity. A stakeholder group might also initiate action against 
a target firm primarily to differentiate itself from other stakeholder groups that share 
similar goals, thereby satisfying its desire to establish a unique identity (Rowley & 
Moldoveanu, 2003). In short, from an identity-based perspective, collective action is an 
end in itself, rather than a means to achieve more rational interests (Larana, Johnston, & 
Gusfield, 1994). 
 Several researchers have attempted to subject these ideas to an empirical test. 
Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves (2004), for instance, used the Rowley & Moldoveanu’s 
(2003) theory as the framework for their study of the targeting decisions of religious, 
environmental, and pro-labor activist groups filing proxy resolutions at shareholder 
meetings. They found that these shareholder activists tend to target companies with 
problematic products and poor environmental and community-related practices, thus 
providing support for interest-based explanations. But they also found that activists target 
large and highly visible firms, providing support for identity-based explanations.  
 Similarly, Bartley and Child (2007) found that identity-based characteristics such 
as firm image, reputation, and size influence the targeting decisions of anti-sweatshop 
activists, as do interest-based factors, including the extent to which a firm has globalized 
its production through contractual agreements with foreign garment producers. Lenox 
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and Eesley (2009) reached similar conclusions in their study of ENGO campaigns against 
corporate targets. They found the likelihood of being targeted with lawsuits, protests, 
boycotts, letter-writing campaigns, and proxy votes to be related to both “issue factors” 
(i.e., environmental performance) and “identity factors” (i.e., size and visibility).  
 Taking a different methodological approach, Hendry (2006), who conducted 
interviews with leaders of ENGOs such as Greenpeace and Environmental Defense, 
found that activists weighed factors such as the firm’s environmental impact, as well as 
its size and potential influence on others in its organizational field, when making 
targeting decisions. In short, the available evidence, empirical and anecdotal, suggests 
that both interest and identity factors influence the targeting decisions of NGOs. 
 Although it has yet to be examined, there is reason to believe that both interest 
and identity-based motivations are also salient to NGOs that file ATS litigation. After all, 
the small cadre of NGOs that initiate these lawsuits (by serving as legal counsel to 
foreign plaintiffs) are publicly committed to pursuing social justice and advancing 
international human rights norms. Targeting firms that condone or facilitate crimes like 
murder, torture, and forced labor, would thus appear to serve their organizational 
interests.  
 Moreover, by “naming and shaming” firms that allegedly violate human and 
workers’ rights and despoil the environment, these NGOs may feel they are sending a 
signal to other firms within the target firm’s industry, as well as the broader 
organizational field, that they should think carefully about their social and environmental 
footprint (Fielding, 2008).45  
                                                            
45 A litigator with the NGO Earth Rights International recently suggested as much: “I think that 
(the) Unocal (case) and these other cases have caught enough attention that any corporate counsel 
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 Similarly, NGOs that initiate ATS litigation might calculate that their actions 
could cause government regulators to increase their scrutiny of the target firm, thereby 
prompting directors concerned about the firm’s reputation to pressure managers to 
improve their social and environmental practices (Williams & Conley, 2007). Finally, 
NGOs that initiate ATS cases might believe that even if their efforts do not bear 
immediate fruit, they are tilling the soil for future social change, thereby serving as 
“transnational norm entrepreneurs” (Koh, 1998). 
 Also consistent with interest-based explanations is the idea that NGOs might be 
motivated to file ATS lawsuits to solidify relationships with like-minded stakeholder 
groups and gain access to new resource streams (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). After 
all, preparing an ATS case is an expensive and time-consuming process that requires 
extensive research and evidence-gathering, both at home and abroad (Davis, 2008). By 
leveraging relationships with other advocacy groups, as well as public interest attorneys, 
and corporate attorneys offering pro-bono services, NGOs may be able to increase the 
number of cases they take on, while enhancing their odds of success in court (Davis, 
2008; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999).  
 And while it is not clear that “relationship building” has been the explicit 
objective of any past ATS filings, it certainly has been an important outcome. The 
landmark Doe vs. Unocal litigation is a case in point. Filed by the Center for 
Constitutional Rights (CCR) and Earth Rights International (ERI), the case helped 
galvanize the international human rights community and establish a tight network of 
NGOs and public interest attorneys with expertise in human rights litigation (Davis, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
worth his salary… is going to say wait a second you need to think about this. If this happens 
you’re going to get sued” (Davis, 2008). 
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2008). The Unocal case also enabled NGOs to tap new sources of finance: ERI was 
founded with seed money from the Echoing Green foundation based on the promise of 
the case (Holzmeyer, 2009). Meanwhile, the funds the plaintiffs received from the 
settlement – estimated at between $30 and $60 million (Kropf, 2010) -- provided 
substantial resources to pursue future litigation. 
 But interest-based explanations for NGO-initiated legal action do not appear to 
tell the whole story. After all, as previously mentioned, the costs of preparing these 
lawsuits in terms of time, energy, and resources are substantial, while odds of prevailing 
in court are exceedingly small. Indeed, of the more than 100 corporate ATS cases that 
have been filed to date, most have been dismissed by federal courts on jurisdictional 
grounds,46 a few have been settled,47 and the two that have made it to trial have resulted 
in verdicts for the defendants (Drimmer, 2010).48 The prospects for success in ATS 
litigation, in the form of a trial victory or settlement, are in fact so dim that the act of 
filing such lawsuits -- like that of filing proxy resolutions -- may be akin to pursuing a 
                                                            
46 Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the courts may dismiss cases if a more appropriate 
alternative forum exists. 
 
47 The list of corporate ATS cases that have been settled in recent years includes the so-called 
“Nazi gold” lawsuits of the late 1990s, which secured $1.25 billion in compensation from Swiss 
banks for victims of the Holocaust and the case against Unocal in Burma (reportedly between $30 
and $60 million). Other major settlements include those involving U.S. apparel and retail 
companies for allegations related to sweatshop labor in Saipan ($20 million), Royal Dutch Shell 
for alleged human rights violations in the Niger Delta ($15.5 million), and Yahoo! Inc. for 
divulging private information on political dissidents to the Chinese government (undisclosed 
amount) (Goldhaber, 2010). 
 
48 One of these cases (Bowoto v. Chevron) alleged that Chevron was complicit in the Nigerian 
military’s violent crackdown against unarmed protesters at one of the company’s offshore oil 
platforms. The other case (Romero v. Drummond Co.) was based on accusations that the 
Drummond Company conspired with Colombian paramilitary organizations to murder union 
leaders at one of its coal mines (Kropf, 2010). 
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“lost cause” (Rao, 2001).49 Given the high costs associated with filing ATS cases and 
their low success rates, NGOs interested in changing corporate practices in the 
developing world would seem to be better served by engaging in other types of 
advocacy.50 
 If interest-based motivations do not fully explain why NGOs choose to target 
firms with ATS litigation, it may be because other motivations are at play, namely the 
desire to affirm and solidify the group’s identity (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). There 
are numerous ways in which the act of filing civil litigation against a corporation could 
satisfy an NGO’s identity needs, even if the litigation is ultimately unsuccessful. For 
instance, it might mobilize support from members and grass-roots activists that like the 
idea of confronting powerful corporate interests in a public forum (McCann, 1994). 
Targeting large, prominent, profitable, and well-reputed corporations with allegations of 
grave misconduct might also be expected to draw publicity, thereby energizing supporters 
and renewing their emotional investment in the NGO (Melucci, 1995).  
 Filing ATS cases against corporations might also enable NGOs to distinguish 
themselves from other organizations pursuing similar agendas, thereby enhancing their 
appeal to donors. After all, there is a plethora of advocacy groups committed to 
progressive causes, and the competition for donations is intense (Weisbrod, 1998). Just as 
firms find it important to distinguish themselves from their rivals when appealing to 
                                                            
49 Rao (2001) contends that individuals, acting as “gadflies,” submit proxy resolutions and attend 
shareholder meetings to protest firm practices, despite the fact that few other shareholders share 
their concerns, and with the knowledge that their activities will most likely have little or no 
impact on firm behavior. 
 
50 As Holzmeyer (2009) observes, two prominent schools of legal thought, Legal Realism and 
Critical Legal Studies (CLS), regard litigation as having little potential to promote meaningful 
social reform and that activists in most cases would be better served by adopting non-legal 
strategies. 
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customers and investors, so too must NGOs (Lowery & Brasher, 2004). Evidence that 
competitive differentiation takes place amongst NGOs involved in human rights litigation 
abounds. For instance, the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF), a Washington, D.C.-
based human and labor rights advocacy group that has filed ATS cases against numerous 
MNEs including Coca-Cola, Wal-Mart, Drummond Co., and Chiquita, boasts in a recent 
annual report that it is the sole human rights and labor NGO to have utilized both ATS 
litigation and more conventional tactics, such as boycotts, as part of its advocacy efforts 
(Holzmeyer, 2009). 
 In sum, there are reasons to expect that both interest and identity factors may 
influence the targeting decisions of NGOs that file ATS litigation against corporations. 
We next develop and test a series of hypotheses based on these expectations. 
 
XV. Hypotheses 
 In this section we put forth a series of hypotheses about the factors we believe 
may influence the targeting decisions of NGOs filing ATS lawsuits against extractive 
firms. These hypotheses consider both interest-based and identity-based factors. 
 
Interest-based Factors 
 
1. Social Performance – Jones (1991) suggested that observers seeking to understand 
what motivates individuals to take action ought to consider the “moral intensity” of the 
issue at hand. A key element of moral intensity is the “magnitude of the consequences” 
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associated with the focal issue.51 Issues that are perceived to threaten individual interests 
in a clear, direct, and profound way are more likely to stimulate action than those which 
pose a less obvious, immediate, or serious threat. While Jones developed his theory to 
explain individual action, Rowley and Berman (2000) have argued that the logic is also 
applicable to stakeholder groups. As such, we might presume that NGOs seeking to 
promote their interests and agendas would deploy their limited resources in an effort to 
change the behavior of the firms they perceive to most acutely threaten these interests -- 
namely those generating the largest negative social and environmental impacts (i.e., the 
worst social performers).  
 In addition to pressuring these poor performers to change their ways, activists 
might calculate that suing the most egregious offenders could send a powerful signal to 
other firms with questionable labor and environmental practices or those considering 
investments in countries where human rights abuses are pervasive (Davis, 2008). 
Anecdotal evidence supports the idea that activist groups base their adversarial targeting 
decisions at least in part on the firm’s past conduct. For instance, Hendry (2006) found 
that nearly three-fourths of ENGO leaders she interviewed cited the magnitude of the 
                                                            
51 Other components of moral intensity include social consensus, probability of effect, temporal 
immediacy, proximity, and concentration of effect (Jones, 1991). 
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consequences associated with a firm’s behavior toward the natural environment (e.g., 
impacts on biodiversity, climate change, and human health) as critical factors in their 
targeting decisions. We therefore propose: 
 
H1 – Firms with relatively poor social performance are more likely to be targeted with 
ATS lawsuits than firms with relatively good social performance. 
Identity-based Factors 
 
2. Firm size – There are legitimate reasons why stakeholder groups would choose to 
target large firms with ATS lawsuits. After all, these firms are often market leaders in 
their industries and have high social prominence (Miles, 1987; Salancik, 1979; Suchman, 
1995). Such firms may also have well-known brands. While such brands are often viewed 
as an asset for the firm, conveying information to consumers about the firm’s corporate 
values and the quality and authenticity of its products and services (O’Rourke, 2005), 
they represent a liability from the perspective of the activist group that can be exploited 
through coercive tactics designed to damage these intangible assets (Conroy, 2007). 
Indeed, as Klein (1999) observes: “the more ambitious a company has been in branding 
the cultural landscape… the more likely it is to have generated a silent battalion of critics 
waiting to pounce.”  
 Targeting large, prominent firms may also help mobilize support from members 
and other organizations within the NGO’s network (Rowley & Berman, 2000). Amnesty 
International’s recent campaign against Shell for its allegedly damaging business 
activities in the Niger Delta is a case in point. The NGO admits that it selected Shell as 
114 
 
the target for the campaign – its largest ever against a single company – because it has a 
very well-known brand that is useful in mobilizing activists (Williamson, 2009). And 
targeting large, prominent firms may also assist NGO fundraising efforts, since donors 
tend to respond favorably to high-profile campaigns that attract media attention 
(Weisbrod, 1998). 
 In addition to the identity-enhancing benefits that may accrue to organizations 
from targeting large firms, such actions may also bring benefits to individuals within 
these organizations. Organization leaders, in particular, may experience enhanced 
recognition and respect as a result of high-profile campaigns against market leaders 
(David et al., 2007; Lenox & Eesley, 2009). And while the probability of prevailing in a 
legal dispute against a large firm may be slim, the potential payoff, including sweeping 
changes to company and industry practices that impact an entire organizational field, may 
merit the investment (Hendry, 2006). And in the case of an ATS lawsuit, the payoff 
might be a lucrative financial settlement or a favorable jury verdict accompanied by 
millions of dollars in damages, providing NGOs with the resources to fund future cases. 
Based on this, we propose the following: 
 
H2 – The larger the firm, the more likely it is to be targeted with an ATS lawsuit. 
 
3. Reputation - In recent years management researchers have devoted increasing attention 
to the topic of corporate reputation, exploring its antecedents and outcomes (Lange, Lee, 
& Dai, 2011; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005). Broadly defined as a 
perceptual representation of the firm’s overall appeal to key stakeholders compared with 
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leading rivals based on past actions (Roberts & Dowling, 2002), corporate reputation is 
widely seen as having considerable economic value (Fombrun, 2001). Indeed, Lev (2001) 
estimates that “intangible factors,” which include a firm’s reputation, comprise up to five-
sixths of the market capitalization of the S&P 500 firms. In addition to being able to 
charge a premium for their products and services, highly-reputed firms may have an 
advantage over rivals in the competition talented workers, reliable suppliers, and low-cost 
investment capital (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Fombrun, 1996; Turban & Greening, 
1997). A good reputation may also confer insurance-like benefits in the event of a crisis, 
cushioning the firm from potentially negative outcomes (Jones, Jones, & Little, 2000; 
Schnietz & Epstein, 2005; Godfrey, Merill, & Hansen, 2009). In short, a good reputation 
in marketplace is a powerful intangible asset that may represent a source of competitive 
advantage for its owner (Hall, 1992; Roberts & Dowling, 2002). 
 But research suggests that a firm’s reputation may also be a source of 
vulnerability -- especially if it is perceived that the company has failed to live up to social 
expectations (King & Pearce, 2010). Indeed, highlighting hypocrisies so as to “hoist the 
firm on its own petard” has become a key stratagem of anti-corporate campaigns (Bartley 
& Child, 2007; Manheim, 2001; O’Rourke, 2005). Given the great lengths to which firms 
go to build their reputations through philanthropy and other corporate citizenship 
initiatives (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006), NGOs may calculate that managers concerned 
with safeguarding their firm’s reputational assets might be willing to make concessions in 
the face of activist pressure that could jeopardize the value of these assets – a phenomena 
that Spar and LaMure (2003) refer to as “preemptive capitulation.” Such concessions 
might include changes to policies identified as objectionable by activists or the settlement 
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of lawsuits on generous terms. Stakeholder groups might also believe that targeting 
highly reputed firms would send a message to firms further down the status hierarchy 
(Bartley & Child, 2007), while generating enhanced commitment from members and 
donors. Based on this logic we propose: 
 
H3 – Firms with good reputations are more likely to be targeted with ATS lawsuits than 
firms with poor reputations. 
 
4. Financial Performance - There are reasons to expect that activist groups considering 
potential corporate targets for ATS litigation might choose firms that have recently 
experienced weak financial performance. After all, theory suggests that the managers of 
financially troubled firms may be more sensitized to the concerns of external 
stakeholders, and more willing to accommodate them, fearing that further “bad news” 
could trigger even steeper declines in sales or market share, the loss of legitimacy, or 
enhanced external monitoring (King, 2008). But an alternative logic suggests that firms 
with weak financial performance may be unattractive targets for activist pressure. Such 
firms, after all, typically have less slack than firms with good financial performance 
(Cyert & March, 1963), and thus fewer resources to make concessions. Indeed, 
financially distressed firms might be focused primarily on survival, and thus primarily 
attuned to the needs of primary stakeholders. Conversely, managers of firms with good 
financial performance may view concessions to secondary stakeholders in the form of 
changes to operating practices, the adoption of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives, or payments to settle lawsuits as a type of insurance policy that could generate 
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goodwill (Godfrey, 2005). Such concessions might also be viewed as a way to help 
bolster trust and legitimacy and buffer the firm from possible future activist attacks 
(Baron 2001; Baron & Diermeier, 2007). Based on this latter logic, we propose: 
 
H4 – The better a firm’s financial performance, the more likely it is to be targeted with 
ATS lawsuits. 
 
XVI. Methodology  
 
Data Collection Technique 
 The sample for this study is drawn from multiple data sources. Information on all 
ATS lawsuits filed against MNEs involved in natural resource extraction and production 
between 1996 and 2010 was gathered using the LexisNexis and Westlaw legal databases. 
We selected 1996 as the start date for our study since the first major human rights-related 
corporate ATS lawsuit (Doe v. Unocal) was filed that year. Our legal research was 
supplemented by searching business news abstracts in Bloomberg Law, Lexis-Nexis, and 
ProQuest for articles about the filing of human rights-related civil lawsuits against 
extractive corporations published in the major international business press (e.g., The Wall 
Street Journal, The New York Times, and The Financial Times) and wire services (e.g., 
Bloomberg, Dow Jones, Reuters, and the Associated Press). Keywords searches were 
conducted using terms such as “alien tort,” “civil litigation,” “lawsuit,” “human rights,” 
and individual company names, obtaining information on ATS lawsuits involving 32 
multinational corporate defendants. This was reduced to 14 cases after eliminating 
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foreign-headquartered companies, privately owned firms, and firms that were sued by 
private law firms without NGO involvement. See Appendix B for a list of corporate 
defendants in ATS litigation and a brief synopsis of the cases. 
 Our final sample includes a variety of extractive firms, including those that 
explore for and process petroleum, natural gas, coal, and precious metals, as well as 
several that provide infrastructure and services for these endeavors. Represented in our 
sample are defendants in large class-action lawsuits with dozens of MNEs such as the 
South African Apartheid litigation (Khulamani v. Barclay’s National Bank Ltd.), which 
seeks damages from multinational companies and banks that did business with Pretoria 
between 1948 and 1994, and cases with a single corporate defendant, such as Bowoto v. 
Chevron Corp., involving charges of complicity in a violent crackdown by the Nigerian 
military against unarmed protesters at an offshore oil platform. Our sample also includes 
several firms that had more than one ATS lawsuit filed against them during the time 
series, including Exxon Mobil (2), Chevron (2), and Occidental Petroleum (4).  
 In order to assess the likelihood of that a specific firm might be sued under ATS, 
we created a second (matching) database of privately-owned U.S. extractive firms that 
have not been sued under this statute. This control sample was culled from the 2010 
Forbes Global list of the world’s 2,000 largest publicly owned corporations by 
performing searches using the industry filters “Oil and Gas Operations,” “Diversified 
Metals and Mining,” “Aluminum,” and “Construction Services.” These searches yielded 
40 U.S. firms. We narrowed the list to 36 firms by eliminating companies that did not 
have five consecutive years of financial or KLD data (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 
2006). We then examined the two digit Standard Industrial Codes (SIC) codes of the 
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firms on the two lists to assure that they were similar and proportional in composition. 
The SIC codes of the sample firms are as follows: 10 – Metal mining; 12 – Coal mining; 
13 – Oil and gas extraction; 16 – Heavy construction, except building; and 49 – Electric, 
gas, and sanitary services. See Appendix B for the list of firms in our comparison sample. 
 Our combined sample (sued and not sued firms) consists of 50 companies, with 
2010 market capitalizations ranging from $3.5 billion (Tesoro) to $407 billion (Exxon 
Mobil). The average market cap is roughly $35 billion. In terms of assets, the sample 
firms range from $1.7 billion (Walter Energy) to approximately $302.5 billion (Exxon 
Mobil), with an average of $32.7 billion. In terms of revenue generation, they range from 
about $520 million in annual sales (EXCO Resources) to $342 billion (Exxon Mobil), 
with mean sales of approximately $29 billion. Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for 
the firms in our combined sample.  
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Firms in Combined Sample 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Sales2010 43 .52 341.60 28.6861 62.89131 
Profits2010 43 -1.10 30.50 2.3717 5.52759 
Assets2010 43 1.70 302.50 32.7028 55.08475 
Market Cap 43 3.50 407.20 34.8558 67.33764 
Valid N (listwise) 43     
 
Dependent Variable 
 Our variable of interest in this study is whether the firm was a defendant in an 
ATS lawsuit filed by an NGO plaintiff or with NGO legal representation between 1996 
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and 2010. A “1” indicates that the firm was sued at least once during the 15-year time 
series; a “0” indicates that the firm was not sued. 
 
Independent Variables 
 We examine whether certain characteristics of the corporate defendant are 
associated with a higher probability of being sued to test hypotheses 1-4. According to 
hypothesis 1 (Social performance), firms with poor social performance should experience 
a higher probability of being sued. To assess this hypothesis, we use data from Kinder, 
Lydenburg, Domini’s (KLD) Socrates database, accessed through Wharton Research 
Data Services (WRDS). The KLD index is the most commonly used measure of 
corporate social performance (Hillman & Keim, 2001). It has been extensively used in 
empirical research in the fields of strategy (Waddock & Graves, 1997; Godfrey et al., 
2009), international business (Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006), and business and society 
(Rehbein et al., 2004).  
 Derived from a variety of sources including annual surveys, annual reports, proxy 
statements, quarterly reports, and articles in the business press, the KLD index assesses 
the corporate social performance of some 650 publicly listed U.S.-based firms along a 
series of dimensions ranging from community relations to the treatment of women and 
minorities. Each of the 12 KLD categories contains a number of items which are assigned 
a “1” or a “0” depending on whether the firm meets certain criteria. Seven of these 
categories are qualitative in the sense that they consist of both strengths and concerns, 
whereas the other five are exclusionary, in that they are comprised of concerns only. 
Following past research (e.g., Strike et al., 2006; Godfrey et al., 2009) we use the seven 
121 
 
qualitative categories (community involvement, corporate governance, employee 
relations, environmental stewardship, diversity, human rights, and product quality) to 
create a composite social responsibility variable for each firm. We do this by adding the 
strengths and subtracting the weaknesses for each category of each year, and then 
averaging these firm-year scores across the entire time series (Rehbein et al., 2004). 
 According to hypothesis 2 (firm size), firms that are large in size should 
experience a higher probability of being sued because their social prominence makes 
them attractive targets for activists seeking to maximize publicity and mobilize support. 
Although researchers have used various measures as proxies for firm size, including total 
sales (David et al., 2007; Hillman, Shropshire, & Canella, 2007; Hambrick & Canella, 
2004) and number of employees (Rehbein et al., 2004), total assets is the most commonly 
used measure in the strategy and IB literatures (Lenox & Eesley, 2009; Strike et al., 2006; 
Bartley & Child, 2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2005; Oxley & Schnietz, 2001; King, 2008). As 
such, we obtain the total assets of each firm in the sample from Compustat and calculate 
its average over the 15-year time series. 
 According to hypothesis 3 (reputation), firms that have reputations for being 
admired are more likely to be targeted with ATS lawsuits than those without such 
reputations. To assess this hypothesis, we use data from Fortune magazine’s list of 
America’s Most Admired Companies.  Published every year since 1983, the Fortune list 
reports the results of a survey conducted the previous year of some 10,000 business 
executives and market analysts. These executives are asked to rate the top firms in their 
own industries based on eight criteria: innovation, financial soundness, employee talent, 
use of corporate assets, long-term investment value, social responsibility, quality of 
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management, and quality of products and services. Many organization researchers have 
used the Fortune list as an indicator of a company’s overall reputation among 
stakeholders (King, 2008; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Staw & Epstein, 2000; Brown & 
Perry, 1994; Roberts & Dowling, 2002). Indeed, it is the most commonly used measure 
of corporate reputation in current strategy and organization research (Sabate & Puente, 
2003; Basdeo et al., 2006). Since there is only minor variation in the list’s composition 
from year to year, we follow past research and create a dichotomous reputation variable, 
coding the firm “1” if it appeared on the list in any year of the time series, and “0” 
otherwise (Bartley & Child, 2007). 
 To test hypothesis 4, that firms with better financial performance should 
experience a higher probability of being sued, we calculate the firm’s return on assets 
(ROA). A commonly used measure of profitability, ROA involves dividing the firm’s 
annual net income by its total assets (Waddock & Graves, 1997; Bartley & Child, 2007; 
Roberts & Dowling, 2002). Our measure is the natural logarithm of the mean ROA for 
each firm in the sample over the 15 year time series. Log transformation was performed 
to assist with interpretation (Contractor, Kundu, & Hsu, 2003). 
 
Statistical Analysis 
 We examine the relationship between firm characteristics and the probability of 
being sued under ATS by estimating a binary logistic regression model (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). Logistic regression, which predicts the probability of an outcome (e.g., 
membership in a group) based on a set of predictor variables, is the appropriate statistical 
technique for this study since our research question deals with the issue of prediction and 
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our dependent variable is categorical in nature (sued/not sued) (Mertler & Vannatta, 
2005). As Fraas and Newman (2003) observe, the procedure used to calculate the 
coefficients in logistic regression compares the probability of an event occurring with the 
probability of its not occurring for each subject in the sample. This ratio of the two 
probability values is referred to as the odds value. 
 While other techniques such as OLS and discriminant analysis could have been 
employed, logistic regression has several advantages (Newman, Brown, & Fraas, 2004). 
First, it requires no assumptions about the distributions of the explanatory variables be 
made by the researcher – they may be normally distributed, linearly related, or have equal 
variances within each group (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Second, the probability values 
generated by a logistics regression are bounded by the values of zero and one – unlike the 
values estimated by an OLS regression model (Fraas & Newman, 2003). As such, logistic 
regression is a particularly versatile statistical technique well suited to this research. 
 
XVII. Results  
 Table 7 provides a correlation matrix for our dependent and independent 
variables. As can be seen, all of the independent variables are correlated with our variable 
of interest. 
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Table 7: Correlation Matrix 
 
Correlations 
 Lawsuit KLD Assets_log Admired ROA_x_100 
Pearson Correlation 1 .588** .405** .327* .457**
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .004 .020 .001
Lawsuit 
N 50 50 50 50 50
Pearson Correlation .588** 1 .339* .262 .319*
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  .016 .066 .024
KLD 
N 50 50 50 50 50
Pearson Correlation .405** .339* 1 .543** .268
Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .016  .000 .060
Assets_log 
N 50 50 50 50 50
Pearson Correlation .327* .262 .543** 1 .143
Sig. (2-tailed) .020 .066 .000  .323
Admired 
N 50 50 50 50 50
Pearson Correlation .457** .319* .268 .143 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .024 .060 .323  
ROA_x_100 
N 50 50 50 50 50
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 To assure that multicollinearity amongst the predictor variables was not a 
problem, we performed an OLS regression to generate variance inflation factors and 
found that none exceeded 3, a value well below the accepted maximum of 10 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) (See Table 8). 
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Table 8: Tolerance Statistics for Independent Variables 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients Collinearity Statistics 
Model 
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -.677 .421  -1.610 .114   
KLD .086 .024 .430 3.566 .001** .820 1.219
Assets_log .048 .051 .129 .947 .349 .644 1.552
Admired .097 .120 .106 .813 .421 .698 1.433
ROA_x_100 .035 .015 .269 2.298 .026** .868 1.152
a. Dependent Variable: Lawsuit 
** = significant at p<.05 
 
 
 Next, we ran a binary logistic regression to determine whether any of our 
independent variables (social performance; firm size; reputation; and financial 
performance) were predictors of the likelihood of ATS legal action (sued/not sued). Our 
regression results indicate the overall model was statistically significant in distinguishing 
between sued and not sued firms. The -2 Log Likelihood provides an index of model fit. 
A perfect model would have a -2 Log Likelihood of 0; the lower this value, the better the 
models fits the data (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005). The -2 Log Likelihood coefficient for 
our model (29.082) indicates a good fit. The chi-square for our model (29.084) is 
significant (p<.0001), suggesting that the model is significantly better in predicting 
subject membership than the constant-only model (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005). Cox & 
Snell R-square and Nagelkerke R-square coefficients of .454 and .653, respectively, 
indicate that our model accounts for a substantial proportion of the variability in our 
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dependent variable – whether a firm was sued. Table 9 provides several indices of overall 
model fit. 
 
Table 9: Indices of Model Fit 
 
Model Summary 
Step 
-2 Log likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 29.084a .454 .653
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
 
 Table 10 presents the classification table. As can be observed, the model did a 
somewhat better job correctly predicting firms that were not sued (94.4%) than firms that 
were sued (78.6%). Overall, our model correctly classified 90% of the cases. In other 
words, we can infer that our model would correctly predict the likelihood that a new firm 
would be sued under ATS nine times out of ten.  
 
Table 10: Classification Table 
 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Predicted 
 Lawsuit 
 
Observed 
0 1 
Percentage 
Correct 
0 34 2 94.4 Lawsuit 
1 3 11 78.6 
Step 1 
Overall Percentage   90.0 
a. The cut value is .500 
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 The summary of model variables is displayed in Table 11. Our results include 
Wald statistics for each coefficient.52 A logistic coefficient is considered to differ 
significantly from zero when the probability value of the Wald statistic is less than the 
established alpha level (Fraas & Newman, 2003). The Wald logistic coefficients indicate 
that both social performance (as determined by KLD ratings) (.013) and financial 
performance (ROA) (.021) significantly predict the likelihood of being sued (p<.05). 
Both signs are in the right direction as well, indicating that a higher KLD score (i.e., 
greater net number of concerns) and higher return on assets are positively associated with 
the likelihood of being sued. Neither of the other two independent variables is significant 
at conventional levels. The results in Table 11 are consistent with those generated from 
our OLS model (Table 8). In that model, both social performance and financial 
performance account for a significant amount of variance that is unique from that 
accounted for by other variables. 
 
Table 11: Summary of Model Variables 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
KLD .840 .340 6.104 1 .013** 2.317
Assets_log -.276 .564 .239 1 .625 .759
Admired 2.805 1.712 2.686 1 .101 16.531
ROA_x_100 .437 .190 5.312 1 .021** 1.548
Step 1a 
Constant -6.194 4.045 2.345 1 .126 .002
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: KLD, Assets_log, Admired, ROA_x_100 
** = significant at p<.05 
 
                                                            
52 The Wald test is the square ratio of its coefficient to its standard error (Fraas & Newman, 
2003). 
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 Further insights into our results may be gleaned by examining the odds ratios of 
the regression coefficients in Table 10. Odds ratios represent the change in the likelihood 
of a dependent variable arising from a one-unit change in the independent variable. An 
odds ratio of 1.00 indicates no effect. Odds ratios of greater than 1.00 indicate that 
increases in the independent variable increase the likelihood of the dependent variable – 
in this case the likelihood of being sued. Odds ratios of less than 1.00 indicate negative 
associations, or that increases in the independent variable decrease the likelihood of being 
sued (Hillman et al., 2006). 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts that social performance will be negatively associated with 
ATS lawsuit filings. Firms with good social performance are expected to be less 
attractive targets for activists than firms that abuse workers and the environment. The 
evidence in Table 10 supports this interest-based hypothesis. The odds ratio for our social 
performance measure indicates that moving from the sample mean to one unit below the 
mean in social performance more than doubles the likelihood of being sued (odds ratio = 
2.317, p<.05). This finding is consistent with past research by Lenox and Eesley (2009), 
who found that ENGOs tend to target the firms with poor environmental performance 
(i.e., high toxic emissions). 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that firm size will be positively associated with ATS 
lawsuit filings. Larger firms are expected to be more attractive targets for activist groups. 
The evidence in Table 10 does not support this identity-based hypothesis (odds ratio = 
1.00). This result is somewhat surprising given that  past research has demonstrated that 
activist groups tend to target large firms for both boycotts (King, 2008) and shareholder 
resolutions (Rehbein et al., 2004). A possible explanation is that activist groups that file 
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ATS lawsuits have less discretion over whom they can sue than groups initiating other 
types of anti-corporate challenges since there must be a legal basis for their claims, and as 
such, targeting the largest firms, while perhaps desirable, is not always feasible. Another 
possibility is that NGOs initiating ATS lawsuits avoid suing the largest firms owing to 
the possibility that these resource-rich firms will be more formidable opponents and less 
likely to make concessions. A third possibility is that smaller MNEs are more likely to 
commit human rights violations than larger MNEs, which presumably have greater 
resources to devote to human-rights related training and due diligence. 
 Hypothesis 3 predicts that firm reputation will be positively associated with ATS 
lawsuit filings. Better reputed firms are expected to be more attractive targets for activist 
groups. The evidence in Table 10 does not support this identity-based hypothesis (odds 
ratio = 1.00). This result is also somewhat surprising given King’s (2008) finding that 
activist groups tend to boycott firms with strong reputations. Again, it is possible that 
NGOs that file ATS litigation have less discretion in their targeting choices than do firms 
employing alternative tactics and cannot always select firms with good reputations in 
hopes of tarnishing these intangible assets. It is also possible that firms with good 
reputations tend to be better corporate citizens and avoid engaging in the types of 
behaviors abroad that are likely to result in litigation.   
 Hypothesis 4 predicts that firm financial performance will be positively associated 
with ATS lawsuit filings. Firms with better financial performance are expected to be 
more attractive targets for activist groups. The evidence in Table 10 supports this 
identity-based hypothesis. The odds ratio for our financial performance measure indicates 
that moving from the sample mean to one unit above the mean in financial performance 
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increases the likelihood of being sued by roughly 55 percent (odds ratio =1.548, p<.05). 
This finding is consistent with King (2008), who found that activist groups tend to 
boycott firms that have experienced weak financial performance, and Eesley and Lenox 
(2005), who reported that ENGOs tend to select firms that are financially sound as targets 
for anti-corporate campaigns involving boycotts, protests, lawsuits, letter-writing 
campaigns, and shareholder resolutions. 
 
XVIII. Discussion 
 This research contributes to the growing body of empirical literature that 
examines the private political strategies of activist groups (Baron, 2003; King, 2008; 
Eesley & Lenox, 2009; Lenox & Eesley, 2005; Bartley & Child, 2007; Rehbein et al., 
2004; Reid & Toffel, 2009). Given the rise in transnational tort-related litigation against 
MNEs in recent years – and the attention these cases have garnered from business 
executives, policymakers, and the press -- we felt it important to assess how NGOs that 
file human rights-related civil litigation select their corporate targets. We chose to study 
ATS lawsuits filed against extractive companies given the size and importance of this 
industry to the global economy – in 2006, the world’s 39 largest publicly listed oil 
companies generated nearly $2.8 trillion in revenue (Rangan & Barton, 2010) -- and the 
fact that roughly one-quarter of all the corporate ATS lawsuits filed to date have been 
against firms engaged in natural resource extraction or production (Drimmer, 2010).  
 Our results suggest that activist groups sometimes choose their corporate targets 
with the aim of changing the practices of social performance laggards (i.e., based on what 
they do). But they also indicate that some ATS lawsuits are targeted at highly profitable 
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firms, irrespective of their social performance (i.e., based on who they are). Although we 
did not directly test our general propositions, it is possible to infer from these results that 
stakeholder groups are motivated by both interest and identity-based rationales in 
choosing corporate targets for ATS lawsuits – a finding that is broadly consistent with 
past empirical research on stakeholder activism (de Bakker & den Hond, 2007; Rehbein 
et al., 2004).  
 Our findings have important implications for theory. Despite more than 25 years 
of research on stakeholder theory since Freeman’s seminal contribution (1984), scholars 
know relatively little about the mechanisms by which external agents influence 
organizational behavior and the contextual factors that moderate their success (de Bakker 
& den Hond, 2008; King & Soule, 2007; LaPlume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008).  By 
identifying the factors that underlie the targeting decisions of NGOs initiating ATS legal 
challenges against MNEs, this research addresses the gap in our knowledge of the 
motives and tactical choices stakeholders make (de Bakker & den Hond, 2008), thereby 
advancing stakeholder theory.  
 This research also has significance for practice. Given the sharp rise in tort-related 
lawsuits against MNEs in recent years, managers need to have a better understanding of 
the likelihood of litigation prior to entering new markets – particularly since the 
anecdotal evidence suggests that financial markets respond unfavorably to the filing of 
ATS lawsuits (Kobrin, 2004; Kurlantzick, 2004). Our finding that stakeholder groups 
select their targets for ATS litigation based in part on their conduct -- confronting firms 
with poor social performance -- would seem to provide a strong justification for firms to 
improve their overseas practices and stakeholder relations. Possible avenues for action 
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might include adopting private certification schemes (Conroy, 2007; Vogel, 2008) and 
embracing cross-sectoral partnerships with NGOs (Dahan et al., 2010). But it is also 
possible that managers may seek to blunt the threat of ATS litigation by undertaking 
political moves to defeat the litigation or making cosmetic changes to policies and 
practices (David, Bloom, & Hillman, 2007; Shamir, 2004). Future research might seek to 
tease out the factors that influence firm response to civil litigation. To this end, Spar and 
LaMure (2003) offer a framework that may serve as a useful starting point. They identify 
three strategies that firms facing activist pressure may adopt: preemption, capitulation, 
and resistance, with the choice of strategy being influenced by transaction costs, brand 
impact, and competitive position. 
 Future research also might examine whether there are significant differences 
amongst activist groups that file corporate ATS litigation and whether these differences 
influence their targeting decisions. For instance, it is possible that some stakeholder 
groups are motivated primarily by an interest in changing the target firm’s behavior, 
while other are driven largely by a desire to attract publicity, generate resources, and 
achieve individual notoriety. A better understanding of the motivations of different 
stakeholder groups could enable corporate managers to craft more effective risk 
mitigation strategies.  
 Another important avenue of inquiry involves examining whether there are 
systematic differences in the types of firms targeted for lawsuits by NGOs and those 
targeted by private class-action laws firms. This is a matter of some urgency given the 
increase in transnational tort litigation filed by class-action attorneys working on 
contingency fees (Fergenson & Merrigan, 2007). 
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 While this research makes an important contribution to our understanding of 
stakeholder legal activism directed against MNEs, it has several limitations. First it 
examines only a single industry and it is not clear that the findings are generalizable 
beyond the extractive sector. Second, it analyzes ATS lawsuits filed against U.S. firms 
only and it is possible that the targeting decisions of NGOs vary with respect to foreign 
firms, which are also liable under ATS. Third, it considers only characteristics of the 
target firm as determinants of stakeholder action and it is possible that characteristics of 
the NGOs (e.g., ideology, power, and legitimacy) could play an important role in 
targeting decisions (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006). Fourth, it is 
possible that firms are targeted not because of interest or identity factors, but because of 
opportunities. For example, large firms are more likely than small firms to have complex, 
operations involving subsidiaries in multiple foreign countries, and it is this complexity 
which may create exposure to lawsuits (Miles 1987). 
 Notwithstanding these caveats and limitations, this research provides evidence-
based insights into the strategic and tactical decision-making of NGOs pursuing human-
rights-related litigation that will hopefully stimulate further research into this important, 
emerging area of business-society relations. 
 
IXX. Conclusion 
 MNEs with operations in the developing world face a growing number and 
variety of non-market risks that threaten their  ability to profit from their investments 
(Chambers et al., 2010; Grosse, 2005; Henisz, Mansfield, & Von Glinow, 2010). Among 
these is the possibility that they will be sued by secondary stakeholder groups in U.S. 
federal courts over allegations of complicity in overseas human rights abuses. Given the 
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huge potential liabilities associated with these cases, they can represent “bet-the-company 
risks” (Brown, 2011). These risks are exacerbated when stakeholder groups employ 
extra-legal tactics to gain leverage in the legal proceedings. This dissertation contends 
that the threat of transnational legal activism represents a new and serious concern to 
global business that merits attention from management, IB, and strategy researchers. By 
examining the antecedents and consequences of such legal activism in both conceptual 
and empirical settings, this work provides a foundation for future scholarship.  
 As this dissertation shows, the filing of ATS lawsuits is associated with a 
significant loss of shareholder wealth in the weeks leading up to the filing – a loss which 
is far greater in magnitude than that associated with other stakeholder tactics such as 
protests (King & Soule, 2007) and boycotts (Zadek, 2001). Whether the markets react 
because of expectations that the legal process will be lengthy and costly and divert 
managerial attention from running the company, or because it may lead to a costly 
settlement, or because it may culminate in a billion-dollar judgment at trial, or simply 
because it may result in serious reputational harm is unclear and warrants future 
investigation.  
 What is clear, however, is that investors view these lawsuits as significant events 
that cloud the target firm’s future economic prospects. This research also suggests that 
activist groups select targets for litigation-based campaigns based on both who they are 
(i.e., highly profitable companies) and what they do, with extractive firms viewed as poor 
social performers facing a higher probability of being sued than those with better social 
performance.  
135 
 
 This research has implications for theory, practice, and policy. From a theoretical 
standpoint, it contributes to the scholarly effort to understand how a range of relatively 
resource-poor, powerless, and marginalized  stakeholder groups (Gardberg & Newburry, 
2010) are using “voice” (Hirschman, 1970) to challenge corporate policies and practices, 
promote institutional change, and press for new and binding global norms governing the 
conduct of international business (Vogel, 2010). These groups include NGOs (Doh & 
Teegen, 2003; Yaziji & Doh), social movements (King & Soule, 2007; King, 2008; 
Soule, 2009), and transnational advocacy networks (Riesse et al., 1999). It also addresses 
the gap in our knowledge of the motives and tactical choices of stakeholder groups that 
target corporations and the consequences of these actions (de Bakker & den Hond, 2008), 
thereby advancing stakeholder theory.  
 This research also has relevance for practice. Given the sharp rise in human 
rights-related lawsuits against MNEs in recent years, managers need to have a better 
understanding of the likelihood and costs (both direct and indirect) of litigation prior to 
entering new markets – particularly those with endemic human and labor rights 
violations, ethnic and social cleavages, and a recent history of political turmoil. Our 
findings provide strong justification for multinational managers to seek ways to improve 
their overseas business practices and stakeholder relations, so as to make their firms less 
attractive targets. But our research suggests that becoming a model corporate citizen may 
not immunize a firm from being targeted by stakeholder groups with identity-based 
motivations.  
 This research also has important policy implications. The sharp rise in foreign 
direct investment to emerging markets in recent years has been heralded as a promising 
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development in global economic affairs (Khanna & Palepu, 2010). But if MNEs perceive 
the legal risks of doing business in emerging markets to be too great, they may scale back 
their investments or withdraw entirely, with grave consequences for local development 
(Hufbauer, 2009). There is some evidence that such a retrenchment is already occurring. 
Chiquita, which has been sued numerous times under the ATS in recent years owing to 
revelations that the company paid “protection money” to left-wing and right-wing 
terrorist organizations in Colombia, sold off its Colombian assets in 2004 -- reportedly at 
a significant financial loss (Baue, 2007). Canada’s Talisman Energy, another target of 
ATS litigation, divested its $770 million stake in a Sudanese petroleum project in 2002. 
Meanwhile, Exxon Mobil announced in August 2011 that it was selling off its interests in 
three natural gas companies in Aceh, Indonesia – less than a month after a previously 
dismissed ATS lawsuit stemming from alleged human rights violations by Indonesian 
soldiers protecting its Aceh facilities was reinstated by a U.S. federal appeals court 
(Driver, 2001).53 
 U.S. government officials and policy analysts have also warned that the growing 
tide of ATS litigation could strain relations with foreign governments, which object to 
U.S. efforts to impose its legal authority over what they view as purely domestic matters 
(Davis, 2008), and prompt the exit of Western MNEs from countries with weak 
governing institutions, to the detriment of U.S. policy in the struggle against international 
terrorism (Shamir, 2004). A related worry is that the departure of Western firms from 
                                                            
53 The lawsuit, brought by Indonesian villagers who claim that they and their family members 
were beaten, tortured, kidnapped, raped, and murdered by Indonesian soldiers guarding Exxon’s 
natural gas operations, was dismissed in 2009, but overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit in a 2-1 ruling (Kendall, 2011). 
 
137 
 
developing nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America could open the door to state-
owned firms from emerging nations that are less beholden to pressures from civil society 
and less committed to social responsibility (Schrage, 2003). Indeed, when Talisman 
Energy divested from an oil pipeline project in the Sudan in 2003 amidst intense 
stakeholder pressure, India’s state-owned oil company ONGC Videsh Limited purchased 
its assets. The project continues to this day, but without the community development 
projects and transparency initiatives that Talisman claims it had implemented (Manhas, 
2007). 
 But a compelling argument can also be made that corporate liability for overseas 
human rights violations under ATS actually advances U.S. national interests. For one, it 
may promote exemplary corporate conduct in a way that voluntary and non-binding CSR-
related initiatives do not (Vogel, 2010), thereby showing authoritarian host governments 
and their citizens how responsible capitalism and democratic politics can go hand in 
hand. Indeed, as Herz (2008: 228) observes, “the potential for aiding and abetting liability 
ensures that corporation will not only explain democratic values and institutions to 
repressive governments, but will also demonstrate that those values and institutions are 
not merely aspirations but actually govern the conduct of members of a democratic 
society.”  
 Additionally, by pressuring MNEs to avoid or divest from countries where basic 
human rights are not upheld, such litigation may prompt host governments to clean up 
their acts in order to avoid pariah status from international investors. As Kurlantzick 
(2004: 66) observes, MNEs appear to be in a unique position to influence authoritarian 
regimes in places like Myanmar that have resisted the demands of NGOs and foreign 
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governments to reform: “Officials close to the Rangoon junta say that the regime cares 
little about the pressure tactics of the United States, Britain, and other Western 
governments, because they have little impact on the everyday lives of the generals. But, 
the officials say, Yangon’s military leaders do pay attention when companies pull out, 
since a collapsing economy hits their pocketbooks.”   
 Meanwhile, to the extent that the threat of extraterritorial litigation encourages 
MNE managers to be more discerning when choosing foreign business partners, more 
directly involved in formulating policies governing operations, and more vocal in their 
advocacy of human rights within their firms and across their supply chains, it may serve a 
useful purpose (Schrage, 2003). The net result may not only be higher workplace 
standards and safer working conditions in overseas factories, farms, and mines, but more 
productive and committed workers, greater legitimacy, less business risk, and enhanced 
sustainability.  
 While these policy questions are not likely to be settled any time soon, this 
research helps clarify them, while contributing to our understanding of an important new 
phenomena in business-society relations with profound implications for MNEs, their 
stakeholders, and host societies. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A – List of ATS Cases and Dates by Firm 
Corporation 
Date 
Abercrombie & 
Fitch  
3/3/2000
Anglo American 
4/4/2003
Archer Daniels 
Midland          7/15/2005
Barclay's PLC 
11/12/2002
BP 
11/12/2002
Brylane Inc. 
1/13/1999
Caci International, 
Inc.               6/9/2004
Caci International, 
Inc.               7/1/2008
Caterpillar   
3/15/2005
Chevron                    
5/28/1999
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Chevron                    
11/12/2002
Chiquita Brands 
Intl 6/7/2007
Chiquita Brands 
Intl 6/14/2007
Chiquita Brands 
Intl 7/19/2007
Chiquita Brands 
Intl 11/14/2007
Chiquita Brands 
Intl 8/13/2008
Chiquita Brands 
Intl 4/14/2010
Citigroup         
6/17/2002
Citigroup         
11/12/2002
Coca-Cola        
7/20/2001
Coca-Cola        
11/10/2005
Credit Suisse 
6/17/2002
Cutter & Buck, Inc   
1/13/1999
Daimler-Chrysler 
8/19/2002
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Daimler-Chrysler 
11/12/2002
Daimler-Chrysler 
1/14/2004
Dayton Hudson 
Corp     1/13/1999
Deutsche Bank 
11/12/2002
Donna Karen 
International 1/13/1999
Dow Chemical Co    
2/2/2004
Dow Chemical Co   
9/26/2006
Dress Barn       
1/13/1999
Exxon Mobil Corp    
6/21/2001
Exxon Mobil Corp 
8/2/2002
Exxon Mobil Corp 
11/12/2002
Fluor Corp. 
11/12/2002
Fluor Corp. 
4/4/2003
Ford Motor Co. 
11/12/2002
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Freeport-McMoran 
4/29/1996
Gap, Inc 
1/13/1999
General Motors 
11/12/2002
Gold Fields Ltd 
5/2/2003
Gymboree Corp. 
1/13/1999
Honeywell Int'l 
8/2/2002
Hewlett Packard 
Co 9/27/2002
IBM 
2/12/2001
IBM 
6/24/2002
IBM 
11/12/2002
J.C. Penney 
Company, Inc 
1/13/1999
J.P. Morgan Chase 
11/12/2002
Jones Apparel 
Group 
1/13/1999
KBR, Inc 
1/13/1999
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Limited, Inc 
1/13/1999
Liz Claiborne, Inc 
1/13/1999
May Deparment 
Stores Company 6/13/1999
Monsanto 
2/4/2004
Newmont Mining 
Corp. 6/4/2002
Nokia Corp 
8/20/2010
Nordstrom, Inc 
1/13/1999
Occidental 
Petroleum 4/24/2003
Occidental 
Petroleum 2/4/2004
Occidental 
Petroleum 8/11/2006
Oshkosh B'Gosh 
1/13/1999
Pfizer 
8/30/2001
Phillips-Van 
Heusen 6/13/1999
Rio Tinto 
9/6/2000
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Rio Tinto 
11/12/2002
Polo Ralph Lauren 
1/13/1999
Royal Dutch 
Petroleum 11/8/1996
Royal Dutch 
Petroleum 8/2/2002
Royal Dutch 
Petroleum 9/23/2002
Royal Dutch 
Petroleum 11/12/2002
Sasol Ltd 
4/7/2003
Sears Roebuck & 
Co 6/13/1999
Siemens A G  
8/20/2010
Southern Peru 
Copper  12/28/2000
Talbots, Inc 
3/3/2000
Talisman 
11/7/2001
Texaco 
11/4/1993
Titan Corp. 
6/9/2004
162 
 
Tommy Hilfiger 
USA Inc. 1/13/1999
Total Fina ELF SA 
11/12/2002
UBS 
6/17/2002
UBS 
11/12/2002
Union Carbide 
11/15/1999
Unisys 
1/13/1999
Unocal 
10/3/1996
Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc 1/13/1999
Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc 9/13/2005
Warnaco, Inc 
1/13/1999
Xerox 
9/27/2002
Yahoo! 
4/18/2007
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APPENDIX B - List of U.S. Extractive Firms Sued Under ATS, 1996-2010 
 
 
Firm Year Case Country Allegations 
CHEVRON CORP        1999 Bowoto, et al. v. Chevron, 
et al. 
Nigeria Plaintiffs allege that the 
defendants provided 
assistance to and 
participated in military 
raids by the Nigerian 
military against 
demonstrators on a 
Chevron oil rig. 
CHEVRON CORP        2002 Khulumani Group et al. v. 
Barclay Nat'l Bank et al. 
South Africa Plaintiffs allege that the 
defendants, which include 
businesses from a variety 
of sectors, supported 
apartheid-related race 
discrimination and other 
human rights abuses, 
including  murders, 
massacres, imprisonment, 
torture, forced removals, 
and theft of assets. 
EXXON MOBIL 
CORP                           
2001 John Doe I, et al. v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp. 
Indonesia Plaintiffs allege that firm 
was vicariously liable for 
murder, genocide, torture, 
kidnapping, and other 
crimes against humanity 
allegedly committed by 
the Indonesian military in 
Aceh, in northern Sumatra, 
in the course of fighting a 
civil war and protecting 
the firm’s gas production 
facilities. 
EXXON MOBIL 
CORP                           
2002 Khulumani Group et al. v. 
Barclay Nat'l Bank et al. 
South Africa Plaintiffs allege that the 
defendants, which include 
businesses from a variety 
of sectors, supported 
apartheid-related race 
discrimination and other 
human rights abuses, 
including  murders, 
massacres, imprisonment, 
torture, forced removals, 
and theft of assets. 
FLUOR CORP              2002 Khulumani Group et al. v. 
Barclay Nat'l Bank et al. 
South Africa Plaintiffs allege that the 
defendants, which include 
businesses from a variety 
of sectors, supported 
apartheid-related race 
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discrimination and other 
human rights abuses, 
including  murders, 
massacres, imprisonment, 
torture, forced removals, 
and theft of assets. 
FREEPORT-
MCMORAN  
1996 Beanal, et al. v. Freeport-
McMoran, Inc. 
Indonesia Plaintiffs alleged that 
defendant was liable for 
environmental abuses, 
human rights violations 
and genocide, in 
connection with its 
copper, gold and silver 
mining activities in 
Indonesia.  
KBR INC                       2008 Adhikari v. Daoud & 
Partners v. KRR 
Iraq Plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendant engaged in an 
illegal human-trafficking 
scheme involving 12 
Nepali men, ages 18-27, 
who were recruited in 
Nepal to work in luxury 
hotels in Jordan, but were 
instead sent against their 
will to work in a U.S. 
military base in Iraq. The 
Nepalese workers were 
kidnapped and killed en 
route to the base by 
Islamic militants. 
NEWMONT 
MINING CORP            
2002 Maugein v. Newmont 
Mining Corp. et al. 
Peru Plaintiffs sought redress 
for a toxic mercury spill by 
a trucking contractor of 
the firm that injured more 
than 1,000 indigenous 
villagers from the Andean 
countryside. 
OCCIDENTAL 
PETROLEUM CORP    
2003 Mujica v. Occidental 
Petroleum, et al. 
Colombia Plaintiffs alleged that the 
firm provided support to 
the Colombian military in 
return for protecting 
Occidental's pipeline in 
Colombia. Support was 
instrumental in the 
planning and execution of 
a helicopter-borne cluster 
bomb attack that killed 
members of plaintiff’s 
family. 
OCCIDENTAL 
PETROLEUM CORP    
2004 Vietnam Association for 
the Victims of Agent 
Orange/Dioxan v. The Dow 
Vietnam Plaintiffs sought damages 
from U.S. chemical 
manufacturers for the 
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Chemical Company et al. Vietnamese victims of 
Agent Orange, a toxic 
defoliant used by the U.S. 
military during the 
Vietnam War.  
OCCIDENTAL 
PETROLEUM CORP    
2006 Shiguago v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp. 
Ecuador Plaintiffs alleged that the 
firm is complicit in human 
rights violations 
committed by paramilitary 
groups that guard the 
company’s pipeline. 
OCCIDENTAL 
PETROLEUM CORP    
2007 Carijano v Occidental 
Petroleum Corp. 
Peru Plaintifs alleged that the 
firm’s illegal disposal of 
toxic wastEwater in the 
Peruvian Amazon resulted 
in severe contamination of 
the land and rivers in the 
regikn, causing adverse 
health effects including 
lead and cadmium 
poisoning, and damage to 
lIvElihoOds. 
SOUTHERN 
COPPER CORP            
2000 Flores v. Southern Peru 
Copper Corp. 
Peru Plaintiffs, residejts of Peru, 
alleged that pollution from 
the defendant fIrm’s 
miNing, refining, and 
smelting opepatiojs caused 
a variety of serious human 
health problems including 
respiratory diseases. 
UNOCAL CORP           1996 Doe, et al. v. Unocal Corp. Burma Providing support to the 
Burmese military which 
allegedly engaged in 
forced relocation of 
villages, used forced labor, 
and engaged in torture, 
extrajudicial killings, and 
rape in furtherance of a 
natural gas pipeline 
project. 
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APPENDIX C - List of U.S. Extractive Firms Not Sued Under ATS, 1996-2010 (Comparison 
Sample) 
 
Firm SIC Code Description 
ALCOA INC 33 Primary Metal Industries 
ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORP        13 Oil and Gas Extraction 
APACHE CORP                                      13 Oil and Gas Extraction 
BAKER HUGHES INC                            35 Industrial Machinery and Equipment 
CAMERON INTERNATIONAL 
CORP                                
35 Industrial Machinery and Equipment 
CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORP             13 Oil and Gas Extraction 
CIMAREX ENERGY CO                         13 Oil and Gas Extraction 
CONCHO RESOURCES INC                 13 Oil and Gas Extraction 
CONOCOPHILLIPS                                29 Petroleum Refining 
CONSOL ENERGY INC                         12 Coal Mining 
CONTINENTAL RESOURCES INC        13 Oil and Gas Extraction 
DENBURY RESOURCES INC                13 Oil and Gas Extraction 
DEVON ENERGY CORP                        13 Oil and Gas Extraction 
El PASO ENERGY 49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 
EOG RESOURCES INC                          13 Oil and Gas Extraction 
EXCO RESOURCES INC                        13 Oil and Gas Extraction 
FMC TECHNOLOGIES INC                   35 Industrial Machinery and Equipment 
HALLIBURTON CO                               13 Oil and Gas Extraction 
HESS CORP                                           29 Petroleum and Coal Products 
JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP 
INC                              
16 Heavy Construction Except Building  
MARATHON OIL CORP                       29 Petroleum and Coal Products 
MURPHY OIL CORP                             29 Petroleum and Coal Products 
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NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO INC       35 Industrial Machinery and Equipment 
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION CO            13 Oil and Gas Extraction 
NOBLE ENERGY INC                            13 Oil and Gas Extraction 
PEABODY ENERGY CORP                    12 Bituminous Coal/Lignite Surface Mining 
PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES 
CO                              
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 
QEP RESOURCES INC                          13 Oil and Gas Extraction 
SOUTHWESTERN ENERGY CO           49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 
SPECTRA ENERGY CORP                     49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 
SUNOCO INC                                        29 Petroleum and Coal Products 
TESORO CORP                                      29 Petroleum and Coal Products 
ULTRA PETROLEUM CORP                 13 Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas 
VALERO ENERGY CORP                      29 Petroleum and Coal Products 
WALTER ENERGY INC                         12 Coal Mining 
WHITING PETROLEUM CORP            13 Oil and Gas Extraction 
WILLIAMS COS INC                             49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 
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